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General introduction
The population of the developed countries is getting older. In 2050, one third of
European population will be over 60 years old. There are two main factors responsible
for this phenomenon. First, the rates of birth are well below the level necessary for the
replacement of generations. In the OECD countries, fertility rates have gone down
from 2.7 in 1970 to 1.6 in 2000, with a projected rough constancy for 2050. Second,
the life expectancy continues to expand. Between 1950 and 2000, it has increased
from 64 to 77 years and is projected to reach 83.5 in 2050. Moreover, the percentage
of young (15-24) and prime-age persons (25-49) is progressively decreasing, while the
share of older generations continues to rise. The share of population aged 65 and
over is expected even to double by 2050 (see Figure 1) (OECD, 2006).
Figure 1: Ageing populations: Ages 65+ in OECD countries, 2005, 2050 (in %)
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In particular, the ageing population bears important consequences for labour mar-
kets, aﬀecting the quantity and the composition of the labour force. Actually, the
observed increasing life expectancy has not been accompanied by longer working
lives. The changes in age-speciﬁc labour force participation rates generate, on the
one hand, shrinking of the active population and, on the other hand, an increase
in the average age of employees. Over the recent decades, due to prolonged educa-
tion and, hence, later entry into the labour market, we have observed a decrease in
labour force participation of young people. Within the European Union, the number
of workers aged 20-29 is projected to decrease by 20 % while those aged between 50
and 64 will increase by 25 % over the next two decades (The Economist, 16.02.2006 ).
The future economic output will need to be generated by relatively smaller and older
labour force. Furthermore, once the baby-boom generation approaches retirement
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age, increasingly large cohort of workers will be retiring relative to the number of
new labour market entrants available to replace them. Hence, one of the major con-
cerns of public policy became a ﬁnancial sustainability of the current social security
systems regarding pension, health and elderly care.
The problem seems to be further aggravated by the fact that an increasing number
of older workers exit earlier from the labour market. Over the 80s and 90s, in many
European countries, policy makers have argued that early retirement would improve
job prospects for the young unemployed or create promotion possibilities for younger
workers. This may have happened only if older and younger workers were substitutes.
However, this hypothesis has not been conﬁrmed by the empirical studies (Kalwij
et al., 2009). In practice, the earlier exit of seniors from the labour force did not
bring about the expected increase in the employment of the young. Entry and exit
ﬂows did not occur in the same sectors, companies or occupations. Early retirement
schemes have been popular in the industrial sector and in industrial occupations in
big ﬁrms, whereas entries have been much more concentrated in the services sector,
services sector occupations and smaller ﬁrms (Auer and Fortuny, 2000). Moreover,
generous early retirement provisions of the social security system not only encouraged
'voluntary' early retirement but also induced ﬁrms to push more employees into early
retirement (Desmet et al., 2005; Smith, 2006). The share of `involuntary' exits has
been particularly high in the countries with low labour market participation rates of
older persons. Over 50 % of the early retirees in Germany and Portugal, and over 40
% in France, state that their retirement was 'not by choice' (Dorn and Sousa-Poza,
2010).
Overall, the average eﬀective age of retirement is well below the oﬃcial age for
receiving a full-age pension in many European countries. Men on average are still
working at age 65 in Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Switzerland, but have
retired by their 60th birthday in Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Luxembourg
and the Slovak Republic. Women, in general, retire around one to two years earlier
than men (OECD, 2009). In order to avoid an unsustainable increase in retirement
dependency ratio, the policy makers try to discourage early retirement. A call for
prolongation of a working life by raising the eligibility age to collect retirement
pension is now on the political agenda of many countries. However, one of the
consequences of required increase in labour force participation of elderly and a rise
of the retirement age will be the acceleration of the ageing process of the labour
force. In fact, the rapid increase in the older population combined with an increase
in retirement age will result in a large increase in the number of older employees.
These very unusual in the perspective of recent decades demographical changes,
accompanied by the undertaken political measures, will have serious repercussions
at the micro level of the economy, namely on the enterprises who will be obliged to
12
adjust to a serious shift in the composition of their workforce. It is still uncertain how
easily an important increase in the supply of older workers will be accommodated
by the ﬁrms. Large adjustment costs for the employers will concern also managing
an increased number of workers willing to retire, and, at the same time, trying to
recruit from a shrinking pool of labour. This process will certainly lead to labour
shortages in certain domains. In this context, the prolongation of a working life may
constitute a chance for the employers in a sense to enable them to keep longer the
valuable workers. Over recent years, an increasing number of organisations and ﬁrms
have realised that early retirement of older employees deprives companies of valuable
expertise and creates a shortage of qualiﬁed employees (Worth, 1995; Munnell et al.,
2006; Smeaton and Vegeris, 2009).
Nevertheless, the available evidence indicates that in many developed countries de-
spite a political calling for an increase in employment level of the elderly, older
workers continue to confront unfavourable labour market conditions compared to
the other age groups. The seniors who experience age discrimination meet barriers
to recruitment and hiring, diminished conditions of work and employment as well as
limited career development (Macnicol, 2006; Ghosheh, 2008). Moreover, they tend
to occupy a relatively low status in the labour market and are disproportionately
represented among the long term non-employed (Walker, 2005; OECD, 2006). Con-
sequently, the employment and hiring rates of older workers stay at a very low level.
Figure 2 presents the employment rate of elderly people, aged 50 and more, in Europe
and in the OECD countries.
Figure 2: Employment/population ratio of older workers in OECD countries (in %)
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Source: OECD Statistics (2009)
The 2006 OECD report (Live longer, work longer) has identiﬁed three main types
of barriers that make employers reluctant to hire or retain older workers: 1) negative
perceptions about the adaptability and productivity of older workers, 2) labour costs
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that rise steeply with seniority or age, and 3) strict employment protection rules. In
fact, the negative image of older employees, which may lead to prejudices, is still
quite common among the employers. An increase in the workforce's average age is
frequently associated with higher labour costs as well as greater resistance to tech-
nological developments and only rarely with an expected increase in productivity
(Brooke and Taylor, 2005; Remery et al., 2003; Johnson, 2007). Although employ-
ers appreciate older employees' experience, loyalty and low turnover, nevertheless
younger workers are preferred when it comes to actual hiring decisions (Guest and
Shacklock, 2005). Moreover, an ageing workforce is expected to lead to a strong
increase in wage costs. Actually, in most countries, earnings tend to increase with
worker's age and the last earned salary is generally the highest. So long as wages
correspond to productivity at all ages, employers will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to employ
older workers. However, if senior workers' wages exceed their productivity levels,
older workers will represent losses for the companies (Skirbekk, 2003). Though, se-
niors constitute potentially very valuable resource for the employers. Thanks to the
intergenerational transfer of know-how, the companies could make use of the com-
plementary, age-speciﬁc skills of younger and older workers by setting up age-mixed
teams and in this way maximise the human resource potential in a company (Joe
and Yoong, 2004; Brooke and Taylor, 2005).
Consequently, the relationship between the age structure of workforce, earnings and
productivity proﬁles is a key issue for the enterprises facing the phenomenon of age-
ing. The better understanding of this relationship is vital for the ﬁrms' optimal
employment and remuneration policy, training oﬀered and eﬀort incentive system
applied. Finally, the successful age mix of workers will determine the ultimate per-
formance of the ﬁrm.
The present thesis addresses these issues in the following order. In the ﬁrst chapter
we will review diﬀerent theoretical concepts that have been developed over time and
we will depict recent empirical ﬁndings concerning the proﬁle of earnings and pro-
ductivity by age. Researchers puzzled with wages growing with worker's seniority
wanted to understand the relationship between workers' age, wage rates and their
productivity. Among the most prominent explanations that have been oﬀered, we can
distinguish human capital theory, job matching and deferred compensation models.
In the second chapter we analyse the relationship between age, wage and productiv-
ity from the perspective of the ﬁrm. In particular, we focus on the empirical studies
examining the age-related wage-productivity gap. Its existence might reduce the
employment opportunities of workers whose wage exceed their productivity. It con-
cerns especially older employees having high earnings but whose productivity level is
often put in doubt. Therefore, in the following section, we present an original study
providing an estimation of the labour productivity across diﬀerent age groups. We
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use the French data on private ﬁrms that are particularly interesting as, among all
OECD countries, France is characterised by one of the lowest employment rate of
people over 55 (see Figure 2). Finally, the third chapter involves the behavioural
analysis of the workforce touched by the ageing process. Thanks to the experimental
approach, we can collect the unique data that allows analysing nuances of diﬀerences
and interactions between junior and senior workers. In particular, we investigate the
intergenerational diﬀerences in risk attitudes, workers' self-conﬁdence and propensity
to enter the competition, as well as the inﬂuence of the group age composition on
the latter. All these elements are not negligible for the employers managing diﬀerent
generations of workers and facing the current shifts in the age composition of their
employees.
Chapter one is composed of two sections. The ﬁrst section presents the fundamen-
tal theories on the evolution of earnings and productivity with workers' age. One
of the ﬁrst explanations for widely observed upward sloping age-earnings proﬁle was
provided by the human capital theory suggesting that earnings rise with age as a con-
sequence of the productivity increase due to investment in workers' human capital.
Becker (1962) and Mincer (1962) have argued that workers, while gaining seniority
or getting older, accumulate more and more ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital that makes
them more productive compared to others. As a result, this productivity increase
brings a reward in a form of higher wages. Another theory has been proposed by Jo-
vanovic (1979). He claimed that the growth of earnings does not depend on worker's
tenure, but rather on the good quality of match between a worker and an employer.
The observed wage increase simply accompanies the process of changing jobs by a
worker while searching for the best match. Finally, the deferred compensation mod-
els (Lazear, 1979, 1981; Carmichael, 1983) justify increasing wage proﬁles with the
need to create the proper incentives with a double eﬀect: discourage shirking and in-
crease workers' eﬀort. After the presentation of each theory, brief empirical evidence
is provided on various models. In general, empirical studies emphasize that diﬀerent
theories can provide complementary explanations and researchers often need to refer
to many of them in order to explain their results on wage and productivity changes.
Obviously, the mentioned theories do not exhaust the analysis of the relation be-
tween age, wage and productivity. Therefore, the second section of chapter one
invites to consider a number of empirical studies that give some further insights
into this complex relation. Important and interesting ﬁndings on age-earnings and
age-productivity proﬁles are presented separately in two sub-sections. In the part
devoted to earnings, we focus in particular on two issues contradicting the common
paradigms. First, the upward slope of age proﬁle of earnings might correspond not
only to employers' policy but also to preferences of their employees. Many people
tend to behave in the opposition to the present-value maximisation theory prefer-
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ring increasing over ﬂat or decreasing proﬁle of earnings even if the latter would
maximize the net present value of their future proﬁts (Loewenstein and Sicherman,
1991). Another noteworthy issue is whether wage indicates worker's productivity at
any age. To answer this question, we present empirical evidence against the neo-
classical assumption that workers are paid according to their marginal products. In
fact, many ﬁrms apply a rigid remuneration scheme. As a result, within a ﬁrm,
wages vary considerably less than individual productivity. We have a look at this
issue from the theoretical and empirical point of view. In the second subsection,
we focus on age-related labour productivity. Since negative perceptions about the
adaptability and productivity of older workers has been identiﬁed as one of the main
factor inﬂuencing their employment level, this part starts with a survey literature
review on employers' beliefs about the advantages and disadvantages of employing
younger and older workers. Afterwards, we analyse the actual reasons for a possible
increase or decrease in productivity with age. Finally, we present diﬀerent measures
of individual job performance as well as some empirical studies investigating the
impact of diﬀerent workforce age compositions on ﬁrm's productivity performance.
Despite suggested positive eﬀects of age diversity on company's performance, many
employers tend to consider older workers as relatively less productive.
Therefore, the relationship between productivity, earnings and workers' age is fur-
ther investigated in chapter two. This part focuses in particular on aspects relevant
for the employers. Although it has been well established that earnings continue to
rise with age, the rise of workers' productivity is not evident and not easy to verify.
If senior workers' productivity increases at a slower rate than earnings or even de-
creases, it may result in a discrepancy between current wages and productivity that
make older workers less attractive for the employers. The ﬁrst section of this chapter
starts with a brief overview of empirical studies on age-related wage-productivity
gap. Although ﬁrst theories on wage and productivity have been developed already
in the 60s, the ﬁrst empirical papers testing this relationship at the ﬁrm level ap-
peared only recently. Despite the growing interest in this subject, the quality and
scope of analyses depends largely on the available data. This diﬃculty as well as
other methodological challenges have been presented in the following part of the
chapter. Overall, the existing research remains inconclusive about the existence of
pay-productivity gap for senior workers.
The original empirical study presented in the second section subscribes in the line of
the current research. We employ a rich ﬁrm-level dataset on French enterprises. The
study aims at estimating the actual proﬁle of labour productivity across diﬀerent
age groups. Its original contribution consists in overcoming the limitation of the
usual assumption of perfect substitution between diﬀerent types of workers. In this
purpose, we diﬀerentiate the workforce simultaneously by skills (low-skilled, high-
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skilled) and by age (young, middle-aged, old). Estimating a production function with
a nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) speciﬁcation in labour, allows the
imperfect substitution between diﬀerent age and skill categories of workers. Among
the main ﬁndings, labour productivity has been found to highly depend on the skill
category of workers and the sector of activity. Older workers appear to be the least
productive in the low-skilled group, while among the high-skilled employees seniors
tend to be the most productive age category. The discrepancy between productivity
and earnings is likely to be a source of employment diﬃculties in particular for older
low-skilled workers. Regarding the accordance with existing economic theories, the
age-productivity and age-earnings proﬁles in manufacturing sector are compatible
with a model of deferred compensation. The eﬀort incentive problem might have
been regulated by the ﬁrms by oﬀering at the start of the career wages under the
workers' marginal productivity and compensating this diﬀerence in the later periods.
On the other hand, in services and in trade sectors, we observe the combined relevance
of speciﬁc human capital and deferred compensation. The relative productivity over
wage ratio in manufacturing is found to be the highest for young workers whereas in
services and trade sectors it is the highest for the mid-age employees. Thus, it may
incite the employers to maximize their proﬁts in the economic downturn by laying
oﬀ from both ends of the age distribution ﬁrst. Consequently, it may create some
tensions inside the company between workers belonging to diﬀerent age groups.
In the perspective of ageing, the cooperation and competition between diﬀerent gen-
erations of workers is a major challenge for the enterprises. In this context, the issue
of managing the intergenerational teams in particularly important (Hamilton et al.,
2003; 2004). Though, this phenomenon is still relatively little studied. Nowadays,
many employers encourage competition between workers, for example by applying
performance-related pay, in order to stimulate greater productivity and better qual-
ity of work (Booth and Frank, 1999; Lazear, 2000; Cuñat and Guadalupe, 2005). The
employees, in order to gain employer's appreciation, try to perform better than oth-
ers. Over recent decades, a pressure to prove their qualities has been especially high
for senior workers. The technical and organisational changes due to the rapid devel-
opment of information and communication technologies has required from workers
to achieve quickly new skills and competences. Older workers have been especially
concerned with skills obsolescence especially that employers started to attach less
value to their previously accumulated work experience. Moreover, seniors started
to be perceived as overly cautious, less competitive, less willing to learn and adapt
to new conditions. Nevertheless, the recent studies show that seniors are no more
risk averse than juniors and tend to be more cooperative. Both generations seem to
respond strongly to competition (Charness and Villeval, 2009).
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Therefore, the third chapter of this thesis involves the behavioural analysis of the
workforce composed of juniors and seniors. In particular, we study risk attitudes,
workers' self-conﬁdence and propensity to enter the competition, as well as the inﬂu-
ence of the group age composition on the latter. These factors, undoubtedly having
an impact on the workers' individual productivity, cannot be measured using the
traditional survey data. Hence, we decided to perform an artefactual ﬁeld experi-
ment within a company with employees. Due to its highly competitive environment
as well as the presence of ageing problems, the experiment has been organised with
the employees of a Swiss bank. The advantage of the experimental approach is
that it allows the reconstruction and analysis of a chosen economic situation or phe-
nomenon with an important control of the environment, allowing a manipulation of
treatments (here the age composition of groups). The ﬁrst section of this chapter
presents the conceptual and methodological problems with the deﬁnition and the
measurement of overconﬁdence, with a particular focus on age diﬀerences in con-
ﬁdence judgments. The second section describes the design and procedures of the
experiment and presents the obtained results. Although no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in attitudes towards risk and ambiguity have been found between both generations,
seniors have higher propensity to enter the competition. Moreover, the information
on age of others players clearly has an impact on this decision. Curiously, seniors are
more willing to enter the competition when they are matched with many juniors. It
seems that in such a situation of competition, seniors are determined to demonstrate
that they are not more risk-averse or less prone to engage in competitive tasks than
younger generation. However, the excessive entry of seniors turns out to be ineﬃ-
cient i.e. it brings them lower proﬁts than they expected. Overall, the results of the
experiment prove that the age composition of co-workers may have an impact on
the decision eﬃciency of age-homogenous or age-heterogeneous groups. This result
is particularly important in the perspective of ageing labour force and fast changing
workforce age composition. When searching for the optimal age mix of workers,
employers should not forget that well balanced age diversity is a potential source of
improved performance.
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Chapter 1: Existing theories and
empirical evidence on evolution of
productivity and earnings with age
This chapter is composed of two sections. The ﬁrst section presents the major
theories on the evolution of earnings and productivity with workers' age. Each
theory is accompanied by brief empirical evidence. The second section completes the
existing theoretical concepts by providing alternative explanations for the observed
age-earnings and age-productivity proﬁles that have been revealed by a number of
recent empirical studies.
1. Theoretical concepts on evolution of produc-
tivity and earnings with age
Over the 70s and 80s, the relationship between workers' age, wage rates and their
productivity has attracted attention of many researchers. Observations of wage
tending to grow with worker's seniority in the ﬁrm brought questions on the link
between this phenomenon and the evolution of worker's productivity. Several possible
explanations for these upward sloping age-earnings proﬁles exist. Among the most
prominent, we can distinguish human capital theory, job matching and deferred
compensation models.
The human capital theory (Becker 1962, Mincer 1962) suggests that wage proﬁles
are either equivalent to or ﬂatter than productivity growth over the life cycle. It
motivates payment of higher wages to older or more senior workers by the fact that
they have accumulated more ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital and thus are expected to
be more productive.
Older workers might be paid more than younger workers simply due to increase
in their job tenure. Job-matching models (Jovanovic, 1979; Mincer and Jovanovic,
1981) allow the positive wage growth with workers' tenure in case of a good match
between employer and employee. In the model of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2001), em-
ployer pays initially each worker his reservation wage which is usually lower than the
value of their marginal product and afterwards wages rise as the employer matches
some outside options.
Another possible explanation for upward-sloping wage structures can be generated by
incentive considerations. Diﬀerent versions of eﬃciency wage models (Lazear 1979;
Carmichael, 1983; Akerlof and Katz, 1989) suggest that rising wage proﬁle is an
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eﬀective way to discourage workers shirking and to induce them to provide a higher
level of eﬀort. It might be of particular importance in ﬁrms where workers' charac-
teristics are not totally observable and / or where monitoring of their performance
is not perfect (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990).
However, the cost of such eﬀort incentive might rise as workers get promoted and
climb the hierarchy. First, it may take more money to induce eﬀort from the rich
worker than from the one who is less well oﬀ. Second, raises upon promotion may
increase because the optimal level of eﬀort is higher at more elevated ranks, as
decisions made at higher ranks have more wide-reaching eﬀects; it is more important
for the CEO to work hard than for a shop ﬂoor worker to do so. If the marginal return
to eﬀort is increasing in rank, convex wage proﬁles will arise (Prendergast, 1999).
Nevertheless, such convex wage schedules may provide incentives to all employees.
Not only to those in senior positions but also to their younger co-workers who, if
they hope to stay in the ﬁrm, are induced to perform at the optimal level.
1.1. Human capital theory
The age-earnings diﬀerentials are often justiﬁed by human capital theory. The ex-
planation is based on the idea that wages increase over time due to investments in
human capital, particularly investments in the job training (Mincer, 1974; Becker,
1975). Older workers are therefore paid more since they have accumulated more
human capital and thus they are more productive.
After completion of schooling, formal or informal on-the-job training is the major
productivity building investment. The tendency to invest in human capital con-
cerns rather young persons. Postponing the decision about investment reduces their
present value of net gains as the later investment produces returns over a shorter
period (Becker, 1964). For the same reason, also ﬁrms are less willing to invest in
training of older workers as the time of investment return is short and the cost is
higher due to foregone earnings (opportunity costs) increase.
Decreasing marginal returns and increasing marginal costs lead to an optimal amount
of human capital investment that negatively depends on age (Mincer, 1970). How-
ever, human capital investment may not monotonically decline with age if the ac-
cumulated human capital is rather speciﬁc than general. While the proﬁtability of
general skills depends on the length of working life, the proﬁtability of speciﬁc skills
only depends on the expected duration of the current job (Bartel and Borjas, 1977).
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The theoretical models also suggest that the rate of earnings increase with age might
be positively related to the level of skill (Becker, 1964). Empirical studies tend to
conﬁrm that age-earnings proﬁles are steeper, grow faster and peak later at given
years of labour experience among more skilled and educated persons. Equally, the
more educated employees retire at a somewhat older age, though they do not nec-
essarily have a longer working life, since it begins after a longer schooling period
(Mincer, 1970).
The theory makes a distinction between two types of human capital: general and
speciﬁc.
1.1.1. General human capital theory
According to the general human capital theory, workers invest in general on-the-job
training. Skills deﬁned as general, increase worker's productivity in the current ﬁrm
as well as in other ﬁrms. The ﬁrms providing general training could capture return
from training oﬀered in the ﬁrst period only if in the second period their productivity
rose by more than their wages. However, assuming competitive labour market, where
wage rates paid at any ﬁrm are determined by marginal productivities in other ﬁrms,
if one employer refuses to pay the market value for a person's skills, another employer
may be able bid an undercompensated employee away. Consequently, the ﬁrms would
be willing to provide general training only if they did not have to pay any of the costs.
Hence, the only person ready to bear the cost of general training are the workers
themselves as the training raises their future wages (Becker, 1962). Anticipating the
future returns from general training, employees would accept to pay for training in
the ﬁrst period by receiving wages below their current productivity or what they
could receive elsewhere (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Worker invests in general on-the-job training
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The general training has an important impact on the relation between workers' earn-
ings and age. Assuming that untrained worker receives the same wage rate regardless
of age, his or her earnings proﬁle would take a form of a horizontal line UU (see Fig-
ure 4). Now, if we suppose that a worker in a ﬁrst period receives training, his or
her earnings would be below the marginal productivity in the training period and
equal to it afterwards, but exceeding the productivity of an untrained person (line
T'T'). If, in addition, we assume that the increase of earnings is aﬀected more at
younger than at older ages, the earnings curve of a trained person would take a form
of TT. Consequently, wages would rise over the life cycle at a decreasing rate until
depreciation exceeds the level of skill acquisition, yielding a concave earnings proﬁle.
Figure 4: Worker invests in general on-the-job training
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1.1.2. Speciﬁc human capital theory
Apart of general training, a worker may also acquire speciﬁc on-the-job training. Its
particularity is that it increases the worker's marginal productivity more in the ﬁrm
providing such training than in other ﬁrms. Actually, it is often diﬃcult to classify
on-the-job training as purely general or purely speciﬁc. Nevertheless, the one that
increases worker's productivity more in the ﬁrm providing it, is usually deﬁned as
speciﬁc training.
A speciﬁc training, same as general training, causes wages to grow with seniority
because of increase in workers' productivity. Unlike general training, however, ﬁrms
and workers are assumed to share the investment (costs and beneﬁts) in workers'
training. In the ﬁrst period, while being trained, workers receive a wage that is
lower than wages oﬀered otherwise but still higher than their productivity. Thanks
to training, workers become more productive and in the later period their marginal
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product jumps from MP1 to MP2 (see Figure 5). The second period wage, although
higher than in the previous period, lies below the value of marginal productivity
MP2. In fact, the employer and the employee set the second period wage so as
to split the quasi-rents generated by speciﬁc training. On one hand, a wage being
lower than productivity discourages the ﬁrm from laying oﬀ trained workers and
thus encourages workers to participate in the training program. On the other hand,
provided that the wage is higher than the one a trained worker could get elsewhere,
it plays also a discouraging role towards workers quit (Becker, 1962). Actually, it is
possible that in the second period the ﬁrm oﬀers a worker more that he or she can
receive elsewhere and still pays less than what the employee is worth at the current
ﬁrm (Lazear, 1998).
Figure 5: Worker and ﬁrm invest in speciﬁc training
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In line with this theory, compared to an untrained employee, an investment in human
capital steepens age-earnings proﬁles of workers who have been provided training.
It lowers reported earnings during the initial investment period and raises them af-
terwards. Wages grow with seniority because of increase in workers' productivity
induced by the provided training. In case of older workers, the spot wage will al-
ways be less than or equal to the spot value of their marginal product (Hutchens,
1989). Consequently, the workers' earning proﬁle over age will be ﬂatter than the
productivity path (Hashimoto, 1981).
The theoretical model by Becker has been further pursued by Ben-Porath (1967)
who developed an earnings maximizing model of human capital accumulation and
a productivity-based explanation of earnings growing with age. In this model, the
individual maximizes his expected value of the discounted earnings by appropriately
allocating resources to human capital investment over his lifetime. The author as-
sumes the following earnings function: Et = (1− st)Ht−Dt, where st is time spent
investing in human capital, Ht is human capital itself, and Dt denotes direct costs of
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human capital investment. The human capital production function (its change over
time) is deﬁned as H˙t = β0 (stHt)
β1 Dβ2t − σHt where σ is the depreciation rate of
human capital.
According to Ben-Porath (1967), there are three diﬀerent phases of human capital
accumulation: 1) an initial period of no earnings (i.e. full-time human capital pro-
duction, interpreted as "formal schooling"), 2) a period of a part-time human capital
production in which earnings rise at a declining rate (individuals both work and in-
vest), and 3) a phase characterised by no training and earnings decline (see Figure
6). At any point in time, individuals with more schooling or greater ability invest
more in on-the-job training.
Figure 6: Pattern of investment and a pattern of earnings in Ben-Porath model
age 
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
t 
e
a
rn
in
g
s 
age 
~
average MP
MP
W
Source: Taber (2008)
The model by Ben-Porath (1967) has been then generalised by Heckman (1976)
who designed a life-cycle model of labour supply, earnings, consumption, and non-
monetary utility of education that contains the Ben-Porath's model as a special
case. However, even the basic model by Ben-Porath manages to replicate the most
important qualitative characteristics of the empirical life-cycle patterns.
1.1.3. Validity of human capital investment and the life cycle of
earnings
Most of studies verifying the human capital theory focused on econometric testing
whether the observed age-earnings proﬁle (upward slope, deceleration and eventual
decline) is a result of human capital investment. Mincer(1958, 1974) was the ﬁrst
to derive an empirical formulation of earnings over the life cycle. His model focuses
on the life-cycle dynamics of earnings and on the relationship between observed
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earnings, potential earnings, and human capital investment, both in terms of formal
schooling si and work experience (on the job investment) xi:
ln wage (s, x) = α0i + ρsisi + β0ixi + β1ix
2
i + εi (1)
where ρs is the rate of return to schooling (assumed to be the same for all schooling
levels) and ε is a mean zero residual with E (ε | s, x) = 0. Since the theory does
not suggest a clear linear relationship between earnings and experience, the model
includes a quadratic term of work experience.
This model served as a basis for numerous empirical studies that modiﬁed Mincer
earnings function to integrate worker's tenure on the job (see e.g. Bartel and Bor-
jas (1981), Mincer and Jovanovic (1981), Topel and Ward (1992)). Using data on
individuals, the estimated regression took the following form:
ln wage (s, x, t) = α0i + ρsisi + β0ixi + β1ix
2
i + β0iti + β1it
2
i + εi (2)
where ti denotes years of tenure with the current employer. It has been argued that
the inclusion of tenure in the earnings function is necessary if one wants to measure
correctly returns to human capital accumulated on the job via experience coeﬃcients.
Otherwise, they would be biased upwards. According to Mincer and Jovanovic (1981)
the inclusion of tenure terms (ti) in the function permits to separate estimates of
returns to general and speciﬁc human capital after correction for heterogeneity bias.
They approximate that among factors responsible for life-time wage growth, about 25
% is due to interﬁrm mobility, another 20-25 % to ﬁrm speciﬁc experience, and over 50
% is due to general (transferable) experience. Such results accord nicely with human
capital theory, which holds that wages rise with seniority due to greater investment in
general human capital and labour market experience as well as investment in speciﬁc
training, which explains why, even after controlling for experience, wages rise with
tenure (Hutchens, 1989).
However, it has been observed that incidence and duration of training declines with
age, producing concavity in the wage proﬁle, in line with Ben-Porath's model. Mincer
(1997) analysing Panel Study of Income Dynamics panel data found that annual wage
growth of otherwise comparable workers in 1976 jobs was 4.4 % greater during the
1968-82 period for those who received training than for those without training in
the same year. Due to greater frequency and intensity of training, its eﬀect on wage
growth was two to three times greater for young workers (less than 12 years of work)
than for older ones.
Actually, the rising wage proﬁle not only provides incentives to young persons to
invest in training and education in anticipation of higher earnings in the future but
training is also an attractive investment from the point of view of the employer. It
is likely to be associated with signiﬁcantly higher workers' productivity. Analysing
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British panel data, Dearden et al. (2006) estimated the magnitude of the impact of
training on wages being only half as large as the impact of training on productivity.
On the other hand, the real signiﬁcance of including job tenure in earnings func-
tions has been a subject of ﬁerce debate. The cross-section data analysis has been
suspected to suﬀer from a sample selection bias because of job-matching eﬀects. In-
deed, it is possible that workers with high unobserved match quality receive and
accept high wage oﬀers from their existing employers. Consequently, they tend to
stay in their jobs which results in a positive correlation between wages and tenure
conﬁrmed by the data (Abraham and Farber, 1987; Altonji and Shakotko, 1987).
However, other authors have argued that in fact the direction of the sample selection
bias is not so certain. They pointed out the possible negative eﬀect if workers who
move to new jobs, and hence have relatively lower tenure, are those who receive high
alternative wage oﬀers (Topel, 1986; 1991 and Garen, 1988).
Later on, Stevens (2003) has shown that introducing in the model endogenous wage
oﬀers results in the unambiguously negative bias on the return to tenure. Workers
with high levels of speciﬁc human capital tend to stay in their jobs even when match
quality is low. Thus, speciﬁc capital is negatively correlated with match quality. At
the same time, in the absence of speciﬁc human capital, matching does not introduce
a positive relationship between wages and tenure.
1.2. Job matching models
Due to lack of consensus concerning diﬀerent aspects of human capital model, it
has been suggested that alternatives to this model should be considered1. Bartel
and Borjas (1981) pointed out that an important factor, which must be taken into
account while analysing the earnings distribution, is labour turnover. It tends to
aﬀect not only the growth of wages across jobs but also the rate at which wages grow
within the job. Using the National Longitudinal Surveys of Young and Mature Men,
they demonstrated that job mobility may prove successful provided it is undertaken
early in the life cycle of an individual. Those who have gained already considerable
experience and settled in one ﬁrm may expect larger lifetime wage growth than
similar workers still changing jobs. The potential gains to quitting appear to be
positive for young men, and zero or negative for older ones. However, the type of
quits is not without importance. Bartel and Borjas distinguish between quits due
1Concerning literature conﬁrming human capital model and for relation between training received
from the current employer and increased wage growth see e.g. Duncan and Hoﬀman, 1979; Mincer,
1988; Barron et al., 1989; Brown, 1989; Altonji and Spletzer, 1991; Barron et al., 1993 and Barrel,
1995.
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to 1) ﬁnding a better job, 2) being dissatisﬁed with the current job, and 3) personal
reasons. In both age groups, those who quit for another job usually experience
signiﬁcant wage gains. Though, there exist certain age diﬀerences in the nature of
quits. At older ages, they are mainly result of dissatisfaction with the current job
and, in general, do not bring signiﬁcant wage growth.
Furthermore, Topel and Ward (1992) have found that a career development among
young workers is characterized by high turnover and rapid wage growth before tran-
sition to relatively stable employment. During the ﬁrst ten years of labour force
participation the typical young worker holds seven jobs, and over one third of aver-
age wage growth during this period is due to job changing. Based on this ﬁnding, the
authors called for a re-evaluation of the standard human capital investment model
of lifecycle earnings. The job-changing activities of young workers observed by Topel
and Ward appeared strongly consistent with models of on-the-job search and job
matching (Jovanovic, 1979; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). According to these
models, the declining probability over life cycle that an individual will change job is,
in part, evidence of successful initial mobility by young workers, which is conﬁrmed
by corresponding life-cycle wages increase.
Finally, let us compare both theories. It can be noticed that the human capital model
states that the positive correlation between wages and tenure reﬂects an increase in
productivity that results from investments in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. On the
other hand, the job matching model argues that this positive relationship comes
from the market good worker-employer matches. In this model, future wages do not
depend on the worker's length of tenure. It is rather the quality of match, not the
wage, which dictates the rate of turnover, thus observed tenure (Hotchkiss, 1998).
1.2.1. Jovanovic's matching model
The job matching model proposed by Jovanovic (1979) predicts that workers remain
on jobs in which their productivity is revealed to be relatively high and that they
select themselves out of jobs in which their productivity is revealed to be low. Wages
are assumed to always equal expected marginal products for all workers, conditional
upon all the available information at that time. Wage growth is positive only if the
average production exceeds the employer's expectation at time zero. In particular,
the good match generates wage growth as tenure increases.
The model assumes that worker's contribution to the total output X (t) depends on
the tenure, that is the period spent in the ﬁrm, t:
X (t) = µt+ σz (t) (3)
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µ is a measure of the quality of the match whereas σ is the same for each ﬁrm-worker
match. µ and σ are constants and σ > 0; z (t) is a standard normal variable with
mean zero and variance t. When the match is formed, µ is unknown but as the
match continues, further information is generated. In particular, a "good match" is
characterized by large µ.
It is assumed that workers diﬀer in their productivities across diﬀerent jobs and in a
given task that the employer needs to have performed. The main problem concerns
optimal assignment of workers to particular jobs. Due to imperfect information on
both sides of the market (employers and employees), turnover is generated as the
phenomenon of optimal reassignment which tends to decline with time as better
information about the quality of match becomes available. A worker's productivity
in a particular job is not known ex ante and becomes known more precisely as
production takes place and the worker's job tenure increases. With accumulation of
tenure and experience, the workers' mobility declines. This phenomenon is mainly
attributable to locating a successful match after the initial job search period when a
worker aims at gaining experience, wages, and skills by moving across ﬁrms in order
to ﬁnd eventually a suitable job in which one can settle and grow for a long time
(Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981). Good matches tend to survive and poor matches are
likely to end. A key diﬀerence is that survivors learn that they are well matched, so
that their own probability of moving decline with tenure after some critical amount
of know-how has been accumulated.
1.2.2. Empirical evidence on job matching model
Over time considerable eﬀorts have been undertaken to test the job matching model
against human capital theory and to determine its empirical importance. In his re-
view of the empirical studies of job matching, Garen (1988) concluded, "The evidence
surveyed in this paper does not reveal any consensus about the importance of the
job matching model. The results from the studies of wage determination are mixed.
Some of the ﬁndings imply that matching accounts for nearly all of the wage-tenure
correlation, while others suggest only a part is explained by this model". Garen
attributes the inconclusiveness of the empirical works to the absence of the data sets
that would measure the quality of the worker-ﬁrm match (and thus determine wages
and turnover), for example the worker's performance on the job.
Following the suggestion by Garen, Bishop (1990) conducted a robust test of job-
matching theory. He analyzed a data set containing measures of the match quality
between job and worker deﬁned as the productivity of the individual worker relative
to co-workers reported in a supervisor's productivity ratings. The major ﬁndings are
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that both involuntary and voluntary turnover is negatively related to employer pro-
ductivity ratings, which is consistent with job matching theory. This phenomenon
appeared, however, to concern only small- and medium-sized non-union establish-
ments. Moreover, while job matching turn out to be an important phenomenon at
most establishments of this type, it did not account for a signiﬁcant share of the rise
in average productivity that occurs in the ﬁrst year of tenure on the job.
Among other empirical works, the positive and strong relationship between worker
tenure and wage has been also conﬁrmed by Topel (1991). Farber (1994)has shown
that tenure is initially positively and soon after negatively correlated to the hazard
rate of separation, while Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) has found a negative link
between tenure or wage and the worker propensity to search on the job.
1.3. Deferred compensation models
The third explanation for an observed upward sloping age-earnings proﬁle has been
provided by deferred compensation models which underline the possibility of incen-
tive based compensation schemes. In order to discourage workers' shirking, the ﬁrm
pays young workers below their marginal productivity and later in their career re-
munerates them over their marginal product. Senior workers receive high salaries,
not due to relatively higher productivity but because it creates the appropriate wage
incentives for them and for their younger co-workers (Lazear, 1981). Consequently,
a steeper wage proﬁle increases workers' eﬀort. In particular, the young workers who
hope to stay in the ﬁrm are induced to perform at the optimal level. Among the
technologies that give rise to delayed payment contracts are those which pose moni-
toring diﬃculties (Lazear, 1979; 1981) or which involve speciﬁc training (Carmichael,
1983).
1.3.1. Lazear's model of delayed payment contracts
It has been observed that even in the absence of on-the job training or investment in
human capital, the earnings growing with workers' age are widespread. The agency
models by Becker and Stigler (1974) and Lazear (1979, 1981) demonstrated that the
use of seniority wages can be motivated by an incentive for increased eﬀort. Moreover,
delayed payment contracts tend to discourage shirking and malfeasant behaviour, in
particular when it is diﬃcult for the employer to monitor worker's eﬀort.
According to Lazear's model, initially workers are paid less than their marginal
productivity, and as they work eﬀectively over time within the ﬁrm, earnings increase
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until they exceed marginal productivity (see Figure 7). A steep earnings path not
only reduces the worker's incentive to shirk, but also it aﬀects the amount of output
per hour consequently increasing worker's productivity. Thus, workers produce more
and are paid more if their wage paths are steeper than their productivity. A worker
who shirks, risks being caught and get ﬁred before obtaining the wage premium
foreseen at the end of the contract.
Figure 7: Delayed payment contract in Lazear's model
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While steeper proﬁles increase workers' eﬀort, ﬂatter proﬁles (in which smaller amount
of earnings are suspended until late in workers' life) might make ﬁrms more honest.
Indeed, in a situation when older workers are paid above their marginal product and
there is no transfer of know-how from older to younger employees, it would be opti-
mal for a ﬁrm to make redundant all workers at time t˜ and, instead, hire new cheaper
workers. However, the reputation concerns could prevent the ﬁrm from engaging in
moral hazard behaviour. Thus, the delayed payment contracts tend to be long-term
contracts and are likely to be associated with large established ﬁrms as those who
are less likely to fail and who are more concerned with reputation (Lazear, 1979;
Hutchens, 1986).
By the same token, the deferred compensation can reduce workers' voluntary turnover
rate. Since wages are higher than productivity towards the end of the career, wages
send the wrong signal to workers who might not want to retire at the eﬃcient age.
Hence, mandatory retirement clause might be needed as a part of an eﬃcient labour
contract in order to induce workers to leave the ﬁrm at the optimal date (Lazear
1979). Figure 8, below, illustrates this situation. Let us consider a worker who has
a value of marginal product over his lifetime, V ∗ (t), and a wage rate W ∗ (t). He
is receiving an amount less than his VMP for t < t∗and an amount greater than
his marginal product for t > t∗. At point T , the value of V ∗ (T ) is equal to the
individual's reservation wage at t, W (T ).
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Figure 8: Optimal date of retirement in Lazear's model
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If a worker was paid at each point in time according to his spot value of marginal
product V ∗ (t), then at time T the value of the worker's marginal product would be
just equal to his reservation wage and the worker would have no more incentive to
work. Thus, it would determine the optimal date of retirement for the worker. But
when workers are paid less than their marginal products when they are young and
more when old, their wage rate at T will exceed their marginal product and, therefore,
also the reservation wage. Since in this situation the worker will not retire voluntarily,
the mandatory retirement at the point T is necessary. However, as noticed by Lazear
(1979), although the mandatory retirement usually means ﬁrm-worker separation, it
is also possible that worker stays with the ﬁrm after re-negotiating his contract. The
new contract might imply changes in wage rates as well as in working conditions
(working hours, ﬂexibility, eﬀort, etc.) so that they match better the interests of
both, the employer and the worker, over the time period between T and retirement.
1.3.2. Carmichael's model of seniority based promotions
Although Lazear's theory explains why wages grow with tenure in the ﬁrm, it does not
provide an insight into why wages grow with labour market experience. Carmichael
(1983) extended a human capital theory in an empirically relevant direction and
demonstrated that when a job involves speciﬁc training, it can be eﬃcient for the
ﬁrm, to pay older workers a wage that exceeds the value of their marginal product.
In the Carmichael's model, a worker enters on the market with general human capital
worthWa (equal to alternative wage). When he ﬁnds an employment, he joins a ﬁrm
contracting two-period wages: W1 andW2. His ﬁrst period productivityMP1 is equal
to alternative wage (Wa) minus the cost of ﬁrm-speciﬁc training. This training raises
worker's productivity in the second period to MP2.
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At the end of the training period, a worker receives a raise in wage to a level just
below his alternative wage rate. Suppose there are two types of second period jobs,
denoted as type 1 (lower ranked) and type 2 jobs (higher ranked). Sometime in the
middle of their second period (after training), a worker receives a promotion based
on his seniority which ensures that his entire second period earnings are suﬃcient
to compensate him for the training costs paid in the ﬁrst period and the low initial
wage in the second period (W2 < MP2). A worker is promoted when he is the
senior member of type 1 job and a vacancy appears (due to a retirement) in the
type 2 jobs. Promotion involves a wage increase (to a level of W2 + B) as well as
a change in duties. Figure 9 illustrates this pattern. It is assumed that worker's
marginal product is constant over the second period, even if he switches jobs. Since,
by assumption, workers in the type 2 jobs are no more productive than those in type
1 jobs, it can be shown that at least some of these more senior workers are paid a
wage greater than marginal product (that is, W2 +B > VMP2 > W2).
Figure 9: Carmichael's model of seniority based promotion
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1.3.3. Consequences of delayed payment contracts for ﬁrm's propen-
sity to hire older workers
Large number of empirical studies suggests that ﬁrms do indeed follow deferred
compensation model (Kotlikoﬀ and Gokhale, 1992; Barth, 1997; Abowd et al. 1999;
Prendergast, 1999; Lazear, 2000; Fukao et al., 2006). Actually, ﬁrms systematically
overpay their older employees and underpay their younger counterparts. The
fact that wages do not reﬂect the actual productivity but increase with seniority
may result in raised employment diﬃculties for older workers. Indeed, we observe
that for certain jobs many ﬁrms employ, but tend not to hire older workers.
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Hutchens (1986) argues that when the ﬁrm shifts compensation to the end of the
contract, it incurs a form of a ﬁxed cost (associated with e.g. a risk of shirking by
workers or dismissal of non-shirkers by the ﬁrm) which is invariant to contract length,
into the employment relationship. Since the ﬁrm pays this cost each time it hires a
new worker, it tries to minimize hiring by entering into long-term relationship with
young workers.
In order to test the hypothesis that delayed payment contracts are associated with
establishments that employ but do not hire older workers, Hutchens (1986) compares
the inter-jobs values of the following index:
I (i, j) =
% of recently hired workers in industry i and occupation j that are over age k
% of all workers in industry i and occupation j that are over age k
(4)
where age k was set at 55 and recently hired workers concern those who have been
employed by the enterprise within last 5 years. In order to estimate the logit model,
the index has been regressed on the census data. The dataset contains information
on almost one million employees recorded in the National Longitudinal Survey of
Men aged 45-59. The control variables include years of education, age at the time of
entry into ﬁrst job, health status, region of residence, part-time workers and wages set
through collective bargaining. Small values of the index indicate a speciﬁc occupation
in a given industry where older workers are employed but not hired. Analysis of the
data reveals that, indeed, employer behaviour often looks like age discrimination.
Jobs for which older workers are employed but not hired (for example lawyers) do
have the characteristics of delayed payment contracts, i.e. pensions, long job tenures,
comparatively high wages and mandatory retirement. This hypothesis has been also
conﬁrmed by Heywood, Ho, and Wei (1999) using data from establishments in Hong
Kong.
However, while explaining this phenomenon, there exists another aspect that should
not be neglected. According to Hutchens (2006), one of the reasons why older people
are not hired for posts currently held by older workers is that these jobs are more
likely to be ﬁlled from the inside, in particular when they involve costs associated
with speciﬁc training. Actually, the employer might prefer to ﬁll vacancies after
older workers with insiders due to better information on insiders than outsiders2.
An insider, either young or old, seems naturally the best worker for a job with a
delayed payment contract.
2For a review on job assignment and promotion assuming this type of asymmetric information
see Valsecchi (2000).
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1.4. Conclusions
The ﬁrst part of this chapter presents the development over the 70s and 80s of
the major theoretical concepts on evolution of earnings and productivity with age.
The empirical studies, that appeared considerably later, revealed that the observed
wage and productivity proﬁles of individual workers cannot be fully explained by
either human capital theory or job matching or deferred compensation models. In
fact, human capital and incentive theories can provide complementary explanations.
For example, the accumulation of speciﬁc human capital is most important at early
stages of careers and in jobs which require speciﬁc skills. The deferred compensation
models appear optimal in jobs where worker eﬀort and/or output are diﬃcult to
verify and where a wage-productivity gap is socially desirable for increased eﬀort
incentive reasons.
Moreover, both theories partially explain why ﬁrms employ senior workers but are
reluctant to hire them. According to human capital theory, older workers tend to
have accumulated important amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital whose particu-
larity is that it increases worker's productivity more in the ﬁrm that has provided the
appropriate training than in other ﬁrms. Consequently, seniors can be eﬃcient em-
ployees in their current ﬁrm but since they cannot easily transfer their competences
to another company, they have reduced chance to ﬁnd a new potential employer. On
the other hand, deferred compensation model, involving payment to young employ-
ees under their productivity and older workers above their productivity, tend to be
based on a long-term relationship. Thus, it is diﬃcult for an older person to join an
enterprise applying deferred compensation scheme.
Furthermore, multiple empirical studies underline that in order to explain wage and
productivity changes, even within the same ﬁrm, one needs to refer to diﬀerent
theories (Baker et al., 1994). Many authors observe the signiﬁcant wage eﬀect of
labour market experience and interpret it as an indication of relevance of general
human capital, whereas the returns to tenure (time spent in the ﬁrm) are meant to
indicate returns to speciﬁc human capital (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987; Topel, 1991;
Yamaguchi, 2007). However, a signiﬁcant tenure eﬀect can be also consistent with
Lazear's agency theory (Abowd et al., 1999). Seltzer and Merrett (2000), using a
long panel data for employees of Australian bank, ﬁnd that both incentive theory
and theory of speciﬁc human capital explain tenure eﬀects in individual wages. The
combined relevance of both theories within the same ﬁrm has been found by Grund
and Westergård-Nielsen (2005) who ﬁnd the productivity proﬁle steeper than the
wage proﬁle at the beginning of a worker's career, followed by wage proﬁle steeper
than productivity at its end. We will come back to this issues in chapter 2, when
interpreting the results of the empirical studies on age-related pay-productivity gap.
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2. Important empirical ﬁndings concerning age-
earnings and age-productivity proﬁles
The theories presented in the ﬁrst part of this chapter propose several distinct expla-
nations for upward-sloping wage structures as workers get older. They are justiﬁed
by the increased workers' productivity thanks to longer tenure and acquired expe-
rience. Or, they are applied as productivity-enhancing method by encouraging a
higher level of eﬀort. However, there exist additional explanations that theories do
not take into account but which have been proved by a number of empirical studies.
First, some interesting facts on age-proﬁle of earnings will be presented. We will
see that its increasing slope might be not purely employer's decision but also a
result of workers' preferences. Then, we focus on the observed phenomenon of wage
compression within the ﬁrms i.e. when wages vary less than individual productivity.
Finally, we signal possible errors concerning the interpretation of age-earnings proﬁle
depending on the characteristics of the available dataset. Second, we present some
empirical evidence concerning the productivity variation by age. This subsection
starts with the presentation of the actual employers' beliefs about advantages and
disadvantages of employing junior and senior workers. Then, we depict determinants
and existing measurement methods of individual job performance, followed by the
empirical studies evaluating the eﬀect of age composition on the ﬁrm's productivity.
2.1. Age-proﬁle of earnings
The observed ﬁrms' remuneration policies indicate that earnings tend to rise with
workers' seniority. Indeed, a newly-hired employee receives initially a certain wage
which, due to a sequence of promotions and pay increases, reaches with time a higher
level. Most employers oﬀer to senior workers not only higher wages but also larger
non-wage compensation such as pension rights, vacation time and other beneﬁts
(Hutchens, 1986). These observations conﬁrm the principal theoretical intuition
(presented in the previous part) for increasing age-earnings proﬁle. However, the
upward-sloping age-earnings proﬁle might not only be desired by the employers but
also correspond to preferences expressed by workers (Loewenstein and Sicherman,
1991).
Another interesting issue in the context of age-earnings diﬀerentials is whether wage
indicates worker's productivity at any age. There exist several theories as well as
empirical evidence (Frank, 1984; Campbell and Kamlani, 1997) contradicting the
paradigm of equality of wage and marginal productivity. These diﬀerent studies do
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not focus directly on the age eﬀect. Nevertheless, they bring valuable insights into
the age-earnings relationship. Actually, although the empirical research is often built
around the neoclassical assumption that workers are paid their marginal products,
empirical studies point out that wage rates vary substantially less than individual
productivity values. Even if a wide discrepancy in productivity among individual
workers exists, many ﬁrms continue to follow strict remuneration scheme based on ed-
ucation, experience and tenure length. As a result of this rigid remuneration scheme,
in response to a negative productivity shock, employers instead of adjusting wages,
adjust their employment structure. Consequently, the least productive workers or
those, whose wages exceed their productivity levels, are the ﬁrst to become redun-
dant. If this is the case of older workers, they will constitute the most vulnerable
age group on the labour market.
While analysing age-proﬁle of earnings one should not neglect the confusion existing
in the literature concerning their interpretation (Thornton et al., 1997). The most
frequent mistake is about confounding diﬀerences between wages of individuals at
diﬀerent points in their lives (cross-section) and wage diﬀerences within persons over
time (longitudinal data). Thus, on the basis of cross-section data, it is impossible to
make conclusions concerning earnings changes of individuals over time.
2.1.1. Workers' preferences for increasing age-earnings proﬁles
Interestingly, the upward-sloping age-earnings proﬁle might not only be desired by
the employers but also correspond to preferences expressed by workers. It has been
shown that many people prefer increasing over ﬂatter or decreasing proﬁle of earnings
even if the latter would maximize the net present value of future proﬁts. Thus,
such behaviour violates the principle of present-value maximization. Loewenstein
and Sicherman (1991) provide empirical evidence on this subject. They asked 80
persons to answer a questionnaire and rank alternative payment options 1) for a
job and 2) for rental income from a small apartment building. Most of respondents
expressed a preference for increasing payment scheme, in particular with regard to
wage payments. Only the minority demonstrated preferences for decreasing payment
option compatible with present-value maximization. Even after having provided the
respondents with arguments favouring the decreasing payments, most of them have
not changed their preferences and opted for an increasing payments proﬁle.
Regarding the respondents' motivation, the authors expected that some of them
might associate level of wage with level of productivity so that a payment increase
could create a sort of feeling of mastery. A preference for increasing earnings
could also come from a taste for increasing levels of consumption accompanied by
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self-control problems to save adequately in earlier periods. People could also derive
current utility from expecting higher consumption in the future.
Among reasons for choosing the increasing proﬁle of earnings, the respondents most
frequently indicated a taste for increasing payments followed by savouring (plea-
sure of expecting higher income in the future), inﬂation consideration and aversion
to earnings decrease. Such explanations accounted for 71 %.
According to Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991), the observed individual prefer-
ences for increasing payments could explain why actual earnings proﬁles oﬀered by
ﬁrms might be steeper than those predicted by the theories. However, likewise, the
authors underline that in order both employers and employees could beneﬁt from
upward-sloping remunerations, it is necessary that job contracts guarantee long-term
employment.
The preference for increasing wage payments has been further conﬁrmed in the ex-
perimental study by Duﬀy and Smith (2010) who found that the taste for increasing
income is increasing in the size of the payments and is strongest for intermediate
wages.
2.1.2. Intra-ﬁrm wage rigidity
Some of the existing theories predict earnings proﬁle to be ﬂatter than proﬁle of
workers' marginal productivity (speciﬁc human capital theory) and some other pre-
dict them to be steeper (deferred compensation model). Nevertheless, the empirical
research is often built around the standard neoclassical model assumption of com-
petitive labour market. It implies that workers are paid their marginal products
by cost-minimizing ﬁrms and thus at any point in time, a person's wage indicates
the person's productivity3. Consequently, data on wages are often used as suﬃcient
statistics for workers' productivity in order to estimate empirical models concerning
so various economic aspects as growth models based on estimation of production
function (Duﬀy and Papageorgiou, 2000), skills' substitutability (Ciccone and Peri,
2003) or capital-skill complementarity (Duﬀy et al., 2004).
In recent years, this assumption has become more and more controversial. The
perfect competition on the labour market is highly doubtful. In fact, depending on
the actual level of competition, employers might apply diﬀerent wage policies. In
the absence of competition for employees from other ﬁrms, employers tend to oﬀer
3However, Becker (1962) argues that even if a discrepancy between marginal labour product and
wage tends to be interpreted as a proof of competitive market imperfections (monopsony power), it
would occur even in a perfectly competitive environment provided it involves investment in speciﬁc
training.
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a rather ﬂat wage-tenure schedule. If competition from other employers is likely to
take place, the employer will probably try to choose his optimal wage structure in
a way to hit two conﬂicting targets: a steep wage-tenure proﬁle to deter quits of
his employees but a ﬂat one so that workers with a high quit propensity are still
attracted to the ﬁrm (Manning, 2003).
Until now, rich argumentation has been provided why wages and productivities may
actually diverge. Over the past twenty years, several theories have been developed
to explain why ﬁrms, even if a wide discrepancy in productivity among individual
workers exists, continue to follow strict remuneration scheme based on education,
experience and tenure length (Table 1). Thus, wages are determined by other factors
than individual contribution to ﬁrm's value-added.
Table 1: Theories of wage rigidity
Theory Source of wage rigidity
Contract theory Long-term contracts between firms and workers set wages in advance and are negotiated on a
staggered basis [Fischer 1977; Taylor 1979].
Implicit contract theory Workers are risk averse, preferring a real wage that is stable over the business cycle to one
that rises in expansions and falls in recessions. A firm offering its workers a steady wage
could therefore pay an average wage below what it would otherwise have to pay because it
would be giving workers a compensating differential in return for the lower average wage.
This risk aversion gives firms and workers an incentive to reach an implicit understanding
that the wage will be kept stable over the business cycle [Baily 1974; Gordon 1974; Azariadis
1975; Stiglitz 1986].
Efficiency wage theory Workers’ productivity depends positively on the wage [Solow 1979; Yellen 1984; Stiglitz 1986].
a. Shirking model The cost of losing one’s job depends positively on the wage, so that a higher wage will induce
fewer workers to shirk and risk dismissal [Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984].
b. Gift-exchange model Workers view a higher wage as a gift from the firm, inducing them to work harder as a gift to
the firm [Akerlof 1982, 1984].
c. Adverse selection model A higher wage raises the average quality of a firm’s applicant pool. In addition, adverse
selection may also apply to quits, since a firm’s most productive workers are the most likely to
quit if it cuts wages [Weiss 1980, 1990].
d. Turnover model Workers’ quit rates depend negatively on the firm’s wage. Thus, a firm paying higher wages
will have lower costs of hiring and training new workers. In addition, its workers on average
will have acquired more firm-specific human capital, making them more productive than
similar individuals with no experience at the firm [Stiglitz 1974; Schlicht 1978; Salop 1979;
Hashimoto and Yu 1980].
Fair wage-effort hypothesis If workers’ wages are below their perceived fair wage, then their effort depends on the ratio of
their wage to their perceived fair wage [Akerlof and Yellen 1990].
Insider-outsider theory Firms do not dismiss their current workers (i.e., insiders) and hire the unemployed (i.e.,
outsiders) at a lower wage because of the cost of hiring and training new workers and because
of the ability of insiders to harass or not cooperate with new entrants hired to replace
dismissed insiders. The costs of replacing insiders with outsiders gives insiders a great deal of
power in setting their own wage [Lindbeck and Snower 1988].
Source: Campbell and Kamlani (1997)
Five of the most prominent theories concerning wage rigidity are contract theory, im-
plicit contract theory, eﬃciency wage theory, fair wage theory, and insider-outsider
theory. According to implicit contract theories, compensation is redistributed over
the period of the contract, independently of the current level of productivity. Thus a
person's spot wage might have little to do with spot productivity. While facing un-
certainty about new workers productivity, employers may oﬀer remuneration scheme
taking a form of e.g. complex insurance if employees are relatively more risk averse
than ﬁrms (Stiglitz, 1975; Malcomson, 1999) or a deferred compensation system.
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The marginal productivity theory of wages has been examined by Frank (1984) who
noticed that many ﬁrms follow strict pay schedules that are much more egalitarian
than actual productivity diﬀerences between workers. Obviously, measuring indi-
vidual productivity could be very costly for the ﬁrm and that would explain wage
compression. However, the rigid pay schemes have been observed even in occupations
where there is relatively easy to observe individual productive contribution. Frank
(1984) constructed direct estimates of the marginal productivity of employees in a
variety of enterprises that could reasonably be assumed to purchase labour under
competitive conditions (estate salespeople, car salespeople, research scientists) and
then compared these estimates with the amounts these workers are actually paid.
The main ﬁndings contrast sharply with the characterization of labour market equi-
librium as it is described in traditional neoclassical models. Wage rates tend to vary
substantially less than individual productivity values. The most productive workers
appear to be paid substantially less than their marginal products while the least
productive members - substantially more.
Moreover, Frank (1984) pointed out that workers might attach great importance to
their relative standing in the income hierarchies of the groups to which they belong.
He demonstrates that in this case and if status can be treated like most other goods,
people will expect compensating wage diﬀerentials: the premium for occupying a
low-ranked position and implicit price to pay for occupying a high-ranked position
in an earnings hierarchy, which tends to rise over time as incomes grow.
The analysis of reasons for wage rigidity has been carried out also by Campbell and
Kamlani (1997). In order to test which existing theory gains the strongest empirical
support, the author conducted a survey of 184 ﬁrms, mostly compensation executives
in Business Week 1000 corporations, and some smaller ones. Respondents were given
a series of statements based on various theories of wage rigidity and were asked to
indicate the importance of each of them in explaining why their ﬁrm normally does
not cut wages during recessions to the lowest level at which it can ﬁnd the necessary
number of qualiﬁed workers (provided their ﬁrm normally does not cut wages as low
as possible in recessions). First, the results revealed that ﬁrms do not pay wages that
are equal to workers' productivity. On average, respondents indicated that the pay
diﬀerential would equal only about half the diﬀerential in productivity. The fact of
keeping wage diﬀerentials between employees smaller than productivity diﬀerentials
was justiﬁed by a concern that large pay diﬀerentials would be harmful to workers'
morale.
Furthermore, investigating the reasons for wage rigidity, the authors found the
strongest support for explanations based on adverse selection in quits and on the
eﬀect of wages on eﬀort. Firms fear that, in particular for white-collar workers, cut
in wages could increase the number of quits and decrease their eﬀort, result in lower
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output or poorer service. Though, highly-skilled workers were found more likely to
quit than to reduce their eﬀort in response to a pay cut (Agell and Lundborg, 1995).
White-collar workers often acquired more ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, they perform
jobs that are more challenging and less standardized between ﬁrms. It makes their
hiring and training costs higher compared to other employees. Thus, employers wish
to reduce their turnover and retain them in the ﬁrm. On the other hand, the implicit
contract theory and impact of wage cut on level of eﬀort is supposed to well explain
wage rigidity for blue-collar and less-skilled workers. Also, hiring and training costs
appear to be a relatively important factor but signiﬁcantly less than for white-collar
workers.
Moreover, the eﬀect of wages on eﬀort concerns employers' fear that wage cuts would
generate negative feelings among workers and thereby lead to less eﬀort. Cohn
et al. (2011) conducted a ﬁeld experiment to test whether workers respond to wage
cuts and whether their response depends on co-workers' wages. They showed that,
in a group of two, cutting both workers' wages reduced their work performance
signiﬁcantly. However, cutting only one worker's wage resulted in a decrease in his or
her performance that was twice as large. In contrast, the spared worker's performance
remained unaﬀected. These ﬁndings conﬁrm the fair wage-eﬀort hypothesis, which
can explain intra-ﬁrm wage compression. Consequently, ﬁrms may ﬁnd it optimal to
refrain from cutting wages in recessions, even though wage reductions would decrease
labour costs. Since wages are not equal to productivity, ﬁrms would rather lay oﬀ
their least productive workers than lose their most productive workers through quits.
Also, the interview of three hundred business executives by Bewley (1999) revealed
that during the economic downturns, the executives might be reluctant to cutting
wages of their current employees or new hires since they believe that it would hurt
workers' morale. Consequently, it could harm the cooperation between the employees
and make it impossible to convince them to internalize the managers' objectives for
the company.
The similar argument is often used in the context of pay cut for older workers. In
a competitive labour market, if older workers were less productive than younger
workers, the employers would be forced to pay older workers a lower wage rate than
they pay younger workers without a necessity to lay them oﬀ. In real world, it is
argued that lowering the wages of older workers would adversely aﬀect their morale
and consequently their eﬀort level or productivity. However, as pointed out by Lazear
(1979), it is not evident that terminating older workers rather than lowering their
wages would improve the morale of the remaining employees: a 60-year-old worker
who is faced with approaching termination is not necessarily going to have a better
attitude than one who knows his wage rate will be lowered 5 years from now. It is
true that it might be diﬃcult to judge the actual decrease in productivity of an older
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worker in order to adjust his wage accordingly. However, the author remarks that
laying oﬀ a worker adjusts his wage rate to zero. This is a poorer approximation of
his true productivity decline than any smooth wage adjustment.
Wage rigidity has been also the object of a study by Caju et al. (2007). They
estimated nominal and real wage rigidity over the period 1991-2002 for diﬀerent
categories of workers in Belgium. Earnings of white-collar workers have been found
substantially more rigid than those of blue-collar workers. Similar as Campbell and
Kamlani (1997), the authors put attention to the fact that ﬁrms want to avoid decline
in eﬀort or quitting the ﬁrm by the white-collar workers. Therefore, employers may
be reluctant to cut wages of these workers whose eﬀort is less easily monitored and
having high replacement costs.
Consistent with the prediction of the shirking model and the adverse selection model
applied to quits, Du Caju et al. (2007) have found both real and nominal rigidity to
decline with age. Since the job loss is more costly for older workers, they are less likely
to quit or shirk, even if their earnings increases are below their expected bargaining
reference point. The low rigidity could be also related to the fact that automatic
pay increases due to age or tenure ﬂatten out with age. Moreover, as the extra-wage
components of earnings become more important for people with more experience and
responsibilities, real decreases in total earnings could be more probable. Real rigidity
has been evaluated as 35% lower for workers over 45 years old. Real and nominal
wage rigidity has been found highest for the youngest workers. In general, their
wages tend to be lower and thereby closer to the minimum wage. Likewise, there
are more workers with very low education and poorly paid jobs in the lowest age
category. The last phenomenon might be the result of the union bargaining within
ﬁrms. If unions care more about senior workers and their preferences, incumbent
workers controlling the union might exploit newcomers. Furthermore, employment
protection legislation in particular the last-in ﬁrst-out rule may protect older workers
more than younger workers. Due to this rule ﬁrms cannot simply replace high wage
older workers for low wage young workers (de Hek and van Vuuren, 2010).
2.1.3. Controversies about interpretation of age-earnings proﬁle -
longitudinal versus cross-section data
After having analysed, in the previous part, theoretical concepts on evolution of
productivity and earnings with age, people's actual preferences for increasing age-
earnings proﬁles and the phenomenon of intra-ﬁrm wage rigidity which results in
wages that do not necessarily indicate persons' productivity, this part is devoted to
a very important issue of correct interpretation of the age-earnings proﬁles.
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Depending on the type of available data, it is possible to investigate how earnings
change with workers' age, how they vary across diﬀerent age groups and to fore-
cast the evolution of future earnings. The longitudinal data permit to analyse the
changes of individual's pay over his life cycle as well as the cohort analysis over time.
The cross-sectional earnings data allow depicting the contemporaneous diﬀerences
between individuals of diﬀerent ages, belonging to diﬀerent cohorts.
However, in the literature, certain confusion concerning the interpretation of age-
earnings proﬁles has been observed. Many economists misinterpret the real meaning
of these proﬁles confounding diﬀerences between individuals at diﬀerent points in
their lives and diﬀerences within persons over time (Luong and Hébert, 2009). They
claim that cross-sectional, point-in-time data can also describe how earnings change
over the working life of the average worker, i.e. rising rapidly at younger ages,
reaching a peak, and then declining before retirement. In fact, cross-sectional proﬁles
generally understate the actual course of earnings over the average individual's life
cycle. Moreover, the characteristic inverted U shape (earnings peak and decline) of
cross-sectional proﬁles is not always observed in time series earnings data - almost
never for a cohort's nominal earnings path, and only sometimes for a cohort's real
earnings path (Thornton et al., 1997).
While analysing cross-sectional data that compare individuals in diﬀerent cohorts at
diﬀerent ages, it is impossible to make conclusions concerning earnings changes over
time. For example, one cannot expect that a 20-year-old today will in 30 years have
the same remuneration as a 50-year-old person today. Moreover, as diﬀerent age
cohorts vary in size, the baby boom generation will be expected to have relatively
lower wages than a cohort of baby bust. Also, the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁle
might not explicitly account for the change over time in returns to education due to
changes in technology and the industrial structure (Gohmann et al., 1998).
The problem with the interpretation of the cross-sectional data, which in contrast
to the longitudinal data, do not track the earnings of speciﬁc individuals through
their lifetimes but rather show the earnings of diﬀerent ages at some particular point
in time, has also been noticed by McConnell and Brue (1994). The authors state
explicitly that: the fact that the age-earnings proﬁles ultimately decline must be
interpreted with some care. While it is tempting to attribute the declining incomes
of older workers to diminished physical vigour and mental alertness, the obsolescence
of education and skills, or the decision to work shorter hours, the decline may be
largely due to the character of the data. (. . . ) Longitudinal data which do trace
the earnings of speciﬁc persons over time indicate that earnings continue to increase
until retirement.
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The explanation for the shape of cross-sectional earnings proﬁle grounded in human
capital theory has been surprising already for Mincer (1970). He pointed out that
original model does not directly apply to cross-sections and the theory deals with
lifetime behaviour of individuals, not with diﬀerences among individuals of diﬀerent
ages. The distinction between longitudinal (cohort) analysis and contemporaneous
(cross-section) analysis would not matter only in some exceptional cases such as
stationary economy or an economy in which changes are "neutral" with respect to
categories entering the human capital model.
Furthermore, concerning the characteristic inverted U shape of cross-sectional age-
earnings proﬁle, one should notice that in fact it will take place only if earnings of a
younger cohort grow at a suﬃciently faster rate to eventually overtake the earnings
of an older cohort. It is also possible that the decline in earnings for older age group
observed in a cross-section might represent simply a selection bias. If availability of
pensions (or other types of non-labour income) encourages some workers to retire
earlier and at the same time individuals with higher pensions are those with higher
earnings, there will be a higher rate of withdrawal from the labour force for these
workers compared to lower-paid individuals. Then, from a cross-sectional proﬁle
perspective, the average earnings of older workers may appear to decline sharply.
But evidently, such a phenomenon would not represent the actual course of earnings
for the remaining workforce (Thornton et al., 1997).
2.2. Age-related labour productivity
The fact that earnings tend to increase with seniority is often used as an argument
against older employees who are considered costing too much compared to their pro-
ductivity. However, although the level of earnings can be relatively easily veriﬁed,
the right estimation of workers' productivity is already much less evident. In par-
ticular, there is no well-deﬁned method of estimating how productivity varies by
age. Consequently, the age structure of a given workforce is largely based on the
employer's anticipations and beliefs about productivity of junior and senior workers.
In order to evaluate managers' willingness to employ workers belonging to diﬀerent
generations, this part starts with a brief review of the survey literature concerning
employers' beliefs about advantages and disadvantages of employing younger and
older employees.
Though, the real question is the actual evolution of productivity with age and
whether labour productivity is age-speciﬁc. Hence, the following part describes,
ﬁrst, various factors having impact on increase and decrease in productivity with
age and, second, diﬀerent approaches used to measure individual job performance.
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Finally, the last part of this section will be devoted to empirical studies evaluating
the eﬀect of age composition on the ﬁrm's productivity. Although a given workforce
is composed of many individuals, the diﬀerent mixture of junior and senior work-
ers might create working environment more or less favourable for the productivity
increase.
2.2.1. Advantages and disadvantages of employing younger and older
workers  opinions held by the employers
Searching for the optimal age structure of workforce, many employers base their
hiring decisions on the beliefs they hold about productivity of diﬀerent age groups.
In particular, the negative views about the adaptability and productivity of senior
employees, translates into lower hiring and retention rates, especially once workers
reach their early to mid-50s (OECD, 2006). In the large-scale postal survey of
personnel managers, Warr and Pennington (1993) found that, indeed, age is an
important factor in recruitment decisions in many organisations.
There is some evidence that employers have rather stereotypical views about the
strengths and weaknesses of younger and older workers. Senior employees tend to
be considered as diﬃcult and not willing to train, lacking creativity, too cautious,
incapable of heavy physical work and disliking taking orders from younger workers
(Walker, 2005). According to 2001 employers' survey carried out in Sweden, 50 %
of all employers considered older workers to have less relevant skills than younger
workers and to be more rigid and inﬂexible with respect to changes in the work-
place (OECD, 2003). In addition, 70 % of them reported that they never or only
very rarely hired older workers. Similarly, in the United States, a 1998 survey of
employers revealed that while older workers were often seen as being more loyal and
committed than younger workers, they were also seen as being less ﬂexible, less will-
ing to participate in training and less likely to have up-to-date skills (OECD, 2005).
One notable exception is Denmark, where in one survey, human-resource managers
generally reported that competences did not diﬀer systematically by age and that
age had no importance in their hiring decisions (OECD, 2006).
Obviously, both age groups have their advantages and disadvantages as employees.
The review of the survey literature shows that managers' opinions are fairly divided
in this aspect.
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Advantages of employing older workers
Many researchers report positive perceptions of senior workers by their employers or
they report that common stereotypes (lower performance, ﬂexibility or adaptability,
less potential, and less ability to learn new skills) are not justiﬁed (Bennington and
Tharenou, 1998; Fenstermacher and Kleiner, 1999; Kaplan, 2001; London, 1996;
Mallier and Shafto, 1992; Moberg, 2002; Paul and Townsend, 1993; St-Amour, 2001;
Yearta and Warr, 1995). Based on an extensive review of the literature by Guest and
Shacklock (2005), the most frequent references to the advantages of employing older
workers concern: experience and developed skills, reliability/dependability, loyalty,
low turnover, attendance/low absenteeism, knowledge and doing a better quality job
(see Table 3). Moreover, older workers tend to be seen as likely to retain plenty of
`mileage', being productive, ﬂexible, less accident prone and not lacking in creativity.
Many managers believe that older workers beneﬁt the ﬁrm thanks to their knowl-
edge, reliability and dedication (Buck Consultants, 2007) . Most of private-sector
employers interviewed by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, de-
clared that older workers' knowledge of procedures and other aspects of the job and
their ability to interact with customers substantially enhanced their productivity
(Munnell et al., 2006). Workers over 50 are appreciated by human resources execu-
tives for their loyalty and dedication to the company, commitment to doing quality
work, solid performance record and are considered as someone you can count on in
a crisis. Some employers prefer older workers to their younger counterparts because
they value their maturity, and strong work ethic (Johnson, 2007).
Advantages of employing younger workers
Some other research has argued that younger workers are valued more than older
workers by employers (Min and Kleiner, 2001; Australian Government Productivity
Commission, 2005). Among the advantages of employing younger workers, the most
frequent references were made to their ﬂexibility, training, adaptability or willingness
to change and more relevant skills (for a complete list see Table 2).
In terms of the perceived advantages of younger workers, O'Neill (1998) identiﬁed
that younger workers had more or better vision, hearing, strength and endurance,
cognitive processing and intellectual capital (except for general knowledge and verbal
ability). Employers rated younger workers as being more creative and easier to
train (Steinberg et al., 1998), ambitious, mentally alert, hardworking and creative.
Furthermore, employers perceived junior employees as being less cautious, higher in
physical capacity, more interested in learning technological skills, less accident prone,
in better health and less resistant to change (Taylor and Walker, 1994).
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Table 2: Perceived advantages of younger and older workers (in alphabetic order)
Perceived advantages of 
younger workers older workers 
 ability to learn new skills/creativity 
 adaptability/willingness to change 
 aggressive spirit 
 education quality/relevance 
 flexibility 
 less illness and injury 
 less expensive to hire 
 mental alertness 
 new technology knowledge/skills 
 physical abilities (some) 
 training-faster response 
 less expensive 
 take less time to learn 
 fewer accidents 
 accuracy 
 attendance/absenteeism 
 better quality job 
 commitment/able to be counted on  
in crisis situations 
 creativity/flexibility 
 experience and developed skills 
 ethical decision making/honesty 
 job turnover 
 knowledge/expertise 
 loyalty 
 maturity 
 people management/influence on 
 younger workers/mentoring roles 
 productivity 
 reliability/dependability 
 trainability 
 work ethic 
Source: Guest and Shacklock (2005)
However, perceptions of advantages of older or younger workers need careful appli-
cation. Not all individuals will perform at the same level or standard, nor will they
`age' at the same rate. It is possible that young people work faster, but they make
more mistakes. Older people can take longer to train, but they will do things more
thoroughly and produce a higher standard of work (James, 2001). Naturally, older
workers will have more experience, but the importance is the relevance and currency
of such experience.
Productivity versus cost: employers' concern about an ageing workforce
Despite all the perceived advantages associated to employment of senior workers and
political calling for extending working life, a Dutch large-scale survey has revealed
that most of the 1000 polled companies and organisations (73 %) declared to associate
an increase in the average age of their workforce with higher labour costs (see Table
3). More than half of the respondents claimed that ageing will increase absenteeism;
reinforce resistance to change and new technology. Moreover, it will certainly require
reorganisation of work and might adversely aﬀect a company's image. Older workers
are commonly thought of as costing more because they earn higher salaries, retire
early, are considered diﬃcult to retrain and prone to higher rates of absenteeism and
work injuries than younger workers (Brooke, 2003).
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On the other hand, 55 % of survey's participants expected that an increase in the
average age of their workforce would result in an increase in know-how and experi-
ence. Merely 15 % supposed that it would lead to fewer conﬂicts and only 7 % hoped
it would bring about an increase in productivity (Remery et al., 2003).
Table 3: Employers' opinions about expected consequences of an ageing workforce
(in %)
Consequences 
Percentage of employers answering 
(Highly) 
unlikely 
Neutral 
(Highly) 
likely 
Total 
• Increase in labor costs 
• Greater resistance to change 
• Increase in absenteeism 
• Increase in know-how and experience 
• Review of the way in which work is organized 
• Need to improve working conditions 
• Less enthusiasm for new technology 
• Fewer conflicts within the organization  
• Negative effect on organization’s image 
• Increase in productivity 
 7 
12 
9
14 
17 
14 
16 
30 
40 
52 
20 
31 
35 
30 
31 
36 
34 
55 
45 
41 
73 
57 
56 
55 
52 
50 
50 
15 
15 
7
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Source: Remery et al. (2003)
Actually, many ﬁrms express concern about the cost of employing older people.
Senior employees may be seen as particularly expensive due to higher salaries, fringe
beneﬁts or higher health care costs. Medical beneﬁts damage employment prospects
for older workers especially in the United States, where it is the employer who covers
most medical expenses (Johnson, 2007).
Employers also may be more reluctant to hire senior job applicants than retain older
workers due to occurring training costs. Seniors, expected to retire relatively soon
(especially due to possible early retirement), might be less eager to undertake train-
ing in order to maintain their productivity. For the same reason, employers do not
have incentive to invest in older workers if it might be diﬃcult to recuperate the
training costs. Hence, senior workers are oﬀered fewer opportunities to participate
in training programmes. However, as shown in the recent (2010) report by the Aus-
tralian Computer Society, due to high labour turnover of juniors (younger workers
are ﬁve times more likely to change jobs than older workers), older workers tend to
stay longer with an employer after training than younger workers.
Furthermore, in the recent decades, the demand for older workers has suﬀered also
due to the rapid development of information and communication technologies. It
was not evident for senior workers to keep up with innovative work practices and
the continuous training has not always been oﬀered. Consequently, technological
and organisational changes induced earlier retirement (Bartel and Sicherman, 1993;
Haegeland et al., 2007) and negatively aﬀected the wage bill share of older workers
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(see Aubert et al., 2006; Beckmann, 2007; Rønningen, 2007). In this context, training
appears to have a positive impact on the employability of older workers, by reducing
their turnover or by increasing hiring rates more than for other age groups (Behaghel
et al., 2011).
2.2.2. Age and individual job performance
As shown in the previous part, employers tend to hold rather stereotypical views
about the strengths and weaknesses of younger and older workers. Thus, there is a
great need to investigate on the actual variation of productivity with age and to see
whether labour productivity is age-speciﬁc. If labour productivity is age dependent,
and older workers are less productive, then ageing workforce would bring about a
decline in aggregate productivity, even if age-speciﬁc productivity were to remain
constant (Börsch-Supan, 2008). This process could be observed at the ﬁrm level as
well as in the whole economy.
The main challenge for the research concerning workers' age and productivity is the
diﬃculty to measure the marginal productivity of individuals. Although the earnings
can be measured with reasonable precision, there does not exist any deﬁnite way of
estimating how productivity varies by age. Existing empirical studies on this subject
often involve a large degree of uncertainty. They rely on strong assumptions that
are likely to bias the estimates or they consider a narrow set of occupations which
limits validity of conclusions to particular jobs.
Furthermore, it happens that certain confusion regarding the interpretation of age-
productivity proﬁles takes place. Namely, the cross-sectional analysis is sometimes
incorrectly followed by conclusions on evolution of productivity with worker's age,
whereas, in fact, it describes the diﬀerence in productivity within the current pop-
ulation. It has been found that studies based on cross-sectional data typically ﬁnd
a younger ability peak than time-series analysis where the same individuals are fol-
lowed over time. For example, Schaie (1996) found in his study on word ﬂuency
that, in the longitudinal dataset, this ability did not decline before the age of 53. In
cross-sectional settings, it has been found to deteriorate already at age of 25. Hence,
studies based on time-series are generally supposed to be biased upwards. On the
other hand, cross-sectional approach might suﬀer from downward bias of produc-
tivity estimates since younger cohorts have on average higher education and ability
levels (Dickens and Flynn, 2001).
Factors determining individual job performance
It is very important to make a distinction between a set of common factors that inﬂu-
ence the productivity of the total workforce (ﬁrm's type, used technology, organisa-
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tion of work, etc.) and the elements having an impact on the individual productivity
potential. The current productivity of each individual is a result of evolution over
time of diﬀerent factors, such as: physical and mental abilities, education and job
experience. Combined with the company's characteristics, job requirements and
task description, these elements determine individual job performance in the current
workplace.
Physical capacities as well as cognitive abilities are both expected to change or evolve
with worker's age. Although today's seniors are more physically ﬁt and the shift
from goods-producing to services-producing jobs has reduced the physical demands
of work (Munnell et al., 2006; Spitz-Oener, 2006), it has been proved that physical
productivity tends to decrease as workers get old (for the review see de Zwart et al.,
1995).
At the same time, it is not so evident to establish a clear correlation between the evo-
lution of productivity over the life cycle and changes in cognitive abilities. According
to Horn and Cattell (1966), we can diﬀerentiate between crystallised abilities and
ﬂuid abilities. Crystallised abilities (e.g. verbal skills) depend on acquired knowledge
and can stay virtually unchanged until late in life. On the other hand, ﬂuid abili-
ties (e.g. reasoning and speed) might start declining already from early adulthood.
Therefore, it has been observed that productivity reductions at older ages are the
strongest in job tasks where problem solving, learning and speed are important. For
work tasks where experience and verbal abilities matter more, there is less or no
reduction in productivity among elderly workers (Skirbekk, 2008). For example, no
evidence of a mental productivity decline has been found by Van Ours (2010) who
compares publication scores in economics journals by members of the Department
of Economics of the Tilburg School of Economics and shows that productivity in
publishing increases with age up to age 50 and stays constant after that.
Even if some cognitive abilities are likely to decline with worker's age, thanks to
longer experience and higher levels of job knowledge, senior workers can maintain
their productivity level. It is well illustrated in a study by Salthouse (1984) on the
eﬀect of age and skills in typing. Compared to their younger colleagues, older typists
were found to compensate for their lower typing speed by using more eﬃcient work
strategies. A vast experimental literature indicates that despite age-related declines
in perceptual and motor capacities and basic cognitive processes, older persons may
perform equally well as their younger counterparts thanks to accumulation of spe-
cialised knowledge (Bosman, 1993; Charness, 981a, 981b; Charness and Bosman,
1990; Rybash et al., 1986; Salthouse, 1987, 1989, 1990). These studies, investigating
age diﬀerences in skill acquisition indicate that older adults are capable of acquir-
ing new skills, and that practice brings about important increase in performance.
Older employees, both white-collar and rank-and-ﬁle workers, are often appreciated
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for their tacit knowledge and familiarity with procedures to solve everyday problems
(Munnell et al., 2006).
In general, senior workers can stay highly productive in the domains that they know
well and where having a long experience is important. On the other hand, as peo-
ple grow older while staying within the same ﬁeld of expertise, they take a risk
that the skills they developed will be less and less transferable. It is particularly
important in the perspective of the currently observed accelerating technological
progress. It increases demand on such skills as being able to learn and to adjust to
new ways of working, while a long work experience becomes less important (Baltes
and Lindenberger, 1997; Hoyer and Lincourt, 1998). In addition, a decline in self-
conﬁdence for career-relevant learning experiences may contribute to older workers'
greater reluctance to pursue learning and development activities (Maurer, 2001). Fi-
nally, although senior workers today have much higher education levels than their
predecessors, their education and skills may be obsolete compared to the younger
generation (Guest and Shacklock, 2005).
Approaches used to measure the inﬂuence of age on individual productivity
The relation between age and job performance has been studied by several diﬀerent
disciplines such as social psychology, medical science and labour economics and each
of them uses diﬀerent methods. Among the most common approaches we can dis-
tinguish: supervisors' ratings, measuring quantity and quality of a worker's output
and employer-employee matched datasets analysis.
Studies based on supervisors' ratings have not found any clear or systematic rela-
tion between worker's age and productivity (McEvoy and Cascio, 1989; Warr, 1994).
However, the main disadvantage of these studies consists in high subjectivity bias.
Evaluating workers' performance, managers might wish to reward certain age cate-
gories of workers for their past achievements or loyalty.
More objective methods are the work-sample tests, measuring quantity and quality of
a worker's output. They usually take a form of a task-quality or speed tests such as
test of computer-based performance. These studies tend to ﬁnd that senior workers
have lower productivity due to longer response time or a greater number of errors.
The potential bias might come from the time-limit (performance during a short test
might not correspond to one's everyday productivity) or participants selection (only
certain age groups or narrow occupations).
In economics, the estimation of workers' productivity has been most often based
on analysis of the matched employer-employee datasets. In this case the individual
productivity is measured as the workers' marginal impact on the ﬁrm's output or
value-added. The most common result is a hump-shaped relation between job per-
formance and age (Andersson et al., 2002; Crépon et al., 2002; Ilmakunnas et al.,
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2000; Haltiwanger et al., 1999). Employees in their 30s and 40s are found to be
the most productive group. Senior workers, above the age of 50 seem to have lower
productivity despite their higher wages. Contrasting results have been presented by
Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) in their study of Israeli manufacturing ﬁrms where
they suggest that productivity increase over the life span. However, the authors
underline themselves that due to the high inﬂow of young immigrants as well as the
poor data quality, no deﬁnite conclusions about age and productivity could be drawn.
Also, in a study of American ﬁrms, Hellerstein et al. (1999) suggest that those above
55 contribute the most to the ﬁrm's output. However, when using the value-added
instead of output as an indicator of productivity, they ﬁnd that the peak productiv-
ity shifts to 35-54-year-olds workers. Thus, the conclusions of empirical studies stay
quite ambiguous.
2.2.3. How the age composition of workforce relates to ﬁrm's pro-
ductivity performance?
As we have seen in the previous parts, the individual job performance is a complex
phenomenon. There are many diﬀerent factors having impact on worker's produc-
tivity. Some are very individual such as physical or cognitive abilities. Some others
depend on working environment (technology, working methods) that can favour or
hinder worker's performance. Nevertheless, there is one more dimension that should
not be neglected when speaking about age and productivity. It is the age composi-
tion of a given workforce. Diﬀerent mixtures of young and old are likely to produce
more or less productive work environment (Guest and Shacklock, 2005). On the one
hand, heterogeneous workforce is expected to be beneﬁcial. Young workers can in-
troduce new techniques to older employees, whereas seniors can share the knowledge
that they have obtained through years of experience in the particular industry or in
a particular ﬁrm. On the other hand, age diversity might be crippled by communi-
cation and coordination problems (Hansen et al., 2006).
The concept of an optimum workforce age mix that maximises ﬁrm's proﬁts is still
investigated. The right combination of age and skills is not always possible or easy
to implement. Obviously, labour turnover is constrained by market rigidities and
law regulations. But a real problem is also a limited supply of labour with required
characteristics, especially nowadays or in the near future because of smaller age
cohorts. It is then particularly important to combine older and younger workers'
skills so that they complement each other. Then, the increased initial costs of the
younger workforce may be balanced by their currency of skills and knowledge, which
in turn can be balanced by the experience and stability of older workers (Brooke,
2003).
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The existing studies tend to underline the positive eﬀects of age diversity on global
productivity (Barrington and Troske, 2001; Hansen et al., 2006; Garibaldi et al.,
2010). Börsch-Supan and Weiss (2011), estimating the relation between the age
structure of work teams and their productivity for a car manufacturing plant, ﬁnd
that older workers are slightly more likely to make errors in the production process.
However, since they hardly make any severe errors, they prove to be especially able to
keep control in diﬃcult situations. On the other hand, Hamilton et al. (2004) using
a novel panel data from a garment plant, conclude that holding the distribution of
team ability constant, teams with greater diversity in age are less productive.
In the context of inter-generational teams, it is worthy to mention a theoretical paper
by Breton et al. (2006) based on an overlapping-generations model with adverse
selection, where wages are reputation-based. They show that even if an employer
is indiﬀerent between inter- and intra-generational teams, workers may care about
the age composition of the team. This occurs because age diﬀerences between co-
workers usually reﬂect diﬀerences in work histories, as well as actual and attributed
productivities (i.e. reputations). As a result, young and high-productivity agent will
always prefer to work in inter- than intra-generational teams. The authors explain
this result as follows. First of all, two young, inexperienced workers are unlikely to be
able to provide training to each other. Thus, a young worker who believes that such
training might allow him to increase his productivity, and so his wage, will prefer
to be teamed up with an experienced senior worker. Moreover, if it is possible to
assess individual contributions to a team output by using individual reputations, an
older co-worker with a clear (either good or bad) reputation implies less uncertainty
when it comes to determine who did what in the team. This might be preferable to
a high-productivity worker who wants to be easily identiﬁed, and will favour team
arrangements that minimize the uncertainty on team members' contributions.
The inﬂuence of age composition of the workforce on ﬁrm performance has been also
a research subject of a number of empirical studies. However, there is no consensus in
their ﬁnal results. The issue whether ﬁrms with young rather than older workers are
more successful and whether ﬁrms with homogenous or heterogeneous workforce are
doing better, has been investigated by Grund and Westergård-Nielsen (2008). They
used linked employer-employee panel dataset for Danish companies over 1980-1998
in order to estimate the following multivariate linear model:
logY = β0 + β1mean age+ β2 (mean age)
2
+ β3sdv of age+ β4 (sdv of age)
2
+Xδ+ ε (5)
Firm performance Y has been measured as value added par employee. The age
structure of workforce has been captured by the mean age and the standard deviation
of worker's age. The authors control for tenure, schooling, share of females and blue
collars (vector X). ε is en error term. Among the main results, the authors ﬁnd that
both mean age and dispersion of age in ﬁrms are inversely U-shaped related to ﬁrm
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performance. Thus, companies with either very homogenous or very heterogeneous
workforces with respect to age of employees have much lower productivity (lower
value-added per worker). Estimating the ﬁxed eﬀects model, the authors found that
the most productive ﬁrms were those with an average age of employee of 37 years
and with a standard deviation of about 10 years.
Another study that tries to answer the empirical question of how labour productivity
at the plant level is related to the age composition of the labour force is the one by
Malmberg et al. (2008). Using the panel data concerning the Swedish mining and
manufacturing industries over the period 1985-1996, the authors estimate a model
with a log value added per worker as dependent variable and log of the age variables
as explanatory variables:
logY = β0+β1log (share ≤ 29)+β2log (share 30− 49)+β3log (share ≥ 50)+β4 (ed. mean)+ε
(6)
The workforce has been divided into three age groups: less than 30, between 30
and 50 and above 50 years. The only explicit control variable is the mean length of
education. In order to avoid problems related to omitted variables bias, the authors
control for plant-level ﬁxed eﬀects. OLS as well as IV regressions results suggest
that high shares of older employees are associated with higher productivity than
high shares of young workers.
The contrary results have been presented by Lallemand and Rycx (2009). The au-
thors ﬁnd that a higher share of young workers within a ﬁrm is favourable to ﬁrms'
productivity while a higher share of older workers is harmful. They investigate the
eﬀects of the workforce age structure on the productivity of large Belgian ﬁrms in two
subsequent cross-sections for 1995 and 2003. More precisely, they examine diﬀerent
scenarios of changes in the proportion of young, middle-aged and old workers and
their expected eﬀects on ﬁrm productivity. The age classes have been deﬁned in the
same way as in the study by Malmberg et al. (2008). The model, estimated by OLS
with White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, takes the form:
lnYj = β0+β1ln (share 16− 29)j+β2ln (share 30− 49)j+β3ln (share ≥ 50)j+γXj+δYj+ε
(7)
where Y is the value added par employee, X is a reach set of aggregate worker
characteristics per ﬁrm: the mean and standard deviation of education (number of
years of schooling), the mean and standard deviation of gross hourly wages in order
to control for eﬃciency wage eﬀects (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986; Weiss, 1991), the
share of blue-collar workers, the share of women, and the percentage of part-time
workers. Yj is a set of ﬁrm characteristics: the size (exact number of employees), the
industrial sector (at the NACE one digit level), the level of collective wage agreement,
the regional aﬃliation and the type of economic and ﬁnancial control.
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Overall, the presented empirical studies on the eﬀect of age composition on ﬁrm-level
labour productivity ﬁnd contradicting results. However, it must be noticed that it
is very diﬃcult to draw some direct comparisons. These studies are characterised
by many peculiarities such as speciﬁcation of independent variables, but also in
terms of data: various time dimensions, ﬁrms from diﬀerent economic sectors and
from diﬀerent countries with other institutional environment. Moreover, they do not
control for the capital stock and do not account for potential endogeneity of the
age composition of a ﬁrms' workplace. These limitations have been addressed by
other studies, using somewhat more structural approach, based on the estimation
of a production function. They will be further discussed in details in the following
chapter 2.
2.3. Conclusions
In order to understand the complexity of the relationship between age-earnings and
age-productivity proﬁles, the theoretical concepts, presented at the beginning, have
been then completed, in the second part of this chapter, with important empirical
ﬁndings.
We have seen that the increasing age-earnings pattern characterised by lower wages
for young workers and higher wages for older workers has been widely observed in
reality. However, it turns out that the wage proﬁle does not necessarily correspond
to worker's productivity at any age. Despite a large heterogeneity in productivity
level of individual workers, many ﬁrms apply a rigid remuneration scheme based on
education, experience and tenure, resulting in high wage compression within a ﬁrm.
One of the reasons is an evident diﬃculty to measure the productivity of an indi-
vidual worker or a particular age group. The intergenerational diﬀerences in job
performance have been investigated using so diﬀerent methods as supervisors' rat-
ings, measuring quantity and quality of a worker's output or through analysis of
employer-employee matched datasets. Although, the obtained results tend to stay
quite ambiguous, most of them suggest that productivity follows an inverted U-
shaped proﬁle, where signiﬁcant decrease comes after the age of 50. Nevertheless,
one should remember that in spite of hump-shaped cross-sectional age-productivity
proﬁles, individuals could experience productivity increase throughout their life cy-
cle. Indeed, thanks to better technologies, higher education level and more capital,
both younger and older workers might become increasingly productive over time.
Moreover, the productivity of both generations within a ﬁrm could be reinforced
through the eﬃcient age-mix of workers with complementary or synergistic age-
dependent skills. The physical strength, high education level and skills currency of
young workers could complement experience, maturity of judgement, reliability, and
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managing skills of older employees. Many studies suggest the positive eﬀects of age
diversity in a company. Nonetheless, up to now, many employers tend to consider
older workers as relatively less productive. This fact combined with widely spread
seniority-based remuneration system raises an important question about existence of
a wage-productivity gap for older workers. This very important from the employers'
point of view issue will be further investigated in the coming chapter 2.
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Chapter 2: Firm-level relationship
between age, wage and productivity
This chapter analyse the relationship between age, wage and productivity from the
perspective of the ﬁrm. It starts with the review of the empirical studies examining
the age-related wage-productivity gap. It is followed by the original study which,
using the French data on private ﬁrms, provides an estimation of labour productivity
across diﬀerent age groups.
1. Research on age-related pay-productivity gap
While deciding on its production level, a ﬁrm has to choose the optimal level of
labour needed to generate the given output. From an economic point of view, there
is an incentive to ﬁnd the age mix of the workforce that can produce a given output
at the least cost. This will be the age mix that yields the highest labour produc-
tivity and is described as the optimal age mix of the ﬁrm's workforce (Guest and
Shacklock, 2005). Although the distribution of earnings is usually easy to verify,
due to measurement problems there exist large uncertainties regarding the levels of
productivity for diﬀerent age categories of workers.
As noticed by Johnson (2007), ageing per se may aﬀect worker's productivity, either
positively or negatively. Thus, the assumption that all the workers are equally pro-
ductive after controlling for variables such as education, experience, and job tenure
is not very convincing. A better approach would be to relate individual productivity
measures to earnings and examine how this relationship varies by age, but individ-
ual productivity is diﬃcult to measure. Therefore, existing empirical studies try to
evaluate the productivity of diﬀerent generations by aggregating employees in dif-
ferent age groups. Nevertheless, the common problem is the underlying assumption
that workers belonging to the same age category have a similar productivity level.
Although, if individuals are aggregated at the ﬁrm level, the relationship between
productivity and age should still hold (van Ours and Stoeldraijer, 2010).
According to Johnson (1993), most employers and probably most employees seem to
believe in a rule of thumb that average labour productivity declines after some age
between 40 and 50. If this is true, and earnings continue to rise with age, older work-
ers may have a wage that is higher than their productivity and as a result, the gap
between wages and productivity can arise. In a perfectly competitive labour market
there is no reason for an age-related pay-productivity gap to occur because ﬁrms pay
workers according to their marginal productivity. However, with the existence of
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labour market institutions, imperfect information and/or costly monitoring of pro-
ductivity the direct relationship between age and productivity disappears and an
age-related pay-productivity gap may occur (Van Ours, 2010). It is important since
workers whose wages exceed their productivity levels might have reduced employ-
ment opportunities. It is observed that as a result of a rigid remuneration system,
in response to a negative productivity shock, employers instead of adjusting wages,
tend to adjust their employment structure. The least productive workers or those
who cost too much are the ﬁrst to become redundant.
Since productivity is a ﬁrm-level phenomenon, establishing the relationship between
age and productivity requires matched data at the level of the ﬁrm. The next part
includes a short review of existing studies followed by the methodological problems
often encountered in this type of research.
1.1. An overview of empirical studies based on production
function approach
In the empirical literature, there is relatively little research aiming at productiv-
ity and wage data comparison and their correlation with workers' age. Moreover,
it remains inconclusive about whether there is or not a pay-productivity gap for
older workers. One of the reason is that each study has its own peculiarities and
limitations. Studies diﬀer in terms of data (country, time period, cross-section or
panel), speciﬁcation of dependent and independent variables as well as chosen esti-
mation methods. Diﬀerent speciﬁcations of estimated production function are brieﬂy
presented in the box at the end of this section.
One of the ﬁrst studies based on the matched worker-ﬁrm data was the contribution
of Hellerstein et al. (1999). In order to analyse the relationship between produc-
tivity and wage diﬀerentials among US manufacturing workers, the authors use a
1990 cross-section plant-level matched employer-employee dataset. The employees
are distinguished by diﬀerent demographic characteristics such as gender, race, mar-
ital status, age, education and occupation. In this purpose, a translog production
function is jointly estimated with an earnings equation. A plant-level production
function takes a form:
lnY = lnA+ αlnK + βlnM + γlnQL+ g (K,M,QL) + µ (8)
Plants produce output Y that is a function of capitalK, materialsM and a quality of
labour aggregateQL. g (K,M,QL) denotes the second-order terms in the production
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function (Jorgenson et al., 1973), and µ is an error term. The labour aggregate QL
is a function of labour inputs:
QL = (L+ (φi − 1)Li) (9)
where L is the total number of workers, Li is the number of workers belonging to
category i and φi is the marginal productivity of i workers relative to the reference
group. As underlined by the authors, the corrections for number of working hours
does not change the conclusions. Diﬀerent categories of workers are assumed to
be perfectly substitutable but have potentially diﬀerent marginal products. The
relative marginal productivities of diﬀerent types of workers are restricted to be
equal across demographic groups. Furthermore, the proportion of workers deﬁned
by one demographic group is restricted to be constant across all the groups.
In order to quantify and compare productivity and wages for various groups of work-
ers, the plant-level production function has been estimated simultaneously with the
average wage equation of the form:
ln(w) = a′ + ln (L+ (λi − 1)Li) (10)
where a′ is the log wage of the reference group (for example, male, nonblack, never
married) and the λi represents the relative wage diﬀerentials associated with each
category. The relative wages of workers are restricted to be constant across all the de-
mographic groups. Moreover, all workers within the same set of demographic group-
ings are assumed to be paid equally. Hellerstein et al. (1999) have used information
on the plant-level rather than individual level earnings in order to compare easily
wage and productivity diﬀerentials. As long as both are estimated at the plant-level,
any unobservables should aﬀect the estimates similarly. In order to estimate relative
wage diﬀerentials for diﬀerent types of workers, total wages have been regressed on
the composition of workforce. The parameters are estimated using nonlinear least
squares.
The authors allow possible inequality between relative marginal productivity and
relative wage for diﬀerent groups of workers, which could be then interpreted as
an indicator of long-term incentive contracts or discrimination. Among the main
ﬁndings, prime-age workers are found as productive as younger ones. Moreover,
productivity and earnings of prime age and older workers rise at the same rate over
the life cycle. Thus, the authors claim that wage diﬀerentials reﬂect actual diﬀerences
in marginal products for most types of workers, particularly for the age category. The
ﬁnding that wage proﬁles are equivalent to productivity is coherent with the general
human capital model by Mincer (1974).
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The method used by Hellerstein et al. (1999) has been expanded by Crépon et al.
(2003). They use the available French matched employer-employee panel dataset
for the period 1994-1997. In order to remove some of the biases associated to OLS
estimation of production function, the authors run the estimations using OLS with
ﬁxed eﬀects and GMM procedure. Since the use of the translogarithmic function
does not change the results, for simplicity, they consider the following Cobb-Douglas
production function:
logQi = βlogKi + αlogL
∗
i + εi (11)
where Qi is ﬁrm's value-added, L∗i denotes labour inputs, K is the capital stock
and εi is an error term. The total amount of work L∗i is a sum of hours worked by
employees of type k in plant i, multiplied by their hourly productivity:
L∗i =
K∑
0
λikLik (12)
The authors make use of disaggregated data on wages that were not available to
Hellerstein et al. and decompose the labour input in the following way:
L∗i =
K∑
0
λik
wik
wikLik (13)
where wik is an hourly wage of workers k in plant i. Thanks to this operation, the
production function can be modiﬁed in a way to contain directly a ratio of hourly
productivity to wage δik =
λik
wik
for diﬀerent workers categories:
logL∗i = logLi + logw¯i + logδi0 + log
(
1 +
K∑
1
(
δik
δ0
− 1
)
Pwik
)
(14)
so that, instead of parallel estimation of production function and earnings equation,
here only one equation is estimated.
Pwik =
wikLik
w¯iLi
indicates the share of total wages received by workers of type k in ﬁrm
i.
The ratio of productivity to wages for diﬀerent types of workers δik is assumed to be
equal across ﬁrms. Similarly as Hellerstein et al. (1999), diﬀerent types of workers
are assumed to be perfectly substitutable.
The results obtained by Crépon et al. (2003) contrast with those by Hellerstein et
al. (1999). The authors state the existence of a wage productivity gap which tends
to expand with age. The wages continue to increase with workers' age whereas the
productivity stops rising at one point or even declines. It is though unclear whether
the old workers are overpaid or the young ones underpaid, or if both events take
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place. However, the authors pointed out that increase in wages for workers over 35
cannot be interpreted as reﬂecting human capital accumulation.
Expanding on the previous methodologies, (Aubert and Crépon, 2003; 2007) made
use of the larger French panel data, covering period 1994-2000, and decomposing the
labour force into thinner age groups. Through the estimation of the Cobb-Douglas
production function, they found that productivity tends to grow with age up to age of
40 and stabilises afterwards. In all sectors, workers aged 35-39 appear to be slightly
less productive than those over 40 and around 15 to 20 % more productive than
young workers under 30 years old. At the same time, the authors found no evidence
of a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between wage and productivity that could explain the lower
employability of older workers. Although for workers older than 55 a slight decrease
in productivity is observed, this result is not statistically signiﬁcant. Hence, the
result is consistent with the original paper by Hellerstein et al. (1999).
The following three studies, using the same estimation method, based on production
function and wage equations, ﬁnd however some evidence on the wage-productivity
gap increasing by age. Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2005) observe the positive cor-
relation between age and the wage-productivity gap that they attribute to strong
seniority eﬀects in wage setting. Dostie (2006) using Canadian matched worker-ﬁrm
data, concludes that both wage and productivity proﬁles are concave, but produc-
tivity is diminishing faster than wages for workers older than 55. Finally, a cross-
section study by Hellerstein and Neumark (2007) who refer to their previous article
(Hellerstein et al., 1999) strongly rejects the hypothesis of productivity and wage
diﬀerentials equality. The authors use the same speciﬁcations and sample selection
criteria like in the previous paper but use this time larger and more representative
dataset. The estimated age proﬁles suggest that the most productive group are
prime-age workers (35-54), followed by the younger ones and the seniors (over 55) as
the least productive. Furthermore, the wage proﬁle steeper than productivity proﬁle
is consistent with the deferred compensation model à la Lazear.
However, according to Van Ours (2010), a productivity-wage gap at high ages should
not be overestimated. The author analyses the relationship between age, wage and
productivity using a matched worker-ﬁrm panel dataset from Dutch manufacturing
covering the period 2000-2005. Using a variety of estimation methods, he ﬁnds little
evidence of an age related pay-productivity gap. The results of GMM estimation,
with the use of instrumental variables in order to control the endogenous character
of the age structure, reveal that both productivity and wage costs increase with age,
but in a similar way.
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Diﬀerent production function speciﬁcations
Cobb-Douglas production function (Douglas and Cobb, 1928) is the most widely used 
functional form in economics to represent the relationship of an output to inputs. It takes the 
following form: ܻ ൌ ܣܭఈܮఉ 
 
where Y is total production, L denotes labour input, K denotes capital input and A is total 
factor productivity. α and β are the output elasticities of labour and capital, respectively. 
These values are constants determined by available technology. The Cobb-Douglas form 
imposes strong assumptions on the underlying functional relationship; in particular, the 
elasticity of substitution of capital for labour is fixed to unity. 
A generalization of the Cobb-Douglas production function is the Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) production function. It has been developed by Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, 
and Solow (1961). The formal specification with two inputs is: 
 ܻ ൌ ܣሺߜଵܭିఘ ൅ ߜଶܮିఘሻି௩ఘ  
 
The parameter ܣ א ሺͲǡλሻ determines the productivity, ߜ א ሺͲǡͳሻ determines the optimal 
distribution of inputs, ߩ א ሾെͳǡͲሻ ׫ ሺͲǡλሻ determines the constant elasticity of substitution 
which is ߪ ൌ ͳȀሺͳ ൅ ߩሻ and ݒ א ሾͲǡ λሻis equal to the elasticity of scale.  
 
CES form encompasses the Cobb-Douglas (if ߪ approaches 1 for ߩ ՜ Ͳ), the Leontief (if ߪ 
approaches 0 for ߩ ՜ λ) and the Linear production functions (if ߪ approaches λ for ߩ ՜ െͳ and v is equal to 1) as its special cases. Although this function is more flexible than 
Cobb-Douglas, the main restriction is the constancy of the elasticity of substitution between 
inputs along and across the isoquants irrespective of the size of output or inputs (capital and 
labour) used in the production process (Henningsen and Henningsen, 2011). 
 
An alternative function that permits variable elasticities of substitution and transformation 
patterns is the Translog production function that has been introduced by Griliches and 
Ringstad (1971), Berndt and Christensen (1973) and Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973). 
It is the second order approximation to any unknown aggregate production function, using 
Taylor series. For two inputs, the translog production function is specified as: 
 ݈ܻ݊ ൌ ݈݊ܣ ൅ ߙ௄݈݊ܭ ൅ ߙ௅݈݊ܮ ൅ ߚ௄ሺ݈݊ܭሻଶ ൅ ߚ௅ሺ݈݊ܮሻଶ ൅ ߚ௄௅݈݊ܭ݈݊ܮ 
 
Unfortunately, this function is not invariant to the units of measurement of inputs and output. 
Further, on account of inclusion of lnK, lnL, their product and their squared values, 
estimation of parameters of this function often suffers from multicollinearity problem 
(Mishra, 2007). 
 
1.2. Methodological issues
In the studies that have been presented above, the relationship between age and pro-
ductivity has been analysed within a framework of production function. As noticed
by Hellerstein et al. (1999), the estimation of a production function is a compli-
cated task, especially when distinguishing among many types of workers. One of the
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diﬃculties consists in available data limitations. Although the number and quality
of data is increasing, we still tend to observe lack of information on quality dimen-
sions of labour and capital inputs, technologies used and organisational structure of
enterprises.
Besides data availability, the major diﬃculty concerns the potential endogeneity
of explanatory variables. According to the early critics by Marschak and Andrews
(1944), the usual inputs exogeneity assumptions that are required for the consistency
of OLS are unlikely to hold in production function estimation. In fact, inputs are not
under the control of econometrician but are chosen in an optimal way by the pro-
ducers themselves. Through the increasing availability of panel data, the problem of
misspeciﬁcations that could be assumed ﬁxed over time has been limited. Over years,
diﬀerent new solutions to the endogeneity problems have been proposed, such as in-
strumental variables or between and within estimations. The latest approaches
are attributed to Arellano and Bond (1991) and Olley and Pakes (1996). In recent
years both methods have experienced further developments. Many researchers in or-
der to avoid the simultaneity problem often encountered at the aggregate level, have
shifted to the use of thinner and thinner slices of micro-data. This approach how-
ever has exacerbated other problems and misspeciﬁcations such as high heterogeneity
(Griliches and Mairesse, 1995).
Finally, an important issue are the restrictions imposed on the production process
due to speciﬁc model chosen for the analysis. In the context of productivity according
to workers' age, the speciﬁcation of labour input is particularly important. Usually
made assumptions on perfect substitution among diﬀerent types of workers not only
remain doubtful but also do not stay without an inﬂuence on the estimated workers'
productivity.
1.2.1. Data availability
Most of studies estimating age-productivity proﬁles within the framework of produc-
tion function require the use of plant-level data on inputs and outputs matched with
individual-level data on workers with diﬀerent demographic characteristics. The con-
struction of such dataset is not always easy due to available data limitations. Some
information that have an impact on company's outcome and therefore should enter
the production function, are not always accessible. Ideally, one would like to know
establishment characteristics such as age of the enterprise, economic sector, capital
stock and its technical state as well as the right output measure - value added or
gross output. For example, Griliches and Ringstad (1971) discuss potential virtues of
a value-added output speciﬁcation. It enhances comparability of data across indus-
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tries and across establishments within industries, when they diﬀer in their degree of
vertical integration. Regarding the relevant workforce characteristics, they include
the composition of the labour force with respect to age, qualiﬁcations, education
and tenure as well as the number of hours worked and hourly wages. The missing
data are likely to complicate the analysis of age-productivity proﬁles. For instance,
the lack of information on educational attainment of workers does not let take into
account intergenerational diﬀerences in productivity due to diﬀerent levels of educa-
tion and as we know, older cohorts have less formal education than younger cohorts
(Van Ours, 2010).
Moreover, it is important to measure properly the company's labour input. Number
of hours worked is a better measure than the number of workers, since the latter
does not make a diﬀerence between part-time and full-time employees. If workers
in diﬀerent age groups work diﬀerent number of hours, then, using the information
on number of workers, one would mismeasure the proportion of labour supplied
by workers in diﬀerent groups. For example, if older employees on average work
fewer hours per week than the young ones, then the seniors' labour input would be
overstated.
Particularly important in the context of age-productivity estimation is the availabil-
ity of longitudinal data. This is especially true if the age and quality of the capital
stock or the age of the establishment correlate with the age structure of the work-
force. Some studies underline that in certain sectors older workers tend to work with
older, less productive capital endowment (Malmberg et al., 2008). In a cross section
(or between establishments) analysis this would lead to an underestimation of the
productivity of older workers (Göbel and Zwick, 2009). Longitudinal data enable
within-establishment comparison and thus correct for the bias induced by unobserv-
able factors, such as the quality of capital or establishment age, that are correlated
with certain age groups and establishment productivity (Crépon et al., 2003; Aubert
and Crépon, 2007).
1.2.2. Endogeneity and selection bias
The rich dataset, however, will not help yield consistent parameter estimates in the
production function if the production function itself is misspeciﬁed. The greatest
econometric challenge consists in correction for the simultaneity or endogeneity bias
(Griliches and Mairesse, 1995). It is likely that there are some omitted plant-speciﬁc
state variables that aﬀect simultaneously input choices and output. Then, the input
demand might be correlated with the productivity shocks unobservable by the econo-
metrician but observed or predicted by the ﬁrm (Marschak and Andrews, 1944). A
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proﬁt maximizing (or cost-minimizing) ﬁrm facing positive productivity shocks will
expand its production and thus increase the inputs level. On the other hand, a con-
sequence of the negative shocks will be a production decrease and lower input usage.
As a result, simple OLS estimation of the production function can lead to biased
estimates of the parameters of interest.
In particular, the endogeneity might concern the changes in the age composition of
the workforce. If a ﬁrm anticipates a negative productivity shock, it might adjust
inputs at the same time so that it becomes impossible to identify whether a decrease
in production is due to a lower level of inputs or due to a decrease in demand. A
ﬁrm facing a low demand might stop hiring new workers or ﬁre some of the younger
employees. Then, we will observe a decrease in productivity accompanied by higher
share of older workers. One could wrongly conclude that the aging workforce was
responsible for the drop in productivity while in fact there was just a correlation
between the drop in productivity and an increase in the share of older workers (Van
Ours, 2010). Similarly, a positive productivity shock could encourage a ﬁrm to hire
some young workers. Then, we will observe an increase in productivity generated by
relatively younger workforce. Therefore, one could wrongly conclude that increase
in productivity was due to young employees. The causality problem that appear is
whether ﬁrms employing relatively older workforce are less productive or if ﬁrms em-
ploy relatively older workforce because they are less productive (Aubert and Crépon,
2003).
Another related problem is endogenous selection. The workforce observed in the ﬁrm
is not a random draw from the population. The estimated productivity concerns only
employees, thus the people still actively present on the labour market. It could be
that only the best senior workers remain active while the least productive leave the
ﬁrms and possibly even the labour force. Moreover, workers who expect to earn
low wages at old age might be willing to retire earlier than workers with a high
earnings potential (de Hek and van Vuuren, 2010). At the same time, ﬁrms wish to
keep workers with high productivity, and stimulate low productive workers to retire.
Consequently, this could introduce an upward bias for the productivity of older
employees. Finally, the selection bias is possible also when some highly productive
workers, initially low-skilled, might access with time the high-skilled positions along
their career. As a result, we will observe more high-skilled and high-productive
persons among older workers.
In order to overcome the problem of endogeneity several approaches have been de-
veloped. The two traditional solutions comprise instrumental variables and ﬁxed
eﬀects. Among more modern approaches, the most known are the two following: a
procedure developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the one initiated by Olley
and Pakes (1996). Both have been further expanded by other researchers.
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Instrumental variables
Instrumental variables approach relies on ﬁnding appropriate instruments, i.e. vari-
ables that are correlated with the endogeneous explanatory variables but not with
the production function residuals. The natural instruments would be input prices
which have a serious impact on the choice of inputs but do not directly enter the
production function. Moreover, under the assumption of perfectly competitive in-
put markets, the ﬁrm has no inﬂuence on market prices so that they should not be
correlated with the production function residuals. However, using input prices as
instruments has not been very successful in practice. First of all, they are often not
reported by ﬁrms that make them diﬃcult to use. Furthermore, in order to be help-
ful as instruments, they should vary signiﬁcantly across ﬁrms due to diﬀerences in
exogeneous input market conditions and not in unobserved input quality (Ackerberg
et al., 2006). The challenge is to ﬁnd external instrumental variables with strong
resolving power.
Fixed eﬀects
The basic assumption behind ﬁxed eﬀects estimation is that unobserved productiv-
ity is constant over time. Then, production function parameters can be estimated
consistently using mean diﬀerencing, ﬁrst diﬀerencing or the least squares dummy
variables. However, since within a ﬁrm the changes of production and age structure
between years are likely to be determined in the same period, ﬁxed eﬀect estimates
are likely to be not particularly useful for the estimation of age productivity proﬁles
(Göbel and Zwick, 2009).
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (2000)
Approach
An alternative approach to control for the endogeneity bias has been developed by
Arellano and Bond (1991) in a dynamic panel data model. It consists in estimat-
ing an equation in ﬁrst-diﬀerences with appropriately lagged levels as instruments.
Though, since lagged variables in levels are often weak instruments for contempora-
neous diﬀerences, in case of highly persistent data, the method appeared to suﬀer
from ﬁnite sample bias and poor precision of the estimates. This problem has been
further addressed by Blundell and Bond (1998) who proposed the use of extra mo-
ment conditions that rely on certain stationarity conditions of the initial observation.
When these conditions are satisﬁed, the resulting system GMM estimator has been
shown to have much better ﬁnite sample properties in terms of bias and root mean
squared error than that of the ﬁrst diﬀerenced GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond,
1998; Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer, 2000). Within this framework lagged levels
are used as instruments for contemporaneous diﬀerences and lagged diﬀerences as
instruments for contemporaneous levels.
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The use of lagged observations in order to instrument current values of the inputs has
been applied in a number of studies dealing with age and productivity (e.g. Crépon
et al., 2003; Aubert and Crépon, 2006; Daveri and Maliranta, 2007; Lallemand and
Rycx, 2009). The underlying assumption is that contemporary shocks that may
aﬀect productivity and the age structure of the workers are orthogonal to the past
level of capital and the ﬁrm's age structure.
Nevertheless, instrumenting the age structure by its lagged values has some limits.
In particular, concerns about the quality of lagged values as instruments, and the
large standard errors usually found, make it diﬃcult to draw solid conclusions. These
limits have been acknowledged, among others, by Aubert and Crépon (2004), Dostie
(2006) and Roodman (2006). It has been conﬁrmed that Arellano and Bond's tech-
nique is a very useful method for dealing with any autoregressive characteristics in
the data. However, too many instruments might bias the estimator to the within
estimate. Borowczyk-Martins and Vandenberghe (2010) underline that also system
GMM procedure proposed by Blundell and Bond (2000) suﬀers from two types of
problems: 1) the estimated results are typically extremely sensitive to a great num-
ber of methodological choices (e.g., the number of lags for each variable), and 2)
instruments are often weakly identiﬁed, casting doubts on the quality of the estima-
tions. The potential weak instrument problem for the system GMM estimator has
been also established by Bun and Windmeijer (2007).
Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer
(2006) Approach
A more structural approach for the estimation of production functions has been
proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and further developed by Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003). They start from assumptions about the underlying economic process and
timing of input decisions by ﬁrms. The main idea is that ﬁrms primarily respond to
productivity shocks by adapting the volume of their investments (Olley and Pakes) or
intermediate inputs (Levinsohn and Petrin). Whenever such data are available, they
can be used to proxy productivity shocks. An advantage with respect to the system
GMM is that these methods do not require relying on instruments that lack a clear-
cut economic meaning and which tend to be only weakly correlated with the included
endogenous variables (Borowczyk-Martins and Vandenberghe, 2010). At present,
there exist only few studies that apply this approach to estimate age-productivity
proﬁles (Hellerstein and Neumark, 2004; Dostie, 2006; Roger and Wasmer, 2009).
The approach by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) has been
questioned by Bond and Söderbom (2005) and Ackerberg et al. (2006). Their main
concern has been identiﬁcation problem because of collinearity in the ﬁrst step esti-
mations of the labour coeﬃcient and investment (for Olley and Pakes) or material
input (for Levinsohn and Petrin) coeﬃcient. Ackerberg et al. (2006) propose an
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estimation procedure to solve these issues that assumes a strict time schedule for the
decisions on material inputs/investments, labour, and capital. In particular, they
allow labour input to have dynamic implications.
These assumptions about the unobserved timing of information on productivity
shocks and the timing of input decisions for the diﬀerent inputs have been found
controversial also by Göbel and Zwick (2009). They notice that, in the context of
estimation of age-productivity proﬁles, the existing employment protection law, skill
shortages or industrial relations could lead to much more complex timings with re-
spect to employment decisions for diﬀerent age groups than those assumed in the
above models. For example, in many countries, older employees are stronger pro-
tected by labour law or by agreements against dismissals.
1.2.3. Production function speciﬁcation and elasticity of substitution
Finally, in the framework of estimation of the production function, one should not
forget about the limitations coming directly from the model speciﬁcation. When
trying to evaluate age-productivity proﬁles, the right deﬁnition of the labour input is
of particular importance. Most of the empirical studies that have been evoked above
(see point 1) draw on the additive speciﬁcation of the labour input, i.e. productivity
of the ﬁrm's labour is equal to a sum of productivities of all the individual workers
(Hellerstein et al., 1999; Crépon et al., 2003; Aubert and Crépon, 2003; Dostie, 2006;
Van Ours, 2010). Consequently, workers with diﬀerent demographic characteristics
are assumed to be perfect substitutes in production.
In reality, whether young and older workers are substitutes remains doubtful. Work-
ers of diﬀerent age might be imperfect substitutes, or even complementary to some
degree. In this case, hours worked by younger and older persons cannot simply be
added to obtain an aggregate measure of labour input (O'Mahony et al., 2005). Ide-
ally, they should be weighted by their respective relative productivities. In the same
way, other characteristics should be controlled for such as education or skills.
It has been well documented that diﬀerences in the production function of ﬁrms
might be related to the diﬀerences in their substitution possibilities (Dupuy, 2004).
The degree of substitutability is usually measured by a parameter known as the
elasticity of substitution. In the context of age-heterogeneous labour, it describes
the degree to which older workers can be substituted for younger workers, and vice
versa, while producing a given output at the least cost (Guest and Shacklock, 2005).
Nevertheless, in the economic literature based on production function estimation,
we tend to observe a certain trade-oﬀ between two assumptions concerning labour
force: 1) perfect substitution and 2) equality of relative wages and relative marginal
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products. As mentioned above, in microeconomic studies estimating labour produc-
tivity, it is usually assumed that all the types of workers are perfectly substitutable.
On the other hand, studies on returns to higher education, schooling externalities or
macroeconomic modelling of demographic change often make use of the CES (con-
stant elasticity of substitution) production function, thus allowing imperfect sub-
stitution of diﬀerent types of workers. Card and Lemieux (2001) model returns to
higher education allowing imperfect substitution between similarly educated workers
in diﬀerent age groups. Ciccone and Peri (2003) estimate the long-run aggregate
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers. Iranzo and Peri
(2006) investigate production externalities of college education, accounting for im-
perfectly substitutable skill groups and skill-speciﬁc technologies. Finally, Prskawetz
et al. (2005) and Prskawetz and Fent (2007) analyse the sensitivity of the projected
labor productivity with respect to alternative assumptions about future labor sup-
ply and the substitutability, and productivity of the labour force at diﬀerent ages.
However, at the same time, all these studies assume the equalities between marginal
productivity and wages of workers belonging to diﬀerent age or skill category.
1.3. Conclusions
Overall, it is evident from the review of existing studies on the relationship between
age and productivity that no clear conclusion can be drawn from earlier research.
Some authors argue that wage diﬀerentials reﬂect diﬀerences in workers' productivity,
whereas others suggest an existence of a wage-productivity gap that tends to increase
with employees' age. These results are not always easy to compare since they use
datasets for diﬀerent countries with their own speciﬁc economic characteristics and
labour market regulations. Moreover, the mentioned studies do not cover the same
time period. Some use cross-sectional information whereas others dispose of panel
dataset. At the methodological level, we observe also certain diﬀerences in the choice
of the method dealing with endogeneity of the age composition of a ﬁrms' workforce.
Though, the existing studies have one common limitation. It is the assumption
of perfect substitution between diﬀerent types of workers. In fact, within the given
enterprise, workers of diﬀerent ages might be less than perfectly substitutable. Hence,
the optimum age composition of a given workforce might depend on two elements:
relative marginal productivity and the degree of substitutability between workers
of diﬀerent ages (Lam, 1989). The original empirical study presented next adds to
the existing research on age-productivity proﬁles by allowing imperfect substitution
between workers with diﬀerent skills and of diﬀerent ages, and at the same time not
imposing the condition of equality for workers' wages and their marginal products.
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2. Empirical evidence on labour productivity dif-
ferentiated by age and skills  an original test on
French data4
This section aims at evaluating the actual proﬁle of marginal productivity across the
age classes within the workforce. The comparison with earnings proﬁles allows us to
analyse the relative productivity and test whether diﬀerences in wage shares across
groups of workers are justiﬁed by proportional productivity contribution.
Age-productivity proﬁles may diﬀer between occupations. Older workers can remain
highly productive in the domain they know well and where relatively long experience
is important. For example, thanks to tacit knowledge, older managers may perform
as well as younger ones (Colonia-Willner, 1998). Thus, the workforce has been
diﬀerentiated not only by age (young, middle-aged, old), but also by skills (low-
skilled, high-skilled). The simultaneous diﬀerentiation by age and by skills is of high
interest in the perspective of possible dissimilarities among diﬀerent categories of
workers with respect to the sensitivity to work eﬀort incentives, training oﬀered, etc.
Although there is a growing research interest in the relation between age and pro-
ductivity, the empirical analyses so far have often been focused on the estimation
of Cobb-Douglas production functions speciﬁcation in capital and labour. The ﬁrm-
level labour productivity itself has been treated as a simple summation of productiv-
ities of individual workers (Hellerstein et al., 1999; Crépon et al., 2003; Aubert and
Crépon, 2003). Thus, the existing studies are characterised by an assumption of per-
fect substitutability between diﬀerent categories of workers. In this study, we refer
to the production function estimation as well. However, in contrast to the previous
studies, the use of the less restrictive, constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) func-
tional form is proposed at the level of labour input. This more general form, thanks
to smaller number of constraints imposed on the production technology, allows the
imperfect substitution between diﬀerent categories of workers.
The dataset used in this study (DADS-BRN) covers the French manufacturing, ser-
vices and trade sectors. French data are particularly interesting in the perspective
of our study. Actually, among all OECD countries, France is characterised by the
highest employment rate of people aged 25-54 (81.8 % in 2010) and at the same time
one of the lowest employment rate of people over 55 (39.7 % in 2010). Due to early
retirement plans, the actual average eﬀective age of retirement is 60 years. More-
over, workers over 50 are often touched by long-term unemployment. In particular,
the low-skilled workers face problems to stay employed and once unemployed, they
hardly ﬁnd a new job.
4This section is the result of a collaboration with Muriel Roger.
69
Diﬀerentiating the workforce simultaneously by age and skills allows us to observe
the diﬀerences in the age-productivity and age-earnings proﬁles separately within
each skill group. We ﬁnd that this diﬀerentiation is, in fact, very important. The
productivity proﬁle observed across diﬀerent age groups seems actually to depend
on the skill level. Among the main ﬁndings of this study, in the low-skilled category,
labour productivity is found to be the lowest for the seniors. Regarding the high-
skilled labour, in manufacturing, the mean productivity stays quite stable across
the age groups, being the highest for the workers over 50. Also in trade sector, the
high-skilled oldest employees are clearly the most productive group. Moreover, we
observe a very similar age-earnings pattern across the sectors. The wage proﬁle for
the high-skilled workers is steeper than for the low-skilled employees. Furthermore,
in both skill groups and in all three sectors we ﬁnd an evidence for wage compression,
i.e. wage rates vary considerably less than productivity.
The results for the manufacturing sector show that the age-productivity and age-
earnings proﬁles are compatible with a deferred compensation system. It might
indicate that the eﬀort incentive problem has been regulated in practice by many
ﬁrms by oﬀering at the start of the career wages under the workers' marginal pro-
ductivity and compensating this diﬀerence in the later periods. On the other hand,
in services and in trade, we observe the combined relevance of speciﬁc human capital
and deferred compensation.
Though, the most interesting aspect is the workers' productivity in relation to their
cost. It is particularly important as for the employers it may present an incentive
to exclude some age groups from the labour market and to give preference to the
others. In our study, the relative productivity over cost in manufacturing sector has
been found to represent a similar pattern in both skill groups, being the highest for
the young, followed by middle-aged and old workers. In both skill groups in services
sector and for low-skilled trade employees the productivity/earnings ratio is the
highest for the middle-aged, followed by young and senior workers. This discrepancy
between productivity and wage can be a source of employment diﬃculties particularly
for the older low-skilled workers.
The remaining of this section is organised as follows. The next subsection describes
the model. Then, the chosen estimation method is presented. After the dataset
description and the analysis of the estimation results follow the conclusions.
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2.1. The model: production function with labour as nested
CES
The assumption of perfect substitutability between workers with diﬀerent charac-
teristics implies that employing one worker while dismissing another one will not
lead to any change in the marginal products of either of them as one is perfectly
substitutable for another. However, it has been noticed that actually there might
arise an interaction of workers within a ﬁrm (Lengermann, 2002). The productiv-
ity of a certain employee might be aﬀected by co-worker's characteristics. It might
matter whether the employee works together with a colleague with the same level of
skills, similar age, etc. In particular, there exists empirical evidence that the human
capitals of young and older workers are imperfect substitutes (Kremer and Thom-
son, 1998). Hence, labour is not necessarily as easily substitutable as it seems at
ﬁrst glance. This study tries to overcome this problem by choosing such a form of
the production function that would take into account the potential imperfect substi-
tutability inside of the workforce - between high-skilled and low-skilled workers and
between diﬀerent age categories within each skill group. In this purpose, we esti-
mate the Cobb-Douglas production function speciﬁcation in capital (K) and labour
(L) whereas the labour input itself takes a form of the nested constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) function.
Since Arrow et al. (1961) have formulated the function of type CES, numerous studies
have been pursued in order to estimate its parameters. However, none of them has
been used so far in the context of the labour productivity analysis.
Figure 10: Scheme of the production structure
Y
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Our benchmark (see Figure 10) takes into account two skill groups (low-skilled (Ll)
and high-skilled (Lh)) and within each skill category - three age groups of workers
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(young (Ly), middle-aged (Lm), old (Lo)). The labour input is allowed to be het-
erogeneous across but homogeneous within closely deﬁned groups of workers. Thus,
it is assumed that the employees belonging to the same skill-age group (e.g. young
low-skilled) are perfectly substitutable.
At the highest level, our production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form given
by:
Y = f (K,L) = AKαLβ (15)
where K denotes capital, L stands for labour and A is a Hicks neutral technological
progress.
At the second level the labour aggregate is deﬁned as a CES function of high-skilled
and low-skilled workers:
L =
(∑
i
δiL
ρi
i
) 1
ρi
(16)
where i indicates the skill category. Finally, each skill group of workers is a CES
function by itself:
Li =
∑
j
δijL
ρij
ij
 1ρij (17)
where the age category is denoted by j .
Based on this choice of production function, we aim at estimating the distribution
parameters: δi, δij as well as the substitution parameters: ρi and ρij . The elasticity
of substitution is deﬁned as σ = d ln(x1/x2)
d ln
(
∂Y
∂x1/
∂Y
∂x2
) and is a measure of the percentage
change in factors demand due to a percentage change in the marginal rate of technical
substitution so that the output remains constant. For the case of constant returns
to scale it takes the form: σ = 11−ρ . The inverse of sigma
(
1
σ
)
denotes a change in
the marginal rate of technical substitution due to a change in factor proportions so
that the output remains constant.
Productivity contribution
Given the estimates of the production function parameters, we compute the labour
marginal product for diﬀerent categories of labour. In this setting, the constant
returns to scale are assumed at the level of labour inputs. According to the Euler's
theorem, under homogeneity of degree 1, the labour function might be represented
as a sum of its inputs multiplied by their marginal products:
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f(L1, L2, ..., Ln) = L1
∂f
∂L1
+ L2
∂f
∂L2
+ ...+ Ln
∂f
∂Ln
(18)
Therefore, we can deﬁne the marginal product of labour as labour input contribution
to the ﬁrm-level production.
Skill diﬀerentiation
For the given skill group, it takes the following form:
MPi =
∂Y
∂L
∂L
∂Li
(19)
MPi = AK
αβ
(∑
i
δiL
ρi
i
) β
ρi
−1
δiL
ρi−1
i (20)
The marginal rate of technical substitution depends not only on the factor intensity
and the distribution parameter but also on the level of substitution between diﬀerent
labour categories. It shows the rate at which one input may be substituted for
another, while maintaining the same level of production. The relative marginal
product of labour for workers diﬀerentiated by skills is given by:
MP1
MP2
=
∂L/∂L1
∂L/∂L2
= λ =
δ1
δ2
(
L1
L2
)ρi−1
(21)
In order to compare productivity contribution over diﬀerent skill categories, we com-
pute for each enterprise a ratio of marginal product of workers belonging to certain
skill group in relation to the average marginal product of labour. For two categories
of skills, the ratios take the following form:
MP1
MPav
=
L
L1 + λ−1L2
and
MP2
MPav
=
L
λL1 + L2
(22)
where MPav is the average marginal product of total labour.
Age diﬀerentiation
The marginal product of labour for a given age group in a speciﬁed skill category is
deﬁned as:
MPij =
∂Y
∂L
∂L
∂Li
∂Li
∂Lij
(23)
MPij = AK
αβ
(∑
i
δiL
ρi
i
) β
ρi
−1
δiL
ρi
ρj
−1
i δijL
ρij−1
ij (24)
The relative marginal product of any two age groups of workers in a given skill group
is:
MPi1
MPi2
=
δi1
δi2
(
Li1
Li2
)ρij−1
(25)
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In our setting, we deﬁne relative marginal products as: MPiYMPiM = ϕ,
MPiY
MPiO
= γ
and MPiMMPiO = η (where Y - young, M - middle-aged, O - old). The productivity
contribution of each age group is given by the ratio of marginal product of respective
age group over the average labour marginal productivity of a speciﬁc skill group:
MPiY
MPiav
=
Li
LiY + ϕ−1LiM + γ−1LiO
(26)
MPiM
MPiav
=
Li
ϕLiY + LiM + η−1LiO
(27)
MPiO
MPiav
=
Li
γLiY + ηLiM + LiO
(28)
Wage share
Our dataset contains rich information on earnings. Hence, according to the procedure
above, we compute the share of a distinct age group in the wage bill of the given
skill category. Given the productivity contributions and the analogously constructed
wage shares, we can compare an earnings-productivity pattern for diﬀerent categories
of workers.
2.2. The method
In order to obtain consistent estimates of the production function parameters, we use
the method developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The procedure consists in
including in the estimation equation a proxy for the productivity shocks potentially
observed by ﬁrms while making input decisions.
According to the chosen production function speciﬁcation (see Figure 10), we consider
the following value added form:
yit = β0 + αkit + βln

∑
i
δi
∑
j
δijL
ρij
ij it

ρi
ρij

1
ρi
+ ωit + ηit (29)
The error term is composed of 2 elements: ωit denoting productivity shocks likely
observed by the ﬁrm and ηit having no impact on the ﬁrm's inputs decisions. yit is
a natural logarithm of value added and kit denotes a natural logarithm of capital.
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Following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), we assume that ﬁrms decide on the level of
capital at t − 1, thus capital is a dynamic input. The labour and the intermediate
input (materials) mit are chosen at time t . The productivity shock ωit is assumed
to follow a ﬁrst order Markov process:
p(ωit|Iit−1) = p(ωit|ωit−1) (30)
where I is ﬁrm's i's information set at t.
The approach adopted in the current work consists in using intermediate input as
a proxy for the unobservable productivity shocks. Hence, materials control for the
part of the error term correlated with inputs. Given the above timing assumptions,
the ﬁrm's demand for the intermediate input mit is assumed to depend on the state
variables kit and ωit.
mit = ft(kit, ωit) (31)
The assumption that intermediate input is strictly monotonic in the productivity
shock allows inversion of materials demand function for ωit
ωit = f
−1
t (kit,mit) (32)
and substituting it into the production function so that the following ﬁrst stage
equation is obtained:
yit = βln

∑
i
δi
∑
j
δijL
ρij
ij it

ρi
ρij

1
ρi
+ φit(kit,mit) + ηit (33)
where φit(kit,mit) = β0 + αkit + ωit(kit,mit).
By substituting the third-order polynomial in kit and mit, in place of φit(kit,mit):
yit = δ0 + βln

∑
i
δi
∑
j
δijL
ρij
ij it

ρi
ρij

1
ρi
 3+∑
j=0
3−j∑
n=0
δjnk
j
itm
n
it + ηit (34)
we can consistently estimate parameters for labour using the non-linear least squares
method.
Identiﬁcation of the input coeﬃcients according to the method by Levinsohn and
Petrin has been questioned recently. Bond and Soderbom (2005) argue that produc-
tion function parameters are not identiﬁed from cross section variation when inputs
are perfectly ﬂexible and chosen optimally, and input prices are common to all ﬁrms.
However, their result holds on the propriety that Cobb Douglas optimal capital and
labour inputs demand can be expressed as log linear functions of real input prices.
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This is not the case in our model where labour input takes a form of a CES produc-
tion function. Moreover, we do not impose the condition of an optimal input choice
implying wage and marginal productivity equality.
On the other hand, Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) pointed out the potential
problem with the identiﬁcation of the labour input coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst stage of
the Levinsohn and Petrin method. The authors raise the question of collinearity
issues. They claim that the simultaneous choice of labour input and material in-
duces collinearity between the variables in the ﬁrst step regression. Considering
their statement, the identiﬁcation of the labour parameters in our model is relaying
on the non-linearities of the production function5.
The second stage of the procedure helps us to identify the coeﬃcient for capital. It
starts with computing the estimated value of φˆit:
φˆit = yˆit − βˆln

∑
i
δˆi
∑
j
δˆijL
ρˆij
ij it

ρˆi
ρˆij

1
ρˆi
 = δˆ0 +
3∑
j=0
3−j∑
n=0
δˆjnk
j
itm
n
it (35)
For any candidate value α∗, we can compute the prediction for ωit for all periods t:
ωˆit = φˆit − α∗kit (36)
Given these values, we regress non-parametrically ωit on its lagged term ωit−1:
ωˆit = γ0 + γ1ωit−1 + γ2ω2it−1 + γ3ω
3
it−1 + it (37)
in order to get the residual ξit and the conditional expectation E [ωit | ωit−1] =
ωit − ξit.
Given labour coeﬃcients, a guess value α∗and E [ωit | ωit−1], we can ﬁnd a consistent
estimate of a parameter for capital which is a solution to minimizing a squared sum
of a sample residual of our production function:
min
α∗
∑
t
(ηit+ξit)
2=min
α∗
∑
t
yit−βˆln

∑
i
δˆi
(∑
j
δˆijL
ρˆij
ij it
) ρˆi
ρˆij

1
ρˆi
−α∗kit−E[ωit|ωit−1]

2
(38)
The asymptotic standard errors for estimated parameters are constructed using a
bootstrap approach.
5Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) propose an alternative procedure to estimate production
functions. In their approach, all the input coeﬃcients are estimated in the second stage. Their
procedure draws on Levinsohn and Petrin method. Intermediate input demand is indeed used as
a proxy to net out an error term of the production function. The main diﬀerence is that the
ﬁrm's demand for the intermediate input is assumed to be a strictly monotonic function of the
productivity shock and all the input variables, i.e. capital and all types of labour. In the more
complex model that we propose, the ﬁrm's demand for the intermediate input is thus a function of 8
arguments. When substituting the productivity shock with a third order polynomial depending on
materials and other inputs, identiﬁcation became really fragile with our data. We thus privileged
the Levinsohn and Petrin method in our context.
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2.3. Data and summary statistics
The dataset used in this study covers a short panel of data for years 2003 and 2004
for manufacturing, services and trade sectors in France. It comes from merging two
diﬀerent data sources: Bénéﬁces Réels Normaux (BRN) and Déclarations Adminis-
tratives de Données Sociales (DADS). They both constitute mandatory employers'
reports to the Fiscal Oﬃce. The BRN consists of ﬁrms' balance sheets and provides
important information on the employers' output, capital stock and economic sector.
The DADS contains rich data on the characteristics of the workforce. The number
of hours worked is decomposed by workers' age and occupation. The valuable in-
formation on earnings allows to measure the share of a distinct labour category in
total wage bill. However, the dataset is not without imperfection. Unfortunately,
the DADS does not contain any information on workers' education level and tenure.
In order to distinguish among workers according to the level of skills, we make use
of the available decomposition by occupation. The DADS employment data are ar-
ranged by occupation according to the French socio-professional classiﬁcation. This
classiﬁcation is used in collective agreements for wage determination. A higher level
of education places a worker directly on the higher starting point and experience
then allows further wage increases. As emphasised by Thesmar and Thoenig (2000),
this classiﬁcation, based on the mix of education and experience, contains no infor-
mation about the task-assignment. Therefore, the senior personnel (Cadres) may
include high-ranked directors as well as e.g. consultants without any supervision
duty that have been classiﬁed as cadres so that the ﬁrm could justify their high
wages. Using this occupation classiﬁcation, we distinguish two skills categories of
workers: high-skilled and low-skilled. The high-skilled correspond to employers, the
senior and intermediate personnel. The oﬃce and sales employees as well as blue
collar workers are included in the low-skilled category. For details, see Table 4.
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Table 4: Skill classiﬁcation
High-skilled labour Low-skilled labour 
Employers 
Craftsmen 
Traders 
Employers (of 50 or more employees) 
Liberal professions, senior and executive 
personnel*
Liberal professions 
Professors and  scientific professions 
Artistic professions 
Senior administrative personnel*
Engineers and senior technicians*
Intermediate personnel 
Medical and social services 
Intermediate administrative personnel 
Technicians 
Foreman, supervisors 
Non-manual workers 
Office employees 
Sales workers 
Manual workers 
Skilled industrial manual workers 
Skilled craftsman 
Drivers 
Skilled handling, storage and 
transport workers 
Unskilled industrial workers 
Unskilled artisans 
    * the senior personnel corresponds to the higher position and not the worker's age 
Regarding the labour force composition, three age classes are considered within each
skill group. We deﬁne young workers as those who are under 30 years old, the
middle-aged workers between 30 and 50, and the senior employees as those over
50. The reason why we choose these age classes is twofold. First, since we keep
only ﬁrms where all age categories are present, the condition of suﬃcient number of
observations within each age group must have been met. Second, the data analysis
revealed that the employment level is much more heterogenous among the young (up
to 30) and among seniors (over 50) compared to the middle-aged (30-50) group. In
particular, the lowest employment characterise the young under 25 and older persons
over 55. Nowadays, many young people decide to prolong their education and, thus,
enter relatively late into labour market. On the other hand, an earlier exit from the
labour market is still quite common among the seniors. In 2010, 22.5 % of juniors
(aged 15-24) and 6.7 % of seniors (aged 55-64) have been unemployed (OECD, 2010).
For the purpose of our analysis, the volume of production is represented by value
added and the employment level is measured by number of hours worked. It permits
to distinguish between part-time and full-time employees. The aberrant values have
been eliminated. Value added, capital, labour cost and employment are required to
take positive values. Only ﬁrms employing at least ﬁfty workers have been considered.
As a result of these operations, the ﬁnal dataset contains 15'992 observations.
As far as a sector division is concerned, manufacturing, trade and services are distin-
guished according to NES16 (Nomenclature économique de synthèse en 16 postes).
The agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing as well as construction sector (due to high ratio
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of seasonal workers) have been excluded from manufacturing. Administration and
ﬁnancial services have not been takes into account in services sector.
The summary statistics of the main variables as well as the labour force composition
by age and skills are represented in Table 5. We can observe substantial diﬀerences
with respect to age-employment and age-earnings patterns of workers belonging to
diﬀerent skill groups.
Employment pattern
First of all, we can see that in all three sectors, i.e. manufacturing, trade and
services, the workers between 30 and 50 years old account for around 60 % of the
total hours worked. The employment of the young and the seniors is considerably
lower. If we look separately at each skill group, we can notice that among the high-
skilled, the number of hours worked by older workers exceeds those of the young. In
particular, the discrepancies are the biggest in manufacturing. The opposite pattern
characterises the low-skilled employees (with exception of manufacturing sector),
where the young are more numerous than the seniors.
Earnings pattern
We observe that hourly earnings are increasing with age, for both skill groups and
in all the sectors. The remuneration of the young workers is the lowest and the
oldest employees are paid the most. According to economic intuition, high-skilled
workers are better paid than the low-skilled. Taking into account the desaggregation
by skills, the proﬁle of mean hourly earnings of the low-skilled is considerably ﬂatter
- the earnings rise between consecutive age groups on average by 15 % and 4 %.
Interestingly, the respective mean diﬀerentials (increase) in salaries between the high-
skilled age groups are of 40 % and 30 %. Consequently, the range of salaries in this
skill category is wider.
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Table 5: Sample statistics, DADS-BRN, 2004
Variables* Manufacturing Services Trade
share mean sdv share mean sdv share mean sdv
ln value added 
ln capital 
ln capital (t-1) 
ln materials 
ln materials (t-1) 
Hours worked by age:  
total 
(Ly) young (<30) 
(Lm) middle-aged (30-50) 
(Lo) old (>50) 
1.00 
0.18 
0.60 
0.22 
-2.67 
-2.57 
-2.61 
-2.81 
-2.86 
4.85 
0.79 
2.85 
1.21 
1.15 
1.54 
1.57 
1.63 
1.63 
22.47 
4.04 
11.68 
7.09 
1.00 
0.21 
0.58 
0.21 
-3.01 
-3.32 
-3.38 
-5.54 
-5.59 
5.28 
1.09 
3.07 
1.11 
1.26 
1.85 
1.88 
2.06 
2.03 
44.68 
4.99 
24.65 
15.93 
1.00 
0.28 
0.57 
0.15 
-3.04 
-3.28 
-3.34 
-6.81 
-6.82 
3.83 
1.08 
2.19 
0.56 
1.04 
1.38 
1.39 
2.15 
2.17 
22.14 
6.74 
12.90 
2.76 
Hours worked by skills and age:  
(Ll) low-skilled 
(Lly) young 
(Llm) middle-aged 
(Llo) old 
(Lh) high-skilled 
(Lhy) young 
(Lhm) middle-aged 
(Lho) old 
0.59 
0.18 
0.58 
0.24 
0.41 
0.14 
0.59 
0.27 
2.85 
0.52 
1.65 
0.68 
2.00 
0.27 
1.19 
0.53 
13.07 
2.61 
6.65 
4.05 
10.24 
1.52 
5.65 
3.27 
0.58 
0.25 
0.56 
0.19 
0.42 
0.16 
0.61 
0.23 
3.05 
0.74 
1.72 
0.59 
2.23 
0.35 
1.36 
0.51 
18.63 
3.57 
9.64 
6.24 
26.92 
1.71 
15.59 
9.94 
0.65 
0.34 
0.53 
0.13 
0.35 
0.17 
0.65 
0.18 
2.50 
0.86 
1.32 
0.32 
1.33 
0.22 
0.87 
0.24 
17.41 
5.88 
9.70 
1.99 
5.40 
1.04 
3.65 
0.86 
* All variables have been standardised (divided by 100 000 before taking logarithms) 
Variables Manufacturing Services Trade
share mean sdv share mean sdv share mean sdv
Hourly earnings  by age: 
total 
(Ly) young (<30) 
(Lm) middle-aged (30-50) 
(Lo) old (>50) 
1.00 
0.14 
0.60 
0.26
15.66 
12.00 
15.70 
18.99 
3.93 
2.46 
3.98 
6.75 
1.00 
0.20 
0.58 
0.22 
14.65 
11.74 
14.90 
17.90 
5.84 
5.51 
8.04 
7.70 
1.00 
0.22 
0.58 
0.20 
14.36 
10.70 
14.87 
18.58 
4.42 
2.42 
4.52 
7.57 
Hourly earnings  by skills and age: 
(Ll) low-skilled 
(Lly) young 
(Llm) middle-aged 
(Llo) old 
(Lh) high-skilled 
(Lhy) young 
(Lhm) middle-aged 
(Lho) old 
0.52 
0.17 
0.60 
0.23 
0.48 
0.11 
0.59 
0.30 
12.13 
10.54 
12.35 
12.92 
22.13 
15.05 
21.73 
28.00 
2.44 
1.97 
2.53 
3.08 
4.84 
4.52 
4.86 
10.83 
0.51 
0.25 
0.56 
0.20 
0.49 
0.16 
0.58 
0.26 
11.20 
10.15 
11.46 
11.95 
19.94 
14.58 
19.88 
25.96 
2.12 
1.72 
2.39 
2.88 
6.96 
6.44 
7.14 
18.89 
0.50 
0.30 
0.55 
0.15 
0.50 
0.11 
0.62 
0.27 
10.63 
9.49 
11.03 
11.54 
20.62 
14.28 
20.36 
26.66 
1.92 
1.72 
7.49 
5.76 
5.32 
0.36 
8.54 
7.75 
Number of observations                              8185                                           4498                                           3309 
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2.4. Results
We start our analysis with the estimation of the production function whose structure
has been detailed in point 2.1. Based on the estimated parameters, we will generate
and compare the age-productivity and age-earnings pattern for the low-skilled and for
the high-skilled workers belonging to diﬀerent sectors. First, on the basis of median
values, we will present the general pattern. Afterwards, we will analyse the density
estimations of inter-ﬁrm distributions of productivity and earnings. The detailed
analysis will be carried out consecutively by skills and then by age within each skill
group.
2.4.1. Econometric results
Our estimation procedure consists in estimating three following models:
model (1) with labour diﬀerentiated by skills:
Y = AKα
(
δsL
ρs
l + (1− δs)Lρsh
) β
ρs (39)
model (2) with labour diﬀerentiated by age:
Y = AKα
(
δyL
ρa
y + δmL
ρa
m + (1− δy − δm)Lρao
) β
ρa (40)
model (3) with labour diﬀerentiated simultaneously by age and skills:
Y = AKα
(
γ
(
δlyL
ρl
ly + δlmL
ρl
lm + (1− δly − δlm)Lρllo
) ρs
ρl +
+ (1− γ)
(
δhyL
ρh
hy + δhmL
ρh
hm + (1− δhy − δhm)Lρhho
) ρs
ρh
) β
ρs
(41)
The estimation results of the production function for each sector are presented re-
spectively in Tables 6 to 96. The ﬁrst column refers to the results obtained according
to the nonlinear least squares method. The second column reports the production
function estimates based on the two-stages procedure by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
controlling for the potential endogeneity. Since parameters enter in the function in
a nonlinear way, estimators have only asymptotic validity. The standard errors have
been constructed according to a bootstrap approach with 200 replications.
6In order to check the validity and robustness of our results, in the appendix we present the
results of the estimation of diﬀerent models with sub-sector dummy variables in manufacturing and
services sectors (Tables 20 and 21). The results conﬁrm the robustness of the estimates.
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Elasticity of substitution
In models with labour diﬀerentiated by skills, the inter-skill substitution parameter
ρs surprisingly has been found to converge to 1 in all the sectors (see Table 6) which
implies perfect substitutability between workers belonging to diﬀerent skill groups.
We suppose that this result might come from the classiﬁcation on low-skilled and
high-skill workers. It is possible that, in fact, there are not much diﬀerences in skill
levels for certain socio-professional categories. To circumvent this drawback, we have
run the estimation with 3 skill groups, taking apart the intermediate personnel but
it did not have much impact on the results. In the sequel, estimations are thus made
directly under the constraint ρs = 1.
Table 6: Production function estimates for each sector, labour diﬀerentiated by skills,
model (1)
Parameters Manufacturing Services Trade
NLLS LP NLLS LP NLLS LP
c
Į
ȕ
įs
ȡs
-2.197***
(0.015) 
0.187***
(0.005) 
0.829***
(0.008) 
0.231***
(0.011) 
1.257***
(0.078) 
0.301***
(0.047) 
0.729***
(0.009) 
0.207***
(0.015) 
1.327***
(0.093) 
-2.243***
(0.022) 
0.234***
(0.006) 
0.743***
(0.011) 
0.190***
(0.033) 
2.408***
(0.322)
0.173***
(0.038) 
0.699***
(0.023) 
0.163***
(0.043) 
2.649***
(0.512)
-2.421***
(0.027) 
0.118***
(0.008) 
0.903***
(0.012) 
0.216***
(0.016) 
1.336***
(0.111)
0.164***
(0.038) 
0.875***
(0.015) 
0.216***
(0.019) 
1.328***
(0.118)
No of obs. 8185 8185 4498 4498 3309 3309 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
The elasticity of substitution between workers diﬀerentiated only by age appears
quite diﬀerent by sector (see Table 7). The substitution parameter ρa is not signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero in services, between zero and one in manufacturing and
higher than unity in the trade sector. These results imply diﬀerent work organization
in each sector. They hold in the model with labour diﬀerentiated simultaneously by
age and skills (see Table 8). There we observe that the substitution parameter ρh
in the services sector is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. In trade, the respective
parameter for both skill groups tends to converge to 1.
82
Table 7: Production function estimates for each sector, labour diﬀerentiated by age,
model (2)
Parameters Manufacturing Services Trade
NLLS LP NLLS LP NLLS LP
c
Į
ȕ
įy
įm
įo
ȡa
-1.947***
(0.022) 
0.200***
(0.005) 
0.835***
(0.008) 
0.314***
(0.018) 
0.443***
(0.026) 
0.243 
0.367***
(0.074) 
0.278***
(0.038) 
0.726***
(0.010) 
0.281***
(0.020) 
0.491***
(0.032) 
0.228***
(0.017) 
0.246***
(0.094) 
-2.067***
(0.036) 
0.240***
(0.006) 
0.735***
(0.011) 
0.221***
(0.027) 
0.479***
(0.057) 
0.300 
1.321***
(0.314) 
0.186***
(0.037) 
0.691***
(0.021) 
0.238***
(0.036) 
0.540***
(0.084) 
0.222**
(0.094) 
0.955 
(1.482) 
-2.287***
(0.039) 
0.104***
(0.008) 
0.921***
(0.013) 
0.070***
(0.019) 
0.326***
(0.064) 
0.604 
1.912***
(0.340) 
0.159***
(0.038) 
0.879***
(0.016) 
0.074***
(0.017) 
0.357***
(0.072) 
0.569***
(0.074) 
1.848***
(0.366) 
No of obs. 8185 8185 4498 4498 3309 3309 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
Table 8: Production function estimates for each sector, labour diﬀerentiated by age
and skills, model (3)
Parameters Manufacturing Services Trade
NLLS LP NLLS LP NLLS LP
c
Į
ȕ
Ȗ
1-Ȗ
įly
įlm
įlo
ȡl
įhy
įhm
įho
ȡh
-1.294***
(0.021) 
0.186***
(0.004) 
0.833***
(0.007) 
0.274***
(0.013) 
0.725 
0.437***
(0.034) 
0.417***
(0.046) 
0.145 
0.463***
(0.119) 
0.247***
(0.029) 
0.405***
(0.036) 
0.347 
0.725***
(0.122) 
0.291***
(0.045) 
0.736***
(0.009) 
0.254***
(0.015) 
0.746***
(0.015) 
0.395***
(0.032) 
0.458***
(0.052) 
0.147***
(0.030) 
0.372***
(0.120) 
0.242***
(0.031) 
0.432***
(0.042) 
0.326***
(0.026) 
0.594***
(0.132) 
-1.538***
(0.037) 
0.222***
(0.006) 
0.759***
(0.011) 
0.367***
(0.027) 
0.633 
0.275***
(0.036) 
0.497***
(0.075) 
0.227 
0.810***
(0.286) 
0.117**
(0.061) 
0.372***
(0.103) 
0.511 
2.302***
(0.820) 
0.166***
(0.040) 
0.717***
(0.022) 
0.357***
(0.023) 
0.643***
(0.023) 
0.282***
(0.030) 
0.558***
(0.068) 
0.159**
(0.065) 
0.574***
(0.186) 
0.134 
(0.099) 
0.388**
(0.181) 
0.477*
(0.268) 
2.065 
(10.898) 
-1.538***
(0.036) 
0.112***
(0.008) 
0.911***
(0.012) 
0.226***
(0.021) 
0.774 
0.236***
(0.042) 
0.608***
(0.099) 
0.155 
1.341***
(0.427) 
0.209***
(0.032) 
0.421***
(0.049) 
0.370 
0.789***
(0.169) 
0.159***
(0.036) 
0.879***
(0.015) 
0.215***
(0.026) 
0.785***
(0.026) 
0.263***
(0.046) 
0.673***
(0.124) 
0.063 
(0.121) 
1.039**
(0.518) 
0.192***
(0.058) 
0.427***
(0.091) 
0.380***
(0.054) 
0.792**
(0.324) 
No of obs. 8185 8185 4498 4498 3309 3309 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
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The results shown in Table 9 include already all these constraints on parameters
ρl and ρh. We observe that low-skilled workers of diﬀerent age in services sector
are closer substitutes than the high-skilled ones. This ﬁnding supports the view
that low-skilled employees in positions which do not require intensive training can
be substituted relatively easily. Interestingly, in manufacturing, the high-skilled
workers belonging to diﬀerent generations have been found more easily substitutable
between each other than the low-skilled. This result might suggest small diﬀerences in
productivity between younger and older workers, i.e. it is possible that high-skilled
manufacturing workers of diﬀerent age occupy posts that require similar level of
competences in general problem solving, while low-skilled younger and older workers
qualiﬁed for speciﬁc tasks, can be substituted less easily.
Table 9: Production function estimates for each sector, labour diﬀerentiated by age
and skills, constrained model (3)
Parameters Manufacturing Services Trade
NLLS LP NLLS LP NLLS LP
c
Į
ȕ
Ȗ
1-Ȗ
įly
įlm
įlo
ȡl
įhy
įhm
įho
ȡh
-1.294***
(0.021) 
0.186***
(0.004) 
0.833***
(0.007) 
0.274***
(0.013) 
0.725 
0.437***
(0.034) 
0.417***
(0.046) 
0.145 
0.463***
(0.119) 
0.247***
(0.029) 
0.405***
(0.036) 
0.347 
0.725***
(0.122) 
0.291***
(0.045) 
0.736***
(0.009) 
0.254***
(0.015) 
0.746***
(0.015) 
0.395***
(0.032) 
0.458***
(0.052) 
0.147***
(0.030) 
0.372***
(0.120) 
0.242***
(0.031) 
0.432***
(0.042) 
0.326***
(0.026) 
0.594***
(0.132) 
-1.587***
(0.035) 
0.222***
(0.006) 
0.751***
(0.011) 
0.405***
(0.027) 
0.595 
0.252***
(0.038) 
0.430***
(0.071) 
0.318 
1.062***
(0.324) 
0.081**
(0.028) 
0.832***
(0.045) 
0.085 
0
0.165***
(0.040) 
0.709***
(0.022) 
0.387***
(0.024) 
0.612***
(0.024) 
0.263**
(0.030) 
0.505 
(0.074) 
0.231**
(0.079) 
0.778***
(0.230) 
0.110 
(0.034) 
0.802**
(0.052) 
0.087*
(0.034) 
0
-1.534***
(0.035) 
0.113***
(0.008) 
0.910***
(0.012) 
0.218***
(0.019) 
0.782 
0.240***
(0.037) 
0.668***
(0.085) 
0.092 
1
0.222***
(0.032) 
0.373***
(0.029) 
0.404 
1
0.159***
(0.036) 
0.878***
(0.015) 
0.213***
(0.022) 
0.786***
(0.022) 
0.262***
(0.037) 
0.680***
(0.085) 
0.058 
(0.091) 
1
0.201***
(0.056) 
0.385***
(0.038) 
0.414***
(0.039) 
1
elasticity of substitution : ı=1/(1-ȡ)
Lly-Llm-Llo
Lhy-Lhm-Lho 
1.59 
3.64 
4.5 
1
ĺ
ĺ
No of obs. 8185 8185 4498 4498 3309 3309 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
84
Control for endogenity bias
The nonlinear least squares estimates appear to suﬀer from the endogeneity bias
implying existing correlation between productivity and input choices. Interestingly,
the existing bias has diﬀerent character in distinct sectors. In manufacturing and
in trade, the NLLS method tends to underestimate the capital coeﬃcient (α) and
overestimate the labour coeﬃcients (β). Such situation takes place if capital and
labour are positively correlated and labour's correlation with the productivity shock
is higher than capital's correlation. On the other hand, in services, both NLLS coeﬃ-
cients α and β tend to be biased up. It might be the case when only labour responds
to the shock and at the same time capital and labour are positively correlated7.
We also observe interesting results regarding the potential endogeneity bias within
the labour input. In the model with labour diﬀerentiated by skills (model (1) and
(3)), the coeﬃcients of low-skilled workers are slightly biased up in all sectors. Among
diﬀerent age categories, the coeﬃcients of old workers (as well as young workers in
manufacturing) are overestimated. Although these biases are not statistically signif-
icant, they might however indicate that the correlation of these categories of labour
with the productivity shock is higher. It could imply that more of this labour type
is hired/made redundant in response to the positive/negative productivity shock.
Within the labour diﬀerentiated simultaneously by age and skills the NLLS esti-
mates tend to underestimate the middle-aged workers coeﬃcient in all the sectors.
For other skill-age categories, the results are more sector-speciﬁc. Among the un-
derestimated coeﬃcients suggesting lower correlation with the productivity shock,
we ﬁnd: young low-skilled workers in services and trade, old low-skilled workers in
manufacturing, young high-skilled workers in services and senior high-skilled workers
in trade. Nevertheless, these biases stay not very signiﬁcant.
2.4.2. Age-productivity and age-earnings proﬁle: general pattern
According to the methodology presented in point 2.1., we construct the productivity
contributions and wage shares for diﬀerent categories of workers. Thanks to the
information on earnings in the dataset, the share of a distinct age group in the
wage bill of a given skill category may be easily computed. Based on the estimated
parameters values corrected for the endogeneity bias (right columns of Table 9),
we address the question of the marginal product of labour. Consequently, we can
compare an earnings-productivity pattern for diﬀerent skill and age categories of
workers in three diﬀerent sectors.
7According to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), these two cases might be the most relevant for short
panels because between-ﬁrm variation often plays a dominant role in identiﬁcation and, in this
dimension, capital and labour tend to be highly correlated.
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A general tendency regarding productivity contributions and wage shares is shown
in Table 10 and is given by the median. When the data are not necessarily symmet-
rically distributed, the median is a form of average that gives a better idea of a
general pattern than the mean. If data are symmetrically distributed, using either
the mean or the median gives almost identical results. In case of skewed distributions,
using the mean could be misleading as means are very sensitive to outliers.
Table 10: Age-productivity and age-earnings pattern
Manufacturing
Services
Trade
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Assuming that there exists an average enterprise, we observe throughout the sectors
and for both skill categories of workers that wage shares vary substantially less
than workers' productivity. In manufacturing, the age-productivity and age-earnings
proﬁles are compatible with a deferred compensation system. It might indicate
that, in this sector, the eﬀort incentive problem has been regulated in practice by
many ﬁrms by oﬀering at the start of the career wages under the workers' marginal
productivity and compensating this diﬀerence in the later periods. On the other
hand, in services and in trade, we observe the combined relevance of speciﬁc human
capital and deferred compensation. For young employees, the productivity proﬁle is
steeper than the wage proﬁle suggesting that investments in speciﬁc human capital
are important at the beginning of employees' careers. For older workers, the wage
share is higher than productivity contribution implying rather an incentive based
compensation scheme.
Interestingly, for the high-skilled workers in manufacturing, there is not much diﬀer-
ence in productivity across the age groups. Though, it is the highest for the oldest
employees. In trade, the productivity has a clearly increasing slope. Importantly,
in both of these sectors, the proﬁle of wage share of middle-aged and senior workers
does not diverge much from the proﬁle of productivity contribution.
At the same time, in the low-skilled category, the estimated productivity is clearly
the lowest for the oldest workers. It is possible that certain low-skilled employees,
as time is passing, either quit the labour market (e.g. due to early retirement) or
upgrade their qualiﬁcations and move to the high-skilled occupations. Thus, it could
be that senior workers who stay in the low-skilled jobs are those who are not very
productive. The opposite phenomenon could be also observed among the high-skilled
employees. Seniors working as highly-skilled experts are not an exception in certain
jobs. Hence, the high-skilled seniors who are still working tend to be those relatively
more productive. In order to control for this selection phenomenon, time series on
labour turnover would be needed.
2.4.3. Density estimations
The results for the average enterprise are interesting but do not reﬂect all the
complexity of variation in wage shares and productivity contributions across the
enterprises. Therefore, we also analyse the shape of the density functions of wage and
productivity distributions. In this purpose, we make use of kernel density estimation
which is a non-parametric way of estimating the probability density function. It
is clearly smoother than some other density estimators such as histogram. The
univariate kernel density estimator is computed using:
fˆ(x) =
1
nh
n∑
i=1
K
[
x−Xi
h
]
(42)
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where K is the Epanechnikov Kernel function and h is a smoothing parameter called
the bandwith (Parzen, 1962).
2.4.3.1. Productivity
The productivity contribution (MPij/MPiav) is deﬁned as a ratio of marginal prod-
uct of a speciﬁc age group (j) over the average labour marginal product of a given
skill group (i). If the productivity of a certain age group equals to the skill sector
average, this ratio equals to 1. In Tables 11 - 13, this case is expressed as a black
vertical line. Since the distribution of productivity across the age groups is highly
sector-speciﬁc, we analyse each sector separately as follows.
Manufacturing
In manufacturing, as shown in Table 11, the productivity of low-skilled workers
across the enterprises is characterised by higher variability than the one of high-
skilled employees. In general, the median absolute deviations are higher and there
are more positive outliers. If we look closer at diﬀerent age groups, we can notice
that in both skills categories a greater variability in productivity is observed among
young and older workers. At the same time, the productivity contribution of the
middle-aged group does not vary that much between the ﬁrms. Its values are well
concentrated around the sector average.
Certain particularities can be observed within each skill category. Among the low-
skilled, the young workers appear the most productive. Most of them have produc-
tivity contribution exceeding the sector average (>1) and we observe many positive
outliers. On the other hand, the great majority of older workers have productivity
below the average (<1). Though a few positive outliers occur.
The density estimations concerning the high-skilled workers are quite diﬀerent. The
productivity distributions of diﬀerent age groups have much more symmetric shape
and the median value is quite close to the sector average. In this skill category, the
older workers appear the most productive group. More than half of them are more
productive than an average high-skilled person.
Services
Table 12 reveals a pattern of productivity distribution in the sector of services. This
time, a higher inter-ﬁrm variability can be observed for the high-skilled employees.
Both, the median absolute deviations as well as positive outliers take much higher
values for this type of workers.
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Table 11: Share in average marginal productivity (manufacturing)
Nevertheless, this time the productivity proﬁle across the age groups is similar in
both skill groups. The middle-aged workers are found clearly the most productive.
Almost all of them reach productivity higher than sector average ( > 1). In contrast,
most of juniors and seniors are characterised by the productivity below the mean.
However, there are some positive outliers, especially among the high-skilled workers.
Table 12: Share in average marginal productivity (services)
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Trade
As can be seen in Table 13, in trade the productivity pattern is very diﬀerent from
those observed in other sectors. First of all, the productivity variability within
narrowly deﬁned age groups is much lower. Furthermore, there are large diﬀerences
between skill groups. Among the low-skilled workers, the productivity distributions
almost do not cross each other. The middle-aged workers are the most productive
with the productivity contribution over the sector average in all the enterprises. The
productivity of young and seniors is considerably lower, well below the sector mean.
A very diﬀerent situation takes place within the high-skilled category of workers.
Here, the senior are the most productive group followed closely by middle-aged work-
ers with very similar productivity distribution. The young high-skilled employees are
signiﬁcantly less productive.
Table 13: Share in average marginal productivity (trade)
2.4.3.2. Earnings
The distributions of wages in age and skill categories are presented in Tables 14, 15
and 16. The wage share (Wij/Wiav) is deﬁned as a ratio of earnings of a speciﬁc age
group (j) over the average earnings of a given skill group (i). The ratio equals to 1
(expressed in the tables by a black vertical line) if earnings correspond to the sector
average.
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In all the sectors we observe a very similar pattern. In general, wage rates vary
substantially less than workers' productivity. It is in line with empirical evidence
against the paradigm of wage and marginal productivity equality (Frank (1984),
Campbell and Kamlani (1997)).
Looking separately at two skill classes, we notice that wages of low-skilled workers are
less variable than those of the high-skilled. In the low-skilled category, the middle-
aged group of workers is characterised by the earnings distribution with the lowest
variability, well concentrated around the mean. The earnings variability of young
and older workers is very comparable.
Within the high-skilled group we observe more positive outliers, in particular for
senior workers, possibly due to better remuneration oﬀered to high-skilled employees
with a long tenure. The distribution of earnings for the middle-aged workers is the
least variable, followed by young and senior employees.
Table 14: Share in average wage (manufacturing)
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Table 15: Share in average wage (services)
Table 16: Share in average wage (trade)
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2.4.3.3. Productivity/earnings ratio
The most interesting aspect from the perspective of the employer is the workers'
productivity in relation to their cost. It is particularly important as for the employers
it may present an incentive to exclude some age groups from the labour market and
to give preference to the others.
It is possible that some workers having the same productivity are paid diﬀerently or
that some are paid equally but have diﬀerent productivities. The most productive
workers are not necessarily the most proﬁtable. A ﬁrm has incentives to keep those
workers who are the best value, that is the employees who produce the most relative
to their wages. Therefore, apart of analysing the productivity distribution separately
from wages, we consider also the inter-ﬁrm distribution of the productivity/earnings
ratio with respect to all age and skill groups (see Tables 17, 18 and 19). We deﬁne
it as MPijMPiav/
Wij
Wiav
.
It appears that in manufacturing the relative productivity over the wage ratio is
the highest for the young, followed by the middle-aged and the old. The possible
explanation could be that juniors are paid the least due to employer's incomplete
information about the workers' ability at the beginning of their career. At the same
time they are highly motivated to work hard expecting higher opportunities in the
future. Indeed, the young workers might exert much more eﬀort in order to suggest
high ability level and keep their current job and/or get future promotion (Grund and
Westergård-Nielsen, 2008). The high variability in distribution for the young comes
from the positive outliers.
This productivity/earnings ratio decreases with age for both skill groups. It means
that the attractiveness of an employee for the employer decreases with age. Though,
it is not so strong for the high-skilled workers. The distribution of the ratio shows
higher variability for the older compared to the middle-aged workers. It has a lower
median and a signiﬁcant majority of observations are below the sector average.
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Table 17: Ratio of relative productivity over relative wage (manufacturing)
In services sector, we observe lower variability of the ratio among the low-skilled
workers. The high variability for the high-skilled comes, among others, from the
positive outliers in this group. In both skill categories, the productivity/earnings
ratio is the highest for the middle-aged, followed by young and senior workers. Thus,
similarly to the pure productivity proﬁle, the middle-aged workers are the most
attractive employees. However, the biggest positive outliers are found among the
junior workers.
Contrasting results are found in the trade sector as shown in Table 19. For the
low-skilled employees, the productivity/earnings ratio is very dispersed across the
age groups. Likewise in services, the middle-aged workers are the most attractive,
followed by juniors and seniors. Among the high-skilled, for all the age groups the
distribution of the ratio converge closely around the mean and does not vary much.
Again, the prime-age workers constitute the group whose majority has the ratio of
productivity over cost higher than the sector average. They are followed by the older
workers, whose distribution is well symmetric around the mean.
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Table 18: Ratio of relative productivity over relative wage (services)
Table 19: Ratio of relative productivity over relative wage (trade)
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2.5. Conclusions
The second part of this chapter revisits the question of the actual proﬁle of marginal
productivity across the age groups within the given workforce and its potential equal-
ity with proﬁle of earnings. Using the French ﬁrm-level data, we estimated the
parameters of the production function where the labour input, diﬀerentiated simul-
taneously by age and skills, takes a nested CES functional form. We controlled for
the endogeneity bias according to the methodology by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
Among the main ﬁndings, workers of diﬀerent age appear to be imperfect substitutes
in production. The elasticity of substitution for workers of diﬀerent age has been
found considerably lower than implied by the usually applied additive functional form
speciﬁcation. Our results suggest that wages do not necessarily reﬂect the actual
productivity. Consistent with study by Frank (1984) and Campbell and Kamlani
(1997), the wage proﬁle has been found less variable than productivity.
As far as the labour productivity is concerned, its proﬁle across distinct age groups is
likely to depend on the skill category. For the low-skilled workers, it has been found
the lowest for the seniors. In the high-skill group, the oldest employees in manu-
facturing and trade are the most productive group. The results for manufacturing
sector show that the age-productivity and age-earnings proﬁles are compatible with
a deferred compensation system. It might indicate that the eﬀort incentive problem
has been regulated in practice by many ﬁrms by oﬀering at the start of the career
wages under the workers' marginal productivity and compensating this diﬀerence
in the later periods. On the other hand, in services and in trade, we observe the
combined relevance of speciﬁc human capital and deferred compensation.
Relative productivity over wage ratio, an important aspect for the employers, has
been found sector-speciﬁc. In manufacturing, it is the highest for the young workers
and the lowest for the old. Consequently, this discrepancy between productivity and
earnings can be a source of employment diﬃculties for the older low-skilled workers.
In services and trade, the ratio is the highest for the middle-aged employees. It
is important since when downsizing is necessary, ﬁrms have no incentives to retain
workers whose productivity exceeds their wages. Moreover, if for the employer, the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital is important, the ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts by laying oﬀ
from both ends of the age distribution ﬁrst (Lazear, 1998). It means that in case of
the negative productivity shock, the youngest workers who have not yet seen much
investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, and the oldest workers are going to retire
soon, are the most vulnerable age groups to be laid oﬀ.
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2.6. Appendix
Table 20: Production function estimates for each sector, labour diﬀerentiated by age,
sub-sector controls
Parameters Manufacturing Services
NLLS LP NLLS LP
Į
ȕ
įy
įm
įo
ȡa
sub-sector 
controls 
0.222 
(0.005)*** 
0.811 
(0.008)*** 
0.325 
(0.019)*** 
0.450 
(0.027)*** 
0.224 
0.345 
(0.075)*** 
yes
0.284 
(0.029)*** 
0.679 
(0.010)*** 
0.293 
(0.023)*** 
0.508 
(0.035)*** 
0.198 
(0.017)*** 
0.188 
(0.099)* 
yes
0.241 
(0.006)*** 
0.710 
(0.011)*** 
0.275 
(0.026)*** 
0.427 
(0.048)*** 
0.298 
0.935 
(0.213)*** 
yes
0.189 
(0.039)*** 
0.642 
(0.024)*** 
0.299 
(0.030)*** 
0.425 
(0.051)*** 
0.276 
(0.051)*** 
0.759 
(0.176)*** 
yes
No of obs. 8185 8185 4498 4498 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
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Table 21: Production function estimates for each sector, labour diﬀerentiated by age
and skills, sub-sector controls
Parameters Manufacturing Services
no constraints no constraints ȡh=0
NLLS LP NLLS LP NLLS LP
Į
ȕ
Ȗ
1-Ȗ
įly
įlm
įlo
ȡl
įhy
įhm
įho
ȡh
sub-sector 
controls 
0.191 
(0.005)*** 
0.827 
(0.008)*** 
0.279 
(0.013)*** 
0.721 
0.441 
(0.033)*** 
0.420 
(0.046)*** 
0.138 
0.437 
(0.117)*** 
0.248 
(0.029)*** 
0.403 
(0.037)*** 
0.348 
0.726 
(0.124)*** 
yes
0.283 
(0.041)*** 
0.714 
(0.009)*** 
0.269 
(0.016)*** 
0.730 
(0.016)*** 
0.404 
(0.033)*** 
0.465 
(0.052)*** 
0.131 
(0.029)*** 
0.323 
(0.118)*** 
0.246 
(0.032)*** 
0.435 
(0.044)*** 
0.318 
(0.027)*** 
0.581 
(0.138)*** 
yes
0.218 
(0.006)*** 
0.733 
(0.011)*** 
0.331 
(0.025)*** 
0.669 
0.342 
(0.038)*** 
0.435 
(0.071)*** 
0.222 
0.653 
(0.234)*** 
0.211 
(0.041)*** 
0.391 
(0.067)*** 
0.398 
1.009 
(0.288)*** 
yes
0.167 
(0.042)*** 
0.668 
(0.025)*** 
0.324 
(0.023)*** 
0.675 
(0.023)*** 
0.371 
(0.034)*** 
0.451 
(0.062)*** 
0.177 
(0.055)*** 
0.473 
(0.160)*** 
0.214 
(0.067)*** 
0.361 
(0.091)*** 
0.424 
(0.132)*** 
0.984 
(3.484) 
yes
0.219 
(0.006)*** 
0.724 
(0.011)*** 
0.364 
(0.026)*** 
0.635 
0.334 
(0.038)*** 
0.387 
(0.066)*** 
0.278 
0.814 
(0.248)*** 
0.132 
(0.028)*** 
0.696 
(0.045)*** 
0.172 
0
yes
0.167 
(0.042)*** 
0.660 
(0.025)*** 
0.356 
(0.026)*** 
0.643 
(0.026)*** 
0.365 
(0.034)*** 
0.409 
(0.062)*** 
0.226 
(0.060)*** 
0.608 
(0.172)*** 
0.144 
(0.035)*** 
0.664 
(0.054)*** 
0.191 
(0.037)*** 
0
yes
No of obs. 8185 8185 4498 4498 3309 3309 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
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Chapter 3: Intergenerational
heterogeneity in conﬁdence judgments
Following the analysis of earnings and estimation of productivity for diﬀerent age
groups in the previous chapter, this chapter involves the behavioural analysis of the
workforce composed of juniors and seniors. The ﬁrst section presents the conceptual
and methodological problems with the deﬁnition and the measurement of overcon-
ﬁdence, with a particular focus on age diﬀerences in conﬁdence judgments. The
second section describes the design and procedures of the original experiment aimed
at studying risk attitudes, workers' self-conﬁdence and propensity to enter the com-
petition, as well as the inﬂuence of the group age composition on the latter. All these
elements, having an impact on the workers' individual productivity, are particularly
important for the employers managing diﬀerent generations of workers and facing
the phenomenon of ageing.
1. Conceptual problems with overconﬁdence
The realistic judgments are crucial to successful decision making. They require an
understanding of the scope and limits of our knowledge. While making important
decisions or commitments, a correct assessment of the level of uncertainty and risk
might help avoiding costly mistakes. Nonetheless, people are often unjustiﬁably cer-
tain of their beliefs. Experimental evidence suggests that human judgments tend
to suﬀer from overconﬁdence. According to Russo and Schoemaker (1992), few peo-
ple can accurately evaluate their uncertainty. Lack of this ability results in risk
underestimation, missed deadlines and budget overruns.
These might have serious repercussions in many business domains. Barber and Odean
(2001) believe that overconﬁdence strongly explains the high levels of counterproduc-
tive trading in ﬁnancial markets. The investors, who are overconﬁdent, overestimate
the actual value of a security and tend to trade more than rational investors. Con-
sequently, such behaviour leads them to excessive trading and lower expected utility
(Odean, 1998). In the ﬁeld of corporate ﬁnance, overconﬁdent CEOs are supposed to
overestimate their ability to generate returns. As a result, they conduct more merg-
ers than their rational colleagues and, in addition, these mergers tend to be much
less favourable (Malmendier and Tate, 2004). Furthermore, it has been argued that
overconﬁdence of entrepreneurs is a cause of an excess market entry accompanied
by a high business failure rate (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). The phenomenon of
overconﬁdence has been an object of research in many diﬀerent ﬁelds. It has been
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underlined that in medicine, overconﬁdence in the diagnosis of a patient could lead to
inappropriate medical treatment and as a consequence, to patient injury and death
(Berner and Graber, 2008). In a juridical environment, an excessively optimistic
judgment about the outcome of a trial could result in a bad legal advice (Griﬃn,
1992; Griﬃn and Tversky, 1992).
Interestingly, it appears that in some situations or in certain domains people might
be underconﬁdent about their possible performance. In a business domain, under-
conﬁdent person tends to postpone taking a decision or, to follow other people's
advice without verifying if it is actually right. Moreover, it has been observed that
people tend to believe that events with objectively higher probability, or perceived
as controllable, are more likely to happen to them. Kruger and Burrus (2004) sug-
gest that people usually think that they are more likely than the average person to
experience common events (such as owning a car) and less likely than the average
person to experience rare events (such as owning an airplane).
Due to possible consequences of overconﬁdence, the understanding of its mecha-
nism has become extremely important. A psychological literature provides us with
interesting studies analysing the human process of decision making, probability as-
sessment and judgment under uncertainty (Kahneman et al., 1982). In economics,
these issues have attracted attention mostly of experimental and behavioural re-
searchers, although the focus of the studies concerns very diﬀerent aspects. Some
investigate the link between an attitude towards risk, ambiguity and conﬁdence in
decision taking. It has been found that persons who are less risk averse and more
tolerant for ambiguity, show greater conﬁdence in their decision choice (Ghosh and
Ray, 1997). Other studies have been devoted to the analysis of the role of experience
and learning. Oskamp (1968), for example, claims that experienced judges are far
superior to inexperienced ones, as far as the appropriateness of conﬁdence (level of
conﬁdence treated jointly with level of accuracy) is concerned. Overconﬁdence has
been also a research subject of multiple gender studies. Overall, women have been
found more risk-averse and signiﬁcantly less overconﬁdent than men. Moreover, as
men tend to feel more competent than women do in ﬁnancial matters (Prince, 1993),
it has been observed that men trade more and invest in riskier positions than women
(Barber and Odean, 2001). Interestingly, in experimental study with children, Stein
et al. (1971) claimed that tasks that are not matching one's sex role result in lower
expectations of success and lower conﬁdence.
Despite an important interest in conﬁdence judgments by researchers of diﬀerent
specialities, the relationship between age and overconﬁdence has still not been suf-
ﬁciently explored. In this context, we can suppose that experience acquired with
age can lead people to better estimate their relative competences and their own
limitations. However, it is equally possible that with age people's conﬁdence grows
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excessively. Overall, the relationship between age and overconﬁdence remains unde-
termined due to lack of substantial work on the issue.
This section involves an analysis of diﬀerent conceptual problems that exist in the
research and in the literature on overconﬁdence. First, in order to better under-
stand this phenomenon, we present its cognitive determinants, explored mainly by
the psychologists. Then, we present the most common measurement techniques of
overconﬁdence as well as multiple methodological diﬃculties that accompany this
evaluation. Finally, we address the question of age diﬀerences in conﬁdence judg-
ments.
1.1. The cognitive determinants of overconﬁdence
In spite of extensive research on overconﬁdence, its source and causes have not been
explicitly and unanimously deﬁned. While the existence of the phenomenon is ac-
cepted by some researchers without any doubts, some other still debate on its char-
acter and its roots.
The determinants of overconﬁdence have been explored mainly in the ﬁeld of psy-
chology. Among the reasons for overconﬁdence, the literature mentions a failure to
consider alternative perspectives. It can happen that persons responsible for making
the decision do not want any help, they do not consider what anyone else may think,
they are completely sure that they are right and they are so sure of themselves, that
questions are no longer asked (Kissinger, 1998). Similarly, overconﬁdence might
also result from the tendency to favour positive over negative information or to prefer
arguments in favour to the arguments against our initial ideas (Koriat et al., 1980).
While decision making, we naturally look for the support for our opinion rather than
for counterarguments. Additional problem may arise when people do not distinguish
between inferences and assertions, general conclusions and relevant facts (Wurzbach,
1991).
Griﬃn and Tversky (1992) claim that people, while making the intuitive judgments,
focus on the strength (e.g. sample proportion) or extremeness of available evidence
rather than on its weight (e.g. sample size) or credibility of the information. Conse-
quently, their judgments will be overconﬁdent if a strong impression is built on the
basis of limited knowledge and they will be underconﬁdent if despite broad available
information its impact is relatively modest.
As prevailing origins of overconﬁdence Tversky and Kahneman (1974) indicate three
heuristics: representativeness, availability and anchoring heuristics, which constitute
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an important source of cognitive bias while making conﬁdence judgments. The au-
thors claim that, while assessing probabilities of an uncertain event or predicting the
value of an uncertain quantity, people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles
which reduce the complex tasks to simpler judgmental operations. Although useful
in general, these heuristics might lead to serious inaccuracy and miscalculation.
It seems that people usually rely on the representativeness when they need to judge
a probability that a certain item belongs to a given category, an event originates
from a certain process or that a process will generate a certain event. The more
resemblance between these two elements exists, the higher will be automatically the
evaluation of the mentioned probability. At the same time, people often neglect the
role of sample size. They tend to expect that any sample, regardless of its size, will
represent perfectly well (i.e. statistically signiﬁcantly) the essential characteristics of
the whole population. Consequently, many people express substantial conﬁdence in
their own predictions suggested by a good ﬁt between the predicted result and the
initially available information. It is called the illusion of validity.
The heuristic of availability concerns the situations in which people evaluate the
likelihood of an event by the ease with which its examples or occurrences can be
recalled. Consequently, the probability of an event which is diﬃcult (easy) to imagine
may be seriously underestimated (overestimated).
Another often mentioned reason for the observed overconﬁdence is a phenomenon of
anchoring. It refers to a tendency to anchor the estimate on the initial value and
to not adjust away from it suﬃciently. Thus, the ﬁnal answer is biased toward the
starting point or the initial idea (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971).
However, while analysing the cognitive causes of overconﬁdence, one should not forget
that sometimes overconﬁdence  like optimism  might have a highly motivational
value by enhancing the ability to undertake diﬃcult tasks. An optimistic individual
assigns higher probabilities to future events, whereas overconﬁdent person tends to
underestimate the volatility of random events (Dubra, 2004). Thus, both may make
people to do things that they would not have done otherwise (Griﬃn and Tversky,
1992).
Though, the overconﬁdent comportment might equally come from the envy to look
competent. People often confuse conﬁdence with competence and this drives them to
take risky actions or to make not suﬃciently veriﬁed statements (Russo and Schoe-
maker, 1992). Burks et al. (2010) show that irrespective of their ability, people might
make overconﬁdent statements in order to send positive signals about one's ability to
others and in this way receive some social beneﬁts. On the other hand, via increase in
their self-esteem, people might also derive their ego utility from being overconﬁdent.
This hypothesis has been conﬁrmed, among others, by the reluctance of people to
revise downward their beliefs about their true ability (Charness et al., 2011).
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1.2. The measurement issues
In the economic literature, the experiments aiming at identiﬁcation and measurement
of overconﬁdence are usually based on questionnaires or real tasks. The experiment
might concern a prospective or retrospective conﬁdence judgment. If subjects are
asked to evaluate their judgment's accuracy before answering the questionnaire, a
rating is called a feeling-of-knowing. A retrospective judgment is called a conﬁdence
level rating. In this case, the participants must judge their responses accuracy after
having completed the test (for more on this subject see e.g. Reder and Ritter, 1992;
Costermans et al., 1992).
Questionnaires most often take a form of a general knowledge test or a set of questions
assessing certain type of skills such as a mathematical or a logic quiz. Participants
of questionnaires might be asked to make an accuracy judgment about their abso-
lute performance (probability of giving the correct answer by their own) or about
their relative performance, compared to the other participants or a given reference
group (probability to be better or worse than the others). Moore and Healy (2008)
proposed three distinct deﬁnitions corresponding to diﬀerent ways of considering
overconﬁdence in the literature: (1) overestimation  if overconﬁdence concerns indi-
vidual absolute performance, (2) overplacement  when evaluating one's performance
relative to others, and (3) overprecision  excessive certainty about accuracy of one's
beliefs. The relative placement judgments play an important role in many competi-
tive settings. In many jobs, the professional success simply depends on being better
than others. Moreover, people may better understand their relative placement than
their absolute performance level. In this context, we can distinguish tests based on
ranking questionnaire and on scale evaluation. They both require from the partici-
pants making estimation of their position in the experimental or reference group.
In experiments based on questionnaires testing the absolute performance, overcon-
ﬁdence is measured by comparing the number of correct answers with the number
of answers that the participant declared to be certain of being correct. Technically,
after giving the best answer to each question, a person must rate his or her conﬁ-
dence in its correctness. Judgments are identiﬁed overconﬁdent if they exceed the
proportion of correct answers.
Relative placement questionnaires are more problematic as they require not only the
estimation of participants' own level of skill (people dispose of imperfect knowledge in
this aspect, otherwise the overconﬁdence would not be compatible with rationality)
but also the evaluation of the skill distribution within the reference group. Since
people have often very little information about others, their evaluation tends to be
based on some beliefs that can be updated with time (Benoît and Dubra, 2007).
The evaluation of relative placements might involve ranking oneself in a certain
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fraction of population e.g. by making a statement given the distribution of a test
score in a population, I place myself in the ith k-cile or I have a higher score than x%
of the population. The task might also require comparing oneself to the average
(mean or median) person's score using a designated scale8. A majority of people
declaring to be above the average, although in theory only half can be, indicates
overconﬁdence (see, for example, Svenson, 1981).
Another class of experiments measuring overconﬁdence are real tasks asking partici-
pants to take decisions about actions. For example, Koehler (1974) and Hoelzl and
Rustichini (2005) provide an evidence of overconﬁdent behaviour using a vocabu-
lary test. Moreover, Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) observe that overconﬁdence might
change to underconﬁdence when the diﬃculty of an experimental task increases and
this eﬀect is stronger with monetary incentives. In fact, many empirical works often
refer to a seminal paper by Camerer and Lovallo (1999). The authors propose an
experiment modelling the process of ﬁrm's decision making about a market entry.
The participants must decide simultaneously and without communicating whether
to enter the market or, taking into account the number of potential competitors, stay
out of it. The optimal strategy consists in decision to enter only when the number of
expected entrants is below the market capacity. Camerer and Lovallo found out that
if competition is based on participants' skill ranking, market entrants are excessively
conﬁdent, overestimate their chances of success and enter the market much more of-
ten. In addition, they seem to neglect the increased level of competition from other
participants who also believe to be highly placed in a skill ranking (the authors call
this phenomenon reference group neglect). It is important to add that the ranking
is not revealed until the end of the game, which means that all the entry decision are
taken by the participants without knowing their rank. The authors notice that excess
entry does not take place if ranking depends on a random drawing. Consequently,
according to Camerer and Lovallo, the excessive optimism and overconﬁdence about
one's relative ability is a source of the excessive entry and thus a business failure.
According to this explanation, ﬁrms are expected to enter the market even if they
expect negative industry proﬁts.
This approach has been questioned by Hogarth and Karelaia (2008). The authors
claim that judgmental imperfection leading to excess entry does not necessarily imply
overconﬁdence. They show that entrants always exhibit greater conﬁdence than non-
entrants, even when all potential entrepreneurs are on average underconﬁdent. Thus,
observable excess entry can be simply produced by the imperfect estimates of their
true entrepreneurial abilities.
8Using a scale either in the estimation of answer correctness or in the relative placement eval-
uation, one must ensure to choose an appropriate scale format. As underlined by Schwarz et al.
(1991), depending on the scale format e.g. from -5 to 5, or from 0 to 10, estimation given by the
subjects might diﬀer considerably.
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1.3. Methodological diﬃculties
Intuitively, most people understand what overconﬁdence is. Nevertheless, the variety
of techniques used for its evaluation has revealed existence of multiple methodological
diﬃculties. Frequently, a measurement method applied implies a very speciﬁc deﬁ-
nition of overconﬁdence. The most common criticism encountered in the literature
is that observed overconﬁdence might be simply an artefact of a method, question
format or item selection applied in a study.
1.3.1. Format dependence
One of the problems accompanying the choice of an assessment set-up has been spec-
iﬁed as format dependence (Juslin et al., 1999). It turned out that the realism of
conﬁdence depends strongly on the evaluation format. Overconﬁdence assessed by
interval production for an uncertain quantity is larger and often of an enormous mag-
nitude whereas an interval evaluation (probability judgment that the given intervals
include the quantity) shows little or no overconﬁdence (Juslin et al., 2007).
In questionnaire experiments involving an interval production, participants are usu-
ally asked to answer questions by providing the best estimate of the answer and a
conﬁdence interval. It requires estimating dispersion i.e. a lower and an upper bound
of an interval so that it contains the correct answer at a given level of conﬁdence.
The most problematic issue concerns the human process of judgment that the answer
accuracy and interval production actually correspond to required conﬁdence level. In
the literature, it has been widely observed that people's 90 % subjective conﬁdence
intervals typically contain the true value about 50 % of the time, indicating extreme
overconﬁdence (McKenzie et al., 2008).
An alternative method involves interval evaluation and consists in asking experiment
participants to state by themselves a conﬁdence level about the correctness of the
given answers. Technically, this might take a form of a full-range or a half-range
format. Within the full-range format, participants are asked the probability that
the given statement or an answer estimate is correct. The possible answer may be
between 0 % (certainly false) and 100 % (certainly true). Within an assessment
set-up called a half-range format, participants need to declare how conﬁdent they
are that their own answer is exact. The possible response varies between 50 % if
guessing and 100 % if certain (Juslin et al., 2007). Interestingly, it has been shown
that when participants are provided directly with diﬀerent intervals and must assess
the probability that the true value falls within the interval, the overconﬁdence bias
tends to diminish (Winman et al., 2004).
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Concerning the conﬁdence interval production at a conﬁdence level ﬁxed in advance,
it seems that estimates of overconﬁdence may be in this case highly misleading. Russo
and Schoemaker (1992) found out that whether managers were asked to provide 50
%, 70 % or 90 % conﬁdence intervals, only few of them were able to provide them
realistically. Another example by the same authors concerns a group of ﬁnancial
oﬃcers who were asked to solve a test and provide a 90 % conﬁdence interval for an
estimated answer to each of the ten questions. Just after the test was completed, but
still before the solutions were revealed, the participants were asked to estimate how
many of the ten intervals provided would contain the true value. Only one person
has answered nine according to the required 90 %. Others estimated, on average,
5.6 intervals to contain the true value. It means that the level of participants' con-
ﬁdence about their best answer estimate was much lower than required 90 %. It is
particularly important, as in many studies, the fact that people provide conﬁdence
intervals that are too tight is considered a clear evidence of overconﬁdence (Lichten-
stein et al., 1982). In this case, the discrepancy between the imposed conﬁdence level
and the proportion of intervals that includes the correct value cannot be treated as a
proof of overconﬁdence since the post-test questionnaire veriﬁed the true perception
of conﬁdence by participants.
Moreover, there might be a diﬀerence in overconﬁdence pattern in evaluation of
conﬁdence in the answer accuracy for a single question of a test and assessment of
the percentage of correct answers. According to Griﬃn and Tversky (1992), judgment
conﬁdence in single items is evaluated according to arguments for and against a given
hypothesis, while an estimated frequency of correct prediction is based on perception
of task diﬃculty, knowledge of the judge, or past experience with similar tasks.
Nevertheless, many studies have adopted this technique to identify overconﬁdence.
They argue that participants being asked to give a range such that there is a 90 %
chance that the correct answer lies somewhere in the range should obtain approx-
imately 90 % correct answers. Not surprisingly, the results were always the same.
For example, in work by Klayman et al. (1999), where the reported conﬁdence level
was held constant at 90 %, the correct answer fell inside the participants' conﬁdence
ranges about 45 % of the time. Klayman et al. concluded that questions that request
subjective conﬁdence judgments based on setting 90 % conﬁdence ranges generate a
large overconﬁdence bias. Instead, they propose a model of conﬁdence judgments in
two-alternative task which seems to elicit only little overconﬁdence (less than 5 % on
average). In the two-choice task, questions are e.g. Who is older: (A) Bill Clinton
or (B) Madonna? After providing the answer, participants need to indicate their
conﬁdence level by answering the question what is the chance that you are right?
The method stays, however, controversial. It seems straightforward that the two-
choice questions generate much less overconﬁdence than producing a subjective range
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of conﬁdence intervals to a single question. In fact, it is much easier to compare two
elements than precisely estimate only one. To answer correctly the question who is
older: (A) Bill Clinton or (B) Madonna? we do not need to have so precise knowledge
as required to answer How old is Madonna?. Moreover, the diﬀerence between 50
%, 70 % or 90 % conﬁdence intervals might not clear for participants. For those who
have no clue about the true answer, how is it possible to make a diﬀerence between
50 %, 70 % or 90 % conﬁdence intervals? Another problem concerns the correct
deﬁnition of the right calibration. It is highly doubtful that A range such that
there is a 90 % chance that the correct answer lies somewhere in the range needs to
correspond to the proportion of correct answer in the entire test. If participant is
guessing answers to all the questions (which corresponds to 50 % conﬁdence level),
does it guarantee that half of his answers (50 %) will be correct?
As mentioned above, too narrow conﬁdence intervals might simply come from the
wrong experiment task formulation imposing the answers accuracy. However, tight
conﬁdence intervals might also have diﬀerent origins. It has been observed that peo-
ple have a deep aversion to setting wide conﬁdence intervals. They might associate
establishing intervals that they consider too broad to showing their incompetence.
Thus, they prefer to be wrong rather than considered incompetent. This phenomenon
is also supposed to come from a socially rational trade-oﬀ between informativeness
and accuracy (Cesarini et al., 2006). In this context, experts, compared to novices,
appear to provide intervals being narrower and thus more informative as well as
better centred on true values (McKenzie et al., 2008).
1.3.2. Better-than-average eﬀect
The better-than-average eﬀect denotes the propensity of people to believe that they
are better and do better than the average person (Kruger and Mueller, 2002). It is
often thought to depict the judgment bias due to overconﬁdence in the context of
evaluation of relative placements. It has been noticed that a vast majority of people
place themselves above average, although, in theory, only half can be. Nevertheless,
this opinion is not shared by all the researchers. Benoît and Dubra (2007) claim that
this phenomenon does not necessarily need to imply overconﬁdence. The authors
argue that due to a process of Bayesian updating of their beliefs, people can rationally
rate themselves above the average. As an argument they provide an experimental
result where 74 % of participants of math and logic quiz choose to be rewarded based
upon their placement (the condition of winning a prize is a score classiﬁed in the
top half of results obtained by all participants) rather than upon a 50 % chance
bet. According to Benoît and Dubra such result, usually interpreted as 74 % place
themselves in the top half of test takers, is imprecise if not misleading. Instead,
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they propose a following interpretation: 74 % believe that there is (at least) 50 %
chance that they are in the top half. Consequently, assuming that people learn and
after receiving the signal they update their initial beliefs according to Bayes' rule,
one cannot exclude the rationality of the participants' choice behaviour.
1.3.3. Task diﬃculty and hard-easy eﬀect
Recently, some experimental researchers have revealed the existence of a link between
perceived over- or underconﬁdence and the level of task diﬃculty. It seems that people
judge their performance and relative placement diﬀerently depending if it concerns
easy or diﬃcult issues. Pulford and Colman (1997) using a general knowledge test and
manipulating the level of questions diﬃculty, have found that hard questions resulted
in signiﬁcantly higher levels of participants' overconﬁdence than medium-diﬃculty
and easy questions, which in turn generated an underconﬁdence bias. Similar results
have been obtained by Larrick et al. (2007) who found that diﬃcult tasks tend to
produce overconﬁdence but worse-than-average perceptions, whereas easy tasks tend
to produce underconﬁdence and better-than-average eﬀects.
Moore and Cain (2007), as well as Moore and Healy (2008), provide a simple Bayesian
explanation for these phenomena. They argue that as long as people are uncertain
about their own or others' performance, their prediction should regress towards the
prior belief corresponding to a guessing value (e.g. 50 % chance to respond cor-
rectly a yes/no question). Assuming that one's own performance has no impact
on predictions of others' performance, and thus that the latter remains unchanged,
a high own test score makes one think to have done better than others. By anal-
ogy, obtaining a low test score makes one believe being worse than others. In the
authors' own words when your absolute performance is better (or worse) than your
prior expectations, sensible Bayesian inference will lead you to make predictions of
others' performances that are between these priors and your current beliefs about
your performance.
Using the methodology of the experimental market entry game by Camerer and
Lovallo (1999), Moore and Cain (2007) provide experimental evidence that, on simple
tests, people believe themselves to be above average and, on diﬃcult tests, to be
below average. The experiment participants slightly but signiﬁcantly underestimate
their scores on the simple trivia quiz. However, since they underestimate others'
performance even more, as consequence they place themselves above average. By
contrast, on the diﬃcult trivia quiz, people considerably overestimate their scores.
Though, they perceive themselves worse than average since they overestimate others'
scores more than their own.
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The concept of the hard-easy eﬀect has been an object of critics by Juslin et al. (2000).
The authors claim that with two-alternative general knowledge items there is little
or no evidence for an overconﬁdence bias in human judgment. They further argue
that controlling for the methodological problems such as scale-end eﬀects, linear
dependency and regression eﬀects brings to elimination of the hard-easy eﬀect.
Furthermore, the frequent use of the particularly diﬃcult trivia questions as a way
of investigating overconﬁdence has also been questioned. Gigerenzer et al. (1991)
and Juslin et al. (1997) argued that people make much more accurate judgments in
what concerns their natural environment. If questions are more characteristic for
the problems that people solve in everyday life, overconﬁdence tends to disappear.
However, it does not seem really surprising that in familiar domains people are better
informed and naturally generate rather underconﬁdence than overconﬁdence, as it is
a case with easy trivia tests.
A new conﬁdence measurement method has been recently proposed by Blavatskyy
(2009). The author presents a new incentive-compatible method where individual
conﬁdence in own knowledge or ability is determined through observation of a simple
choice behaviour by experiment participants who are asked to bet either on own
knowledge/ability (which reveals overconﬁdence) or on an equivalent risky lottery
(which signals underconﬁdence). The author calls the method incentive-compatible
meaning that subjects cannot increase their monetary payoﬀs through deliberate
misreporting of their conﬁdence assessment, through conscious incorrect answering
or through strategically chosen low eﬀort.
In economic experiments, participants are often asked to make choices for real money,
which is considered as an incentive to reveal their true behaviour and avoid self-
presentation bias of attitudinal questions (Smith, 1976). Among the incentive com-
patible valuation methods are real choice experiment and the non-hypothetical
experimental auction. In hypothetical settings, subjects typically do not put enough
cognitive eﬀort in the elicitation tasks and do not have an incentive to report their
true preferences (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).
The results by Blavatskyy (2009) show that subjects appear to be predominantly
underconﬁdent about their own knowledge. 65 % out of forty-eight subjects are
classiﬁed as underconﬁdent, 29 % as overconﬁdent and only 6 % as well calibrated.
The experiment is designed to test individual conﬁdence in own knowledge without
self-assessment relative to the reference group because an individual may have little or
no information about abilities of other subjects. Individual conﬁdence is measured in
a simple decision problem. Initially, subjects receive ten general knowledge questions,
each with ﬁve possible answers. Subjects are informed that the more questions they
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answer correctly, the higher is their potential payoﬀ. Having answered all questions,
subjects face a choice among three alternatives: 1. One of ten questions is selected
at random and the subject receives 50 CHF (US $39) if he or she answered this
question correctly and 1 CHF (US $1.28) if his or her answer was incorrect; 2. One
card is randomly drawn from a box with ten cards numbered from 1 to 10 and the
subject receives 50 CHF when the number on the drawn card is smaller than or equal
to n (1 CHF otherwise). n is calculated as a number of questions that the subject
answered correctly. Although subjects see the number n, they are not informed
that this is exactly the number of their correct answers. 3. Either alternative 1 or
alternative 2 is selected (the subject presses button Both alternatives are the same).
Alternatives 13 yield identical distribution of monetary outcomes but subjects are
not aware of this fact. Subjects are classiﬁed as overconﬁdent (i.e. overestimating
own knowledge) if they select alternative 1, as underconﬁdent (i.e. underestimating
own knowledge) - if they select alternative 2, and well calibrated - if they select
alternative 3. Alternative 1 involves an ambiguous lottery (betting on an uncertain
event) and alternative 2 involves a risky lottery (betting on an event with a known
probability). Thus, ambiguity averse subjects may be inclined to choose alternative
2 and risk averse subjects may prefer alternative 1. (Blavatskyy, 2009). To control
for risk attitudes the author measured risk aversion and ambiguity aversion of every
subject.
1.4. Age diﬀerences in conﬁdence judgments
Despite an extensive research on conﬁdence judgments, the relationship between age
and overconﬁdence has still not been suﬃciently explored. Though, the mechanism
and quality of decision making by older people is of high importance for the social
policy. Moreover, the very few studies that have addressed the question of age dif-
ferences in realism of conﬁdence judgments provided ambiguous results. Crawford
and Stankov (1996), having tested participants' ﬂuid and crystalized intelligence, ar-
gue that older adults are more overconﬁdent in their judgments than younger ones.
Kovalchik et al. (2005), analysing self-reported conﬁdence on answers to trivia ques-
tions, ﬁnd that both junior and senior participants display overconﬁdence at some
levels. On the other hand, Pliske and Mutter (1996) and Forbes (2005), explor-
ing conﬁdence judgments via a general knowledge quiz, observed less overconﬁdence
among older adults.
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1.4.1. Experience
We can suppose that experience and knowledge acquired with age can lead people
to better estimate their relative competence and their own limitations. However, it
is equally possible that with age people's conﬁdence grows excessively. Block and
Harper (1991) noticed that overconﬁdence tends to be lower for more familiar issues.
Indeed, older adults faced with decisions or judgments in frequently met context may
avoid bias in their decisions thanks to previously acquired experience (Peters et al.,
2007). Also Russo and Schoemaker (1992) suggest that experience possibly reduces
overconﬁdence as they observed more accurate results on the test questions which
were relevant for the participants' job or profession. However, the authors notice
that, in spite of experience, overconﬁdence persists to a certain extent.
We could expect that if good calibration depends on age-sensitive cognitive abili-
ties, then human judgments and decisions will tend to impair with age. Yet, this
potential cognitive decline might be compensated by the beneﬁts of accumulated
experience (Peters et al., 2007). In fact, the tasks requiring high levels of skill or
expertise in various content-speciﬁc areas or utilisation of eﬃcient strategies could
favour older individuals who have acquired many years of experience in the speciﬁc
domain. However, in the experimental literature, tasks representing the pragmatics
of intelligence (Baltes, 1987) or Practical Intelligence (Sternberg and Wagner, 1986)
are relatively under-represented.
1.4.2. Cognitive skills
On the other hand, the literature provides numerous examples of age diﬀerences
in cognitive abilities. Some research suggests that aging is associated with lower
eﬃciency in processing perceived information (Salthouse, 1994). Older adults have
been also found more inﬂuenced by prior expectancies and less likely to correct
their judgments when accurate information regarding the co-occurrence of events was
made salient (Mutter and Pliske, 1994). Moreover, there exist some suggestions that
older adults rely more on heuristic processing due to cognitive capacity constraints
(Johnson, 1990; Klaczynski and Robinson, 2000).
Some other research suggests that ageing is associated with a greater focus on emo-
tional content and on positive over negative information (Peters et al., 2007). Kah-
neman and Tversky (1979) underline that elderly people, putting greater attention
to positive information, may process gain-versus-loss information in decision pro-
cess diﬀerently than younger adults. It might have important implications for their
perception of risk.
111
On the other hand, in some aspects, cognitive age diﬀerences appear to be limited
or not signiﬁcant. Chasseigne et al. (1997, 1999) investigated the relation between
age and ability to learn direct and inverse probabilistic relationships in Multiple
Cue Probability Learning (MCPL) experiments9. They found that elderly adults
performed as well as young adults in probability learning tasks when the cues had a
direct relation with the criterion but performed less well when the cues had a more
complex inverse or multiplicative relation with the criterion.
No signiﬁcant age diﬀerences have been identiﬁed with respect to cautiousness, risk
taking and overall performance in experiments where actual rewards for behaviours
have been involved (Charness and Villeval, 2009; Sutter and Kocher, 2007). In the
experiment by Okun and Elias (1977) older and younger adults participated in a
vocabulary task with a payoﬀ structure varying either directly or inversely with risk.
Both age groups turn out to be equally sensitive to the payoﬀ structure and overall
expected value.
1.4.3. Age and overconﬁdence
Age diﬀerences in cognitive abilities might have important implications for conﬁdence
judgments and assessment of their realism.
Marquié and Huet (2000)investigate to which extent age-related diﬀerences in stereo-
types and metacognitive beliefs are related to age diﬀerences in prospective (feeling-
of-knowing) and retrospective (conﬁdence level) judgments. A metacognitive ques-
tionnaire (Dixon et al., 1988) was used to assess participants' general and computer
knowledge. Half of the questions covered topics in general knowledge (history, geog-
raphy, literature, arts, science and sports), another half concerned computer science.
Test diﬃculty has been equated across three age groups (66 young, middle-aged and
older adults).
The middle-aged and older adults were found to be more underconﬁdent than young
adults when rating their feeling-of-knowing, especially for the computer domain.
Otherwise, no age diﬀerence has been observed in conﬁdence level ratings. The
authors conclude that all age groups were equally accurate in FOK and in CL judg-
ments, in both the general and the computer domain.
Apart from the knowledge test, the participants were asked to fulﬁl a stereotype
questionnaire. It was designed to measure the participants' beliefs about the dif-
ferences between younger and older people in their competence in the general- and
computer-knowledge domains. Interestingly, all three age groups expressed the same
9This cognitive ability depends on information processing speed and working memory capacity.
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opinion that the young participants are more competent for the computer domain
and the older participants for the general domain.
Another study aiming at measuring age diﬀerences in conﬁdence judgments, by Hans-
son et al. (2008), use a test of general knowledge about population of 40 randomly
chosen countries. Quiz participants were asked 1) to make their best guess and then
produce an 80 % intuitive conﬁdence interval and 2) to make their best guess and
then provide a probability judgment that the randomly proposed interval would in-
clude the true value. Apart from the test, the cognitive abilities of participants have
been measured during a separate session. The cognitive test consisted in examining
short-term memory, processing speed, crystallized knowledge and Block Design Test
(BDT).
The results conﬁrmed the presence of signiﬁcant age eﬀects for the short-term mem-
ory, speed measures and for the measures of crystallized knowledge. A general ability
factor, reﬂected by all the individual measures, was strongly negatively correlated
with age. Once all the other factors were controlled, ageing turned out to favour
increase in crystallized knowledge. Besides, the short-term memory and processing
speed did not signiﬁcantly predict overconﬁdence over the general ability. According
to the authors, at least part of the negative inﬂuence of increased age on general
ability in interval production may be compensated for by a greater domain-relevant
knowledge or experience.
Among the main ﬁndings, overconﬁdence was found positively related to age with
interval production but not with probability judgment. It is consistent with a study
by Chasseigne et al. (1999) and Sanford et al. (1972) that older and younger adults
appear to learn and respond to probabilistic information equally well. At the same
time, the results conﬁrm the frequently encountered methodological problem of for-
mat dependence, which has been underlined in the previous part of the present work.
A wide range of cognitive abilities is supposed to decline with increase in human
age. According to Horn-Cattell theory (Cattell, 1941; Horn, 1965) we can distin-
guish between ﬂuid and crystallized intelligence. The crystallized knowledge rooted
in experience (detected through verbal or general knowledge tests) becomes stronger
as we age and accumulates new knowledge and understanding. In contrast, ﬂuid
intelligence, i.e. abilities that are independent of learning, experience and educa-
tion such as the ability to think and reason abstractly and solve problems, tend to
diminish with age.
In order to explore age diﬀerences in the accuracy of conﬁdence judgements, Craw-
ford and Stankov (1996) tested ﬂuid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, short-term
memory and visual discrimination of 97 experiment participants. In order to test
the ability to maximise their game scores, the participants were asked to give their
best guess for each test item, rate their conﬁdence in the answer accuracy and decide
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whether to submit the item for scoring. In case of submission, they could gain one
point if the item was correct, or lose one point if the answer was wrong.
Consistently with the Horn-Cattell theory, older people have been found less success-
ful in tasks involving ﬂuid intelligence and short-term memory, but they performed
better than younger participants on tasks of crystallized intelligence.
Regarding the conﬁdence judgement measures, the results showed a small but sta-
tistically signiﬁcant tendency for greater overconﬁdence for older subjects. However,
results of resolution and slope measures indicate a lower ability of older participants'
conﬁdence ratings to discriminate between correct and incorrect items.
Somewhat unexpectedly, the accuracy on the visual discrimination task was slightly
positively correlated with age. One of the explanations could be greater caution of
older persons in providing the answers as indicated by their slower response times in
all types of tasks.
Age diﬀerences in the accuracy of conﬁdence judgments have been also explored
by Pliske and Mutter (1996). In their experiment, younger and older participants
need to make conﬁdence judgments about the correctness of their responses in a
two-alternative general knowledge test. The subjects were asked to indicate their
conﬁdence level by choosing a number on a scale.
Results indicate that older subjects were signiﬁcantly more accurate than younger
in their conﬁdence judgments. It is consistent with recent theories that suggest that
older adults have greater insights into the limitations of their knowledge (Kitchener
and King, 1981; Kramer, 1983; Kitchener and Brenner, 1990) as well as with the
Horn-Cattell theory that older people typically outperform younger ones on general
knowledge tests (Perlmutter, 1978). Furthermore, the elderly appeared marginally
less overconﬁdent than younger participants but the age diﬀerences in the mean
conﬁdence ratings were not signiﬁcant. However, the authors underline that there
was an important variability in the overconﬁdence scores. Although, on average,
older subjects were less overconﬁdent, some of them were extremely overconﬁdent.
Thus, the results must be interpreted with caution and not be generalised towards
one age group as if it was homogenous.
Another study using a two-alternative trivia general knowledge test is a paper by
Kovalchik et al. (2005). Among the participants were healthy elderly individuals
(average age 82) and young students (average age 20). They were asked to choose
the right answer and provide a conﬁdence judgment of 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 or 100
% certainty. According to the standard methodology, the authors combined all the
answers, for each age group, in which subjects gave the same conﬁdence evaluation
and calculated how often they were right. Individuals were called well calibrated if
the fraction of correct answers corresponded to the stated conﬁdence level.
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The results have shown that both age groups were characterised by a certain level
of overconﬁdence, though older individuals not only answered more questions (74 %,
compared to 66 % for the young) correctly but they appeared also signiﬁcantly more
accurate than younger participants at 60 % and 70 % reported conﬁdence level.
Interestingly, the distribution of responses showed that older subjects much more
often indicated either 100 % (completely certain) or 50 % (completely uncertain)
conﬁdence level. The authors argue that this high resolution of conﬁdence evalu-
ation by the elderly suggests highly accurate beliefs about their knowledge and its
limitations. It is thus probable that through experience older people learnt to temper
their overconﬁdence and, thus, look more like experts.
1.5. Conclusions
There is a widely held belief that ageing is associated with lower eﬃciency in process-
ing information and as a result decision making faculties decline with age. However,
the few studies that have investigated the relationship between age and the ability
to make realistic conﬁdence judgments have not managed to bring conclusive results.
The lack of consensus could result from the variety of methods used to measure over-
conﬁdent attitudes as well as from diﬀerent samples of participants in terms of age.
Nevertheless, it has been noticed that generally overconﬁdence tends to be lower if
judgments concern well known or familiar context (Block and Harper, 1991). It has
been conﬁrmed in the experiments measuring age diﬀerences in overconﬁdence. The
fact that older participants tend to report more accurate conﬁdence levels (Pliske
and Mutter, 1996; Kovalchik et al., 2005) seems to indicate that seniors, thanks to
acquired experience, have greater insights into the limitations of their knowledge.
That would prove the robustness of their decision behaviour.
The age diﬀerences in decision making and overconﬁdence will be further explored
in the next section of this chapter. In an original experimental study inspired by
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) we analyse decision eﬃciency within an age-heterogeneous
workforce. In particular, we study risk attitudes, workers' self-conﬁdence and propen-
sity to enter the competition, as well as the inﬂuence of the group age composition
on this propensity.
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2. Ageing, excess entry and overconﬁdence. An
artefactual ﬁeld experiment in a Swiss bank10
One of the consequences of aging societies is that juniors and seniors are more and
more often confronted with competition on the labour market. Such situation takes
place already while applying for a job. Older workers tend to experience discrim-
ination and be disproportionately represented among the long term unemployed
(Walker, 2005). If lucky to be employed, older workers tend to occupy a relatively
low status on the labour market. Employers hold rather stereotypical views about
the strengths and weakness of older workers. Although they appreciate experience,
loyalty and low turnover of senior employees, in fact younger workers are preferred
when it comes to hiring decisions (Guest and Shacklock, 2005).
Also in the workplace, individuals belonging to diﬀerent generations face compe-
tition. Within the same enterprise, juniors and seniors might compete for getting
involved in a project or being promoted. Nowadays, many employers encourage com-
petition, for example by applying performance-related pay, in order to motivate their
employees, keep them innovative and elicit greater productivity and better quality of
work (Booth and Frank, 1999; Lazear, 2000; Cuñat and Guadalupe, 2005). The em-
ployees, in order to gain employer's appreciation, try to perform better than others
and surpass themselves. In particular, over the recent decades, a pressure to prove
their qualities has been especially high for senior workers. The technical and organ-
isational changes due to the rapid development of information and communication
technologies has required from workers to achieve quickly new skills and compe-
tences. Older workers have been more than ever concerned with skills obsolescence
especially that employers started to attach less value to their previously accumu-
lated work experience. Moreover, seniors started to be perceived as overly cautious,
less competitive, less willing to learn and adapt to new conditions. Nevertheless,
the recent studies show that seniors are no more risk averse than juniors and tend
to be more cooperative. Both generations seem to respond strongly to competition
(Charness and Villeval, 2009).
The objective of this section is to investigate whether juniors and seniors diﬀer in
propensity to enter the competition. If seniors are more likely to compete, it could
increase their chances to bring proﬁts and consequently make them more attractive
for the potential employers who tend to have an image of older workers as less
productive. Moreover, since both generations tend to interact in a workplace, we
verify whether the age composition of a pool of potential competitors conditions risk-
taking behaviour and inﬂuences the overall eﬃciency of decisions. In this purpose we
conduct a controlled experiment with the employees of a Swiss bank. We use a market
10The section is the result of a collaboration with Thierry Madiès and Marie Claire Villeval.
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entry game that is largely inspired by Camerer and Lovallo (1999) and which we
adjusted to study the diﬀerences between generations. In our experiment, the junior
and senior participants need to make a series of decisions on market entry. Given the
limited market capacity, only well-ranked players can make proﬁts. Depending on the
sequence (Random or Performance), the rank of an entrant is assigned randomly by
the computer program or depends on player's performance (relative to other players)
in a quiz in general economic knowledge that is administered at the end of the game.
In order to make the optimal choice, participants must anticipate the behaviour
of other players, the level of their relative abilities, risk attitudes and readiness to
compete.
We ﬁnd that seniors enter the competition signiﬁcantly more often than juniors. We
consider a number of explanations to understand this generation diﬀerence in market
entry. First of all, we verify whether juniors and seniors are characterised by diﬀerent
level of risk and ambiguity aversion. If seniors are less risk and/or ambiguity averse,
it could at least partially explain why they decided to enter the market more often.
Otherwise, this decision could be also driven by diﬀerences in abilities. However,
we ﬁnd that the age gap in market entry is explained neither by intergenerational
diﬀerences in attitudes towards risk and ambiguity nor in quiz performance.
Another explanation that we consider is that seniors might be more conﬁdent about
their relative performance than juniors. In the quiz administered after the market
entry game, it turns out that although seniors rather underestimate their individual
performance, they believe to be better ranked than juniors. Hence, we test the over-
conﬁdence hypothesis to see if these higher expectations about their relative ability
are accurate or not. There exist empirical evidence that experience and knowledge
acquired with age can lead people to better estimate their relative competence and
their own limitations (Peters et al., 2007; Russo and Schoemaker, 1992, Kitchner
and Brenner, 1990).
In order to better explain the age gap in market entry, we run a Probit regression
controlling for age diﬀerences in factors such as overconﬁdence, risk and ambiguity
aversion. We ﬁnd that even including these controls, age diﬀerences are still signiﬁ-
cant and large. This makes us think that the competition entry gap between juniors
and seniors could be in fact driven by the image concern.
Our initial intuition concerning impact of age on the image concern in terms of
relative ability was that juniors would take more risk than seniors to show their
competence. In reality, we ﬁnd that seniors enter the market more often than juniors.
Nevertheless, they tend to be very pessimist about their own individual result, both
in general and compared to other seniors. It is thus possible that by entering the
competition, seniors want to improve their image and ﬁght the stereotype as risk-
averse and less likely to get involved in competitive tasks. Burks et al. (2010)
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suggest that people, induced by social concerns, might behave as overconﬁdent in
order to signal a positive image of themselves to others. In particular, we ﬁnd that
the important presence of juniors in a group creates a sort of informal pressure on
seniors to prove their competences concerning behaviour in competitive environment.
It is likely that seniors get a sort of psychic returns from entering the competition
against juniors so that the total expected utility from entering the market is high.
The remainder of this section is organised as follows. In the next subsection, we
present our experimental design and procedures. Afterwards, we present and discuss
the experimental results before making the ﬁnal conclusions.
2.1. Experimental design and procedures
Our experiment is composed of ﬁve parts. We conducted the sessions in the ﬁeld.
2.1.1. The tasks
The main game consists of a market entry game inspired by Camerer and Lovallo
(1999) and designed to test the overconﬁdence of the participants according to age
and age matching. This game is played in Part 2. Since we are aware that the entry
decision may also capture the inﬂuence of ambiguity aversion as participants decide
without knowing the number of potential competitors on the market11, we control
for risk attitudes and ambiguity aversion in Part 1. The following parts are designed
to measure the participants' conﬁdence in their ability and their beliefs about the
ability of other participants according to their generation.
A test of attitudes towards risk and ambiguity
In Part 1, we elicited our participants' attitudes toward risk and ambiguity by asking
them to choose between certain amounts and drawing a ball from an urn (see Fox and
Tversky, 1995, and Appendix 1). Precisely, the participants have to make a ﬁrst set
of 20 decisions between accepting a certain payoﬀ and extracting a ball from an urn.
The urn contains 5 blue balls and 5 yellow balls and this is common information.
One yellow ball drawn from the urn pays 500 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit,
with 100 ECU = 2 CHF = U.S. $2.06), a blue ball pays nothing. The amount
of the certain payoﬀ increases from 25 to 500 ECU. Then, the participant has to
make a second set of 20 similar decisions, with the same certain amounts, except
11Grieco and Hogarth (2004) state that people seek ambiguity when the source of uncertainty is
related to their competence while overconﬁdence, as such, plays no role in excess entry.
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that the proportions of the balls of each colour in the urn are now unknown. The
switching point in the ﬁrst set of decisions informs us about the risk attitude of the
participants and the diﬀerence between the switching point in the risky lottery and
in the ambiguous lottery indicates the participants' attitude regarding uncertainty.
In both sets of decisions, a risk neutral participant should choose the random draw
until the certain payoﬀ is equal to at least 250 ECU and then choose the certain
payoﬀ. In the ﬁrst set of decisions, a risk averse participant should switch from
the lottery to the certain payoﬀ for certain payoﬀs lower than 250 ECU and a risk
seeking participant should switch for certain payoﬀs higher than 250 ECU. An ambi-
guity averse participant should switch for lower certain amounts in the second set of
decisions than in the ﬁrst set, while an ambiguity-seeking participant should switch
later in the second set of decisions than in the ﬁrst one. The theoretical predictions
are the same for both juniors and seniors.
While decisions are made at the beginning of the session, participants know that the
outcome of their decisions will be determined only at the end of the session after
completion of all the other tasks. Participants are also informed that one decision
in each set of decisions will be randomly drawn for real payoﬀs at the end of the
session.
Eliciting attitudes towards risk and uncertainty informs on whether we observe dif-
ferences according to the participants' generations, as a stereotype is that older
individuals become more risk-averse than young people. But it mainly serves to
better identify the motivation of entry decisions in the main game, the market entry
game.
The market entry game
Since we are chieﬂy interested in analysing whether aging helps individuals in better
calibrating their beliefs about their skill and adjusting their decisions in an uncertain
environment, thanks to a longer return of experience, we have used a market entry
game that is largely inspired by Camerer and Lovallo (1999). At the same time, we
want to see whether information on age of other players has an impact on strategic
behaviour while individual decision making. For this reason, we manipulate the
composition of groups in terms of generations.
At the beginning of the game, each participant is endowed with 500 ECU. The
game consists of two sequences of nine periods each. Each sequence corresponds to
one of two treatments, respectively the Random treatment and the Performance
treatment. As in Camerer and Lovallo (1999), the comparison between the two
treatments should inform on the (over-/under-) conﬁdence of the participants. Let
us describe the Random treatment ﬁrst. In each of the nine periods, participants are
teamed in groups of ten. At the beginning of each period, they are informed on the
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composition of their group in terms of generation (number of juniors and seniors).
The number of juniors (seniors, respectively) can be 0, 3, 5, 7 or 10. Participants
are also told the capacity of the market, i.e. the number of participants in the
group who can make proﬁts by entering the market. According to the periods, the
capacity can be 2, 4 or 6. Payoﬀs depend on the decision to enter or not the market
and if so, on the rank of the participant among the entrants. A participant who
decides not to enter earns nothing and loses nothing. A participant who is ranked
above the capacity of the market loses 500 ECU. A participant whose rank is lower
than or equal to the capacity of the market makes a proﬁt which amount depends
precisely on his rank and on the market capacity, as indicated in Table 22. Whatever
the capacity of the market, the total market proﬁts amount to 3,000 ECU. In the
Random treatment, ranks are assigned randomly by the computer program to the
entrants.
Table 22: Payoﬀ matrix in the market entry game (in ECU)
Rank among the 
entrants
Market capacity, C
        C = 2                       C = 4                       C = 6 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1,900
1,100
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
1,400
  900 
  500 
  200 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
  900 
  700 
  500 
  400 
  300 
  200 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
After being informed on the capacity of the market and on the composition of
his group, each participant has ﬁrst to report his belief about the number of co-
participants who will decide to enter the market. Then, he decides on entering or
not. At the end of the period, the participant receives a feedback on the total number
of entrants in the current period but he is not informed on his rank if he decided to
enter.
The only diﬀerence between the Performance treatment and the Random treatment
is that in the former, ranks in each of the nine periods are assigned according to
the participant's performance in a quiz that is administered in the next part of the
session, compared with the performance of the other entrants in his group. When
they make their decision, participants do not know the content of the quiz. They
just know that it consists of four questions related to general economic knowledge.
They are given two examples of questions similar to that included in the quiz. The
comparison between the two treatments allows us to measure how people condition
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their risk-taking in such an uncertain environment to the mode of determination of
ranks. Speciﬁcally, if a participant enters more in the Performance treatment than in
the Random treatment for a given market capacity and a given belief regarding the
others' decisions, it means that this participant believes he is better than random
others.
The originality of our design compared to the one used by Camerer and Lovallo
(1999) is that we manipulate the composition of the groups in terms of generation to
measure whether individuals condition their entry decision in each treatment i) on
their own generation and ii) on the generation of their co-participants. We can also
measure iii) whether the latter eﬀect depends on the participant's own generation.
From a theoretical point of view, the predictions are the same for both generations.
But if seniors are more (less) risk averse than juniors, they should enter less (more)
than juniors in both the Random and the Performance treatments. If seniors are
overconﬁdent (underconﬁdent) compared to juniors, they should enter more (less) in
the Performance treatment than in the Random treatment, and more (less) so than
juniors. If participants believe that juniors adopt a more risk-seeking (risk-averse)
behaviour, they should enter less (more), the more juniors there are in their group.
At the end of the session, one period out of the 18 periods of the two treatments
is drawn randomly for payment. For this period, the computer program calculates
the number of entrants. The participant is paid 100 ECU if his prediction regarding
the number of entrants in this period was correct. His other payoﬀ for this part
depends on the capacity of the market, on his decision to enter and, conditional on
this decision, on his rank in this period. Participants are informed on their rank but
not on whether this period belonged to the Random or the Performance treatment
for a reason that will become clear below.
The measure of conﬁdence
Typically, tests of miscalibration require the subjects to determine conﬁdence in-
tervals at the 10 %, 50 % and 90 % levels and to predict their number of correct
answers (Dargnies and Hollard, 2009; Cesarini et al. 2006; Juslin, Winman and Ols-
son, 2000; Russo and Schoemaker, 1992). Other tests propose the subjects to bet
on their knowledge (Blavatskyy, 2009; Goodie, 2005; Fischoﬀ et al., 1977). For the
sake of simplicity, for time constraints, and also because the market entry game is
devoted to test for overconﬁdence, we have chosen a very parsimonious incentivised
test of conﬁdence12. Our experimental settings in Parts 3 and 4 are designed such
that we can measure both the ability and the beliefs of our participants on their
ability. They allow us to learn the calibration of the participants and to relate this
to their generation.
12It should be noted that many tests of conﬁdence in psychology do not involve incentives but
self-reports (see for example Svenson, 1981).
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Part 3 consists of a quiz that includes four questions related to general economic
knowledge13. All the participants receive the same questions in the same order. For
each item, they have to enter their answer that can take any value between 0 and 100.
They have also to indicate an interval of conﬁdence for each answer. Precisely, they
indicate a minimum value such that they believe the correct answer cannot be lower
and a maximum value such that they believe the correct answer cannot be higher
than this value. Their precise answer must be included in this interval, otherwise it
is rejected by the computer program.
Payoﬀs for this part are determined in a loss frame as follows. For each item, the
participant receives 100 ECU. If the correct answer falls outside of the interval deﬁned
by the participant, the 100 ECU are lost. If the correct answer falls inside this
interval, the payoﬀ is given by the diﬀerence between 100 ECU and the size of the
interval provided by the participant. Maximum payoﬀ is of course reached when
the participant gives the correct answer and chooses both the lower and the higher
bounds of the interval equal to this answer. This procedure ensures that participants
are incited to give their best possible answer. It also creates a trade-oﬀ between
indicating a smaller interval to earn more ECU (provided it includes the correct
answer) and choosing a larger interval to increase the chance that it contains the
correct answer. This procedure gives us a relative measure of conﬁdence. Indeed, an
overconﬁdent (underconﬁdent) risk-neutral participant should indicate a narrower
(larger) conﬁdence interval than a well-calibrated participant. Total payoﬀs in this
part are given by the sum of payoﬀs obtained for each question14.
Before answering the quiz, participants are reminded that their performance may
inﬂuence their rank in the previous game. A distance index is assigned to each
participant according to the correctness of his answers. This index is deﬁned as
the mean diﬀerence in absolute value between the correct answers and the answers
given by the participant. A lower distance index indicates that the answers were
more precise (in the extreme, an index of zero would indicate that all the answers
were correct). To calculate the rank of a participant in a period of the Performance
treatment, the computer program compares the distance index of the entrants in
this period. Then, it assigns the ﬁrst rank to the entrant whose distance index is the
lowest, the second rank to the second lowest distance index, etc. At the end of the
session, players are informed on their total payoﬀ in this part and on their distance
index but only if they ask for this information in a further part of the session.
13Questions have been chosen such that most participants have an idea of the correct answer, but
an imprecise one. The questions are: How many countries are members of the OECD? What was
the Swiss public debt as a percentage of GDP in 2009? What was the proportion of Swiss people
with a high degree of satisfaction with life in general in 2006 (in percentage)? What was the share
of Swiss exports (as percentage of total exports) to EU 27 in 2009?
14This payment scheme was inspired by Dargnies and Hollard (2009), but our procedure diﬀers
from theirs in that we do not ask participants to give 10 %, 50 % or 90 % conﬁdence intervals.
122
In Part 4, we elicit the participants' beliefs regarding their own distance index, the
average distance index of the juniors in the session, the average distance index of the
seniors, their own ranking in the quiz among the ten participants of their generation,
their ranking among the 20 participants of the session. Each correct prediction pays
50 ECU. Since we expect that it is diﬃcult for any participant to report precise
estimations, the program displays various categories of indices and ranks15. These
beliefs provide us with another indication of the participants' conﬁdence in their
absolute and relative ability compared with the two generations. Indeed, this informs
on whether the participant believes he has provided on average better answers than
the other members of his own generation and better than the members of the other
generation. In addition, if the participant indicates a rank category in the group of
20 that is not exactly twice the category reported in the group of 10, this indicates
that the participant believes he is either more or less able than the other generation.
At the end of the session, participants are only informed on their total payoﬀs for
this part. They are not told which answers were accurate.
2.1.2. Experimental procedures in the ﬁeld
This artefactual ﬁeld experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) was conducted with 80
employees of a large private bank in Lausanne, Switzerland16. Forty juniors (between
22 and 30 years old, mean = 28 years old) and forty seniors (between 48 and 62 years
old, mean = 55 years old) participated in a total of four sessions. The Human Re-
source department recruited the participants via emails and phone calls and took care
of balancing the proportions of juniors and seniors17. All participants had the same
occupation (client advisors), and most of them (82.5%) had no supervisory functions.
Participants were invited from various oﬃces located in French-speaking cantons in
Switzerland in order to minimize the likelihood that several people interacting daily
at work would participate in the same session. The invitation mentioned participa-
tion in a scientiﬁc experiment initiated and managed by academic researchers during
working time. The Human Resource department was aware of not revealing the
purpose of the experiment or details of the protocol to the participants.
These sessions were held in a meeting room of the bank in which we reconstituted
an experimental laboratory thanks to our Regate Mobile Lab. In particular, mobile
15Indices are grouped by ﬁve (0-5, 6-10, . . . ) with a last larger category (45 and more). Ranks
are grouped by two (1-2, 3-4, . . . ).
16Crédit Suissse is a Swiss bank and a leading global ﬁnancial services company, oﬀering clients
ﬁnancial advice in all aspects of private banking, investment banking, and asset management. The
headquarters are located in Zurich. It employs 49,900 employees in 405 oﬃces in 55 countries.
17It has not been possible to balance the proportions of males and females, but these proportions
were similar in both generations (there were 68 % of males among juniors and 70 % among seniors).
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fences separated each seat from the next such that the conﬁdentiality of decision
was guaranteed, and computers were connected through our own independent wiﬁ
network (see Appendix 2). The experiment was computerized using the REGATE
program (Zeiliger, 2000). Four sessions were run in two days to avoid the dissemi-
nation of information about the content of the experiment. The same experimenters
ran all of the sessions. Each session consisted of 20 participants (10 juniors and 10
seniors).
Upon arrival, participants drew a tag from a bag assigning them to a speciﬁc com-
puter. At the beginning of the session, the experimentalist reminded all the par-
ticipants that decisions were anonymous, that no individual data would be com-
municated to the company, and that the earnings gained during the session were
funded by the University research funds. Then, participants had to sign a consent
form in which they conﬁrmed their voluntary participation and acknowledged being
informed that they could quit at any time without any consequence for themselves.
Next, the instructions for the elicitation of risk aversion and attitudes towards ambi-
guity (Part 1) were distributed and read aloud (see Appendix 1). After all questions
were answered in private, participants made their two sets of 20 decisions.
Then, they received a new set of instructions for the market entry game (Part 2).
These instructions detailed the two sequences of play corresponding to the Random
treatment and to the Performance treatment, without mentioning the order of each
sequence. The participants then entered their year of birth on their computer; they
also ﬁlled out a questionnaire to check their understanding of the instructions and
questions were answered privately. When the game started, individuals were in-
formed on the treatment played in the ﬁrst sequence of play. At the beginning of
each period, individuals were matched in a group of 10 participants and they were
informed on the composition of their group by generation (number of juniors and
seniors). Then, they received information on the capacity of the market. Next, they
entered their prediction regarding the number of entrants among their co-participants
and they decided to enter the market or to stay out. Once all group members have
made their decision, a feedback indicated the total number of entrants in the period
but participants were not informed on their rank or their payoﬀ. After each period,
participants were rematched in a new group of 10 individuals and the market capac-
ity was changed18. After the ﬁrst nine periods have been completed, participants
are informed that the other treatment is implemented in the new sequence of nine
periods.
18Since this part comprises of 18 periods, it is impossible to observe for each participant his
decisions in each market capacity with each group composition in each sequence. Therefore, while
all participants are observed in groups with 5 juniors and 5 seniors and in groups with 10 juniors
or 10 seniors, half of the subjects are observed in groups with 3 juniors and 7 seniors and the other
half are observed in groups with 7 juniors and 3 seniors in each market capacity.
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At the end of the previous game, we distributed the instructions for the quiz (Part 3),
explaining the calculation of payoﬀs in this part, the deﬁnition of the distance index
and how this index serves for determining the individual's rank in the performance
treatment in Part 2. We checked for whether people understood the game. We
imposed no time constraint to answer the questions. Once all participants took the
quiz, they received another set of instructions and they entered their ﬁve predictions
regarding their absolute and relative performance and that of each generation (Part
4). Next, after receiving new instructions, they decided whether they were willing
to receive information on their performance and their rank in the quiz and if they
accepted the dissemination of information to others (Part 5). Once all participants
have made their decisions, a table was displayed on all the participants' screens
during 30 seconds indicating, for each individual who accepted its dissemination,
information on his generation, his number of entry decisions in the Performance
treatment in Part 2 and his rank in the quiz among the 20 participants of the
session. Last, participants received a feedback on their payoﬀs in each paid part
before answering a post-experimental questionnaire19. They were also informed on
their distance index and on their rank in the quiz if in Part 5 they chose to be
informed.
Each session lasted between 110 and 120 minutes, all included. Since we were not
allowed to manipulate cash in the ﬁrm, participants received their earnings by mail
at their personal address. On average, they earned 45.08 CHF (about $46.40). The
show-up fee amounted to 15 CHF20.
2.2. Results
We begin this subsection by analysing the results of a test of attitudes towards risk
and ambiguity. Then, we present the fundamental ﬁndings of the market entry game.
We study the juniors and seniors' attitudes towards competition and try to verify a
few hypotheses that could support our observations.
19Indeed, participants did not receive any information on their payoﬀs before the end of the
session. At the end of the session, the computer program selected one decision in each of the two
sets of decisions in Part 1 and a second draw was made if for the selected decisions the individual
had decided to extract a ball from the urn. These payoﬀs were added to the payoﬀs from the
following parts.
20Total payoﬀs are even higher if one accounts for the fact that all the participants were given a
half-day leave to participate (including traveling time).
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2.2.1. Attitudes towards risk and ambiguity
The core of our experiment is the market entry game. It is designed in a way
that participants must make a decision in a situation implying risk and uncertainty.
Thus, the potentially diﬀerent behaviour of juniors and seniors in the market entry
game could be theoretically explained by the intergenerational diﬀerences in risk or
ambiguity aversion.
The results of a test of attitudes towards risk and ambiguity show that, in contrast
to the stereotype that older persons tend to be more risk-averse than the young,
the senior participants of our experiment are even slightly more risk-loving than
juniors. On average, they switch from the lottery to the certain payoﬀ for certain
payoﬀ higher than 300 ECU, whereas juniors switch at the lower amount of 275 ECU.
Interestingly, most of participants in both generations, i.e. 70 % of juniors and 75
% of seniors, can be qualiﬁed as risk-loving. The risk-averse persons are much less
numerous, they constitute respectively 15 % of juniors and 20 % of seniors. We
suppose that this high share of risk-lovers is due to the common job speciﬁcs of our
participants as bank employees, more exactly as client advisors. Actually, in this
domain, workers are often confronted with risk evaluation.
Figure 11: Risk attitudes by generation
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At the same time, both generations are ambiguity averse as they both switch from
the ambiguous lottery to the certain payoﬀ at 250 ECU which is a lower switching
point than in the risky lottery. 62.5 % of juniors and 55 % of seniors are deﬁnitely
ambiguity-averse, and only 17.5 % of juniors and 12.5 % of seniors can be called
ambiguity-loving.
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Figure 12: Ambiguity attitudes by generation
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The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of distributions across the two gener-
ations do not identify any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between juniors and seniors in their
attitudes towards risk and ambiguity21. Consequently, diﬀerent level of risk-aversion
or ambiguity-aversion between generations cannot be used as an argument explain-
ing diﬀerent behaviour of juniors and seniors in the following market entry game
implying high degree of uncertainty.
The market entry game
2.2.2. Propensity to enter the competition
The decision to enter a market is taken individually by each participant. It is based
on information provided at the beginning of each period and on player's expectations.
Participants are informed about the number of entrants who can make proﬁts on the
market (respectively 2, 4 or 6) and about age composition of their group22. In
order to make an optimal decision and given the limited market capacity, players
need to anticipate the number of other entrants on the market. Furthermore, facing
competition from other players, they must judge their own chance to be among those
entrants who will make proﬁts. We remind that the rank of the participant among the
entrants is assigned a) randomly by the computer program (Random treatment) or b)
according to the participant's performance in a quiz in general economic knowledge
that is administered later on in the session (Performance treatment). Thus, in the
21Similarly, contrary to stereotypes, we ﬁnd no diﬀerences in attitudes towards risk and ambiguity
between men and women within both generations. This result is consistent with e.g. Schubert et al.
(1999).
22Each group is composed of 10 players. The ﬁve possible group compositions are the following:
10 juniors, 7 juniors and 3 seniors, 5 juniors and 5 seniors, 3 juniors and 7 seniors, 10 seniors.
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latter case, the participants are required to anticipate their relative ability compared
to those of other players.
Table 23 lists the proportion of players within each generation who decided to enter
the market given its capacity and the age composition of potential entrants.
Table 23: Volume of entrants (in %) by market capacity, group composition and type
of treatment (Random / Performance)
Seniors
 Random Performance 
 obs total C=2 C=4 C=6 obs total C=2 C=4 C=6 
10 seniors 
3 jun 7 sen 
5 jun 5 sen 
7 jun 3 sen 
120
84
120
36
64.0
67.8
69.2
77.7
45.0
57.1
37.5
50.0
62.5
67.8
82.5
83.3
85.0
78.6
87.5
100.0
120
84
120
36
68.3
72.6
70.0
77.7
45.0
64.3
45.0
50.0
70.0
64.3
82.5
91.6
90.0
89.3
82.5
91.6
average 360 68.0 45.8 72.5 85.8 360 71.0 50.0 75.0 87.0 
Juniors
 Random Performance 
 obs total C=2 C=4 C=6 obs total C=2 C=4 C=6 
3 jun 7 sen 
5 jun 5 sen 
7 jun 3 sen 
10 juniors 
36
120
84
120
69.4
65.0
59.5
65.0
66.6
45.0
39.3
52.5
50.0
70.0
57.1
62.5
91.6
80.0
82.1
80.0
36
120
84
120
61.1
58.3
60.7
62.5
50.0
40.0
42.8
45.0
58.3
62.5
60.7
60.0
75.0
72.5
78.6
82.5
average 360 64.0 48.3 62.5 81.7 360 61.0 43.3 60.8 77.5 
The ﬁrst impression is that both generations enter excessively in competition. As
could be expected, the number of entrants increases with market capacity. However,
in all three cases (C = 2, 4 or 6) there are too many entries compared to proﬁts that
could be realised on the market (see Figure 13).
Figure 13: Entrants by market capacity (in %)
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In the Random treatment, when a chance determines distribution of proﬁts among
the entrants, we ﬁnd no evident diﬀerence in the entry rate between juniors (64 %
on average ) and seniors (68 % on average). However, in the sequence Performance,
seniors enter the market signiﬁcantly more (71 %) than juniors (61 %). The non-
parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test demonstrates that this diﬀerence is particularly
strong when seniors are in competition with many juniors (see Figure 14).
Figure 14: Entrants by group age composition (in %)
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In the equilibrium composition, where each generation accounts for a half of the
players, 70 % of seniors enter the market compared to 58.3 % of juniors. When
seniors reach the majority, 77.7 % of them decide to compete against 60.7 % of young
players. Not signiﬁcant variations in the entry rate of juniors between diﬀerent group
compositions shows that they are less sensible to the group age-composition eﬀect.
This analysis and descriptive statistics provide our ﬁrst ﬁnding which is the following:
Result 1: When proﬁt depends on the relative performance, seniors enter the market
signiﬁcantly more often than juniors; in particular, when they are in competition
against many juniors.
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This result suggests that information about generation of other group members might
play an important role in decision making. Seniors clearly choose to compete more,
especially when they are matched with many juniors. One explanation could be
that seniors are more risk-loving. Though, we remember that the tests of attitudes
towards risk and ambiguity have not revealed any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
both generations. Moreover, engaging or not in competition is not the same as being
more or less risk averse. Many additional factors might have an inﬂuence on the
decision to compete.
We consider a number of possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, seniors
could underestimate the spirit of competition of young people. Consequently, seniors
might think that juniors, intimidated by the presence of older and life-experienced
adversaries, will not enter the market in mass. Second, seniors could be simply
overconﬁdent about their performance and ranking in a quiz. While predicting com-
petition accurately, they might have higher expectations about their relative ability
compared to the young. Finally, a purely psychological explanation is possible as
well. Facing juniors, seniors might feel obliged to ﬁght against the stereotype and
prove that they are not more risk-averse or less prone to engage in competitive tasks
than younger generation. Discussing this image concern we will refer to the phe-
nomenon of social signalling by Burks et al. (2011).
2.2.3. Beliefs about willingness of others to enter the competition
Seniors could underestimate the willingness of young generation to enter the com-
petition, especially against more experienced colleagues. An excessive entry due
to underforecasting the number of other competitors is referred to in the literature
as the blind spots hypothesis (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). In order to test this
hypothesis, also called the reference group neglect, we analyse the prediction of
number of entrants and the proﬁt expectations of all the participants. It turns out
that 84 % of juniors and 69 % of seniors anticipate correctly that the number of en-
trants will be higher than market capacity. Nevertheless, an excessive market entry
itself is not an obstacle for most of the players to enter the market. 70 % of seniors
and 62 % of juniors decide to enter anyway. Moreover, a closer look at the data
reveals that predicting the number of entrants is, in fact, not very accurate. Even if
players expect excessive entry, 50 % of seniors compared to 39 % of juniors still tend
to underestimate the actual number of market entrants. It is particularly striking in
Performance part for the group composition of 3 seniors and 7 juniors. In this case
58 % of seniors compared to 36 % of juniors expect the smaller number of entrants
than actually observed. Hence, seniors seem to neglect the level of competition of
other participants, in particular of junior players.
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The predicted number of entrants has a direct inﬂuence on the expected average
proﬁt. It is a function of forecasted number of entrants and given market capacity.
Thus, the fewer entrants one expects, the higher average proﬁt one assumes. Since
the maximal total proﬁt on the market amounts to 3000 ECU (for detailed payoﬀ
matrix please refer to Table 22), the expected proﬁt per entrant can be expressed as:
E (Π) =
3000− 500 (predicted nb of entrants−market capacity)
predicted nb of entrants
(43)
If one forecasts fewer entrants than market capacity, then the expected average proﬁt
is simply a sum of positive proﬁts of all potential entrants divided by predicted
number of entrants.
The analysis of expected proﬁt per entrant shows that, in the Random treatment,
seniors always await signiﬁcantly higher gains than juniors, regardless of the group
composition. In the heterogeneous groups, in the sequence Performance, we observe
that as number of juniors increases, the higher proﬁt seniors expect. The discrepancy
in anticipated gain between representatives of both generations reaches its maximum
for the team of 3 seniors and 7 juniors. Then, the average proﬁt expected by junior
entrants is only 244 ECU compared to 468 ECU foreseen by senior entrants. Thus,
we can formulate our second result:
Result 2: Seniors expect signiﬁcantly higher average proﬁt than juniors, especially
in Performance treatment, when they must compete against many juniors. It is
mainly due to 1) neglecting actual juniors' competitiveness and 2) underestimating
the number of entrants. It explains why seniors enter more the market.
2.2.4. Overconﬁdence hypothesis
The results obtained so far seem to conﬁrm the blind spots hypothesis. However,
the overconﬁdence of players could also have an impact on the decision making.
Observed intergenerational diﬀerences in the market entry are signiﬁcant uniquely
in the sequence Performance, when proﬁt depends on the relative performance in
a quiz in general economic knowledge. Moreover, since the quiz took place once
the market entry game had been terminated, all the decisions to enter the market
in this sequence had to be based on anticipations of future results and a personal
ranking. We remember that seniors tend to enter more in competition in particular
when they are matched with many juniors. Is it then possible that seniors are simply
overconﬁdent about their result in a quiz and their ranking vis-à-vis juniors?
In order to answer this question, we compare the achieved result with the expected
one. First, we measure the average diﬀerence between the correct answers and the
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answers provided by the players. We call this measure a distance index. The
analysis of the quiz results shows that performance of both generations in a quiz
was equally good. The average distance index was 16.2 for juniors and 15.7 for
seniors. Consequently, we observe also no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the ranking of
participants' performance.
Once the quiz completed, all the participants have been asked to predict their results.
We observe that both generations are convinced that seniors performed better. Ju-
niors predict larger distance index, i.e. higher inaccuracy for their own generation.
Using another indicator, a rank category in the group of 20 (mix of juniors and se-
niors) compared to a rank in the group of 10 (age homogenous), reveals that seniors
believe to be better ranked than juniors. In this way, juniors and seniors expect that
older players are relatively more able. This conviction seems to justify why in the
Performance part seniors enter the market signiﬁcantly more than juniors. Thus,
our next result is as follows:
Result 3: Both generations are convinced that seniors performed better in a quiz.
Seniors might assume that juniors will recognize this superiority and will not be
willing to compete against them in the game.
2.2.5. Image concern
Curiously, in our experiment, both generations tend to underestimate their individual
abilities. When reporting their post-quiz beliefs about the obtained results, 80 %
of seniors and 57 % of juniors declared their distance index larger than the actual
one. Prediction of the rank in their own generation reveals that only 32 % of seniors
and 45 % of juniors consider themselves as better than average. Thus, apparently,
seniors have lower self-perception. Compared to juniors, they are also more pessimist
in the judgment of abilities of both generations (predictions of juniors' and seniors'
average distance index). As suggested by Burks et al. (2010), seniors could behave
as overconﬁdent in order to send a positive signal on their value to others. Therefore,
we formulate the following result:
Result 4: Seniors have lower self-perception. By entering the competition, they might
want to improve their image and ﬁght the stereotype as risk-averse and less likely to
get involved in competitive tasks. The important presence of juniors in the group
might create additional pressure on seniors to prove their competences.
132
2.2.6. Probit model
Finally, in Table 24, we analyse the determinants of players' decision to enter the
market using a Probit model with clustering of subjects and robust standard errors.
Since each of 80 participants takes a decision through 18 periods, we dispose of the
panel database of 1440 observations in total. We estimate the model on pooled data
from all the sessions. We run separate regressions for Random and Performance
treatments to see if diﬀerent factors play a role in these two cases. Similarly, for each
treatment, we run the same regressions on the sub-samples of juniors and seniors.
The dependent variable is the decision to enter or not to enter the market. The
explanatory variables include individual characteristics i.e. participant's age and
gender, whether one is a manager, risk-loving or ambiguity averse and whether one
expects too many other entrants. Moreover, we suppose that if players possess strong
beliefs about lower competitiveness or lower conﬁdence of the opposite generation,
it may have a positive impact on their own decision to enter the market. Therefore,
we include dummy variables corresponding to diﬀerent group compositions joining
together juniors and seniors (3 juniors + 7 seniors, 5 juniors + 5 seniors, 7 juniors
+ 3 seniors) or including only juniors (10J) or only seniors (10S). We control also
for the market capacity, period and the order of the sessions (whether Random
or Performance treatment has been run ﬁrst). In the regression concerning only
Performance treatment, we include in addition indices for over- or underestimation
of one's own performance as explicatory variables.
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Table 24: Probit model: the average marginal eﬀects
Random
All Juniors Seniors 
Male
Seniors
Risk-loving
Ambiguity aversion  
Market capacity  
Excessive entry (prediction)
Managers
Homog (5J5S, 10J or 10S)   
Group3S7J
Group3J7S
Order
Period
0.016       (0.062)
0.166*** (0.056)
0.014*     (0.008)
-0.016*** (0.006)
0.095*** (0.011)
0.027**   (0.012)
-0.167*** (0.061)
-0.007       (0.039)
-0.009       (0.048)
0.016       (0.042)
0.058       (0.072)
-0.012**   (0.006)
0.020       (0.071) 
0.052*** (0.012) 
-0.010       (0.009) 
0.081*** (0.016) 
0.006       (0.022) 
-0.202*** (0.060) 
0.004       (0.052) 
-0.043       (0.057) 
0.039       (0.082) 
-0.121       (0.094) 
-0.005       (0.006) 
-0.022       (0.091)
-0.004       (0.007)
-0.014**   (0.007)
0.106*** (0.015)
0.031**   (0.012)
-0.208**   (0.095)
-0.013       (0.058)
0.076       (0.075)
0.009       (0.049)
0.191*     (0.101)
-0.017*     (0.009)
Performance
All Juniors Seniors 
Male
Seniors
Risk-loving
Ambiguity aversion 
Market capacity 
Excessive entry (prediction) 
Managers
Homog (5J5S, 10J or 10S)  
Group3S7J
Group3J7S
Order
Period
Self-ranking within one’s 
own generation (prediction)
0.005       (0.065)
0.235*** (0.118)
0.006       (0.007)
-0.015**   (0.007)
0.090*** (0.012)
0.028**   (0.012)
-0.101       (0.091)
0.021       (0.041)
0.067       (0.037)
0.007       (0.046)
-0.070       (0.073)
-0.009*     (0.005)
-0.113*** (0.025) 
0.061       (0.093) 
0.027**   (0.012)
-0.002       (0.011)
0.082*** (0.019)
0.002       (0.020)
-0.067       (0.089)
0.054       (0.054)
0.059       (0.047)
-0.034       (0.070)
-0.098       (0.110)
-0.007       (0.006) 
-0.139*** (0.052) 
-0.059       (0.063)
-0.006       (0.008)
-0.020*** (0.004)
0.096*** (0.015)
0.033*** (0.011)
-0.354*** (0.115)
0.008       (0.060)
 0.103*     (0.062)
0.048       (0.047)
-0.040       (0.095)
-0.010       (0.009)
-0.078*** (0.030) 
Our ﬁrst fundamental ﬁnding is that being a junior or being a senior has indeed
a crucial inﬂuence on the decision to enter the market. The regressions results
show that the age of participant, all other things being equal, is signiﬁcant and
has a strong eﬀect: 16.6 % in the sequence Random and 23.5 % in the sequence
Performance. Consequently, seniors are much more likely to enter the market than
juniors. Interestingly, we observe that while risk aversion discourages market entry
among the juniors, it is rather ambiguity aversion that plays a role for the seniors.
Thus, while young players base their decision on the individual perception of risk,
seniors seem to take into account rather environmental uncertainty. In fact, factors
such as behaviour of other players decide in large extent about the ambiguity of the
situation. On the other hand, we ﬁnd no evidence of the gender eﬀect. It is rather
the position in a company's hierarchy that reveals diﬀerences in decision making.
Managers in both generations turn out to be more prudent and enter more seldom in
competition. Consequently, as data analysis has proved, they obtain higher proﬁts.
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In Performance treatment, the fact of being a manager plays an important role only
among the seniors.
An interesting result is that prediction of excessive entry appears positively correlated
with the entry decision of senior players. It seems to conﬁrm our hypothesis of
image concern according to which seniors, expecting many other players to enter the
competition, enter as well in order to signal that they are equally ready to compete.
Moreover, in the regression concerning Performance treatment, we include additional
variable  an expected ranking within one's generation in a quiz in general economic
knowledge. Placing oneself as less good in one's own generation is evidently neg-
atively correlated with market entry. However, controlling for other variables that
could indicate players' overconﬁdence about one's absolute or relative performance
turned out not to be signiﬁcant. Actually, since participants were asked to estimate
their performance after that the game and the quiz have been ﬁnished, this ex-post
evaluation could not have any impact on their market entry decision. While entering
the market, people based their decision rather on their expected future performance
in a quiz. It is possible that the expected performance would be higher than the
post-quiz evaluation. Unfortunately, we do not have the information about one's
performance expectations at the beginning of the game. There was a risk that it
would inﬂuence players' decisions about market entry.
Finally, we observe that both generations behave as rational agents by entering more
eagerly when the market capacity is higher. It is not surprising as then there is
statistically more chance to make positive proﬁts. At the same time, we notice a
slight learning eﬀect. As the game progresses, participants correct their behaviour
and enter the market less and less.
In general, we do not observe much diﬀerence between both treatments concerning
the list of factors inﬂuencing market entry decision. The interesting exception is
the variable indicating group composition of 3 seniors and 7 juniors which becomes
signiﬁcant for senior participants in the sequence Performance. It means that when
the ranking of participants depends on relative ability rather than on pure chance,
players pay attention to the age composition of their competitors in the market
entry. Consequently, seniors enter the market more when they are grouped with
many young people.
2.2.7. Decisions eﬃciency and group composition
This assertive comportment of seniors is associated to higher proﬁt expectations.
The simple comparison of expected and realised proﬁt per entrant shows that 26 %
of juniors and only 17 % of seniors made correct predictions. One third of juniors (34
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%) and almost half of seniors (47 %) anticipated excessive proﬁts. 40 % of juniors
and 36 % of seniors thought than proﬁt would be lower.
In order to compare players' behaviour and game strategy in terms of eﬃciency,
we compare the individual gains obtained by juniors and seniors as a result of the
market entry decisions. In general, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in individual
proﬁts, neither in Random, nor in Performance treatment.
However, when we analyse the proﬁts obtained by each generation in diﬀerent group
compositions, we notice that the age mix of other competitors inﬂuences the players'
game strategy and thus their proﬁts. Tables 25 and 26 show, respectively, the aver-
age proﬁt per participant and the average proﬁt per entrant for diﬀerent match of
juniors and seniors. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test reveals the signiﬁcant gain diﬀer-
ences between generations only for the sequence Performance. When seniors are in
majority, they obtain much higher proﬁts than juniors who make losses on average.
However, it turns out that when seniors are matched with many juniors, their com-
mon strategy to enter the market does not bring the expected result. In this group
composition, seniors do not make higher proﬁts than juniors. On the other hand,
the heterogeneous group composition that maximises individual gains of juniors and
seniors is the one with juniors and seniors in equal proportions. In this case, on aver-
age, junior participant (entrant) obtains 132 ECU (226 ECU) and senior participant
(entrant) gains 227 ECU (324 ECU). This leads to the next important result:
Result 5: The situation of competition between juniors and seniors is eﬃciency-
enhancing, i.e. the proﬁts of both generations are maximised, when a pool of com-
petitors is balanced in terms of generation.
Table 25: Average realised proﬁt per participant
Random Performance
obs total Juniors Seniors obs total Juniors Seniors
10 seniors 
3 jun 7 sen 
5 jun 5 sen 
7 jun 3 sen 
10 juniors
120
120
240
120
120
179
158
165
175
175
-
161
207
200
175
179
157
122
117
-
120
120
240
120
120
158
154
179
171
187
-
-67
132
220
187
158
249
227
55
-
average 720 169 190 149 720 171 151 192
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Table 26: Average realised proﬁt per entrant
Random Performance
obs total Juniors Seniors obs total Juniors Seniors
10 seniors 
3 jun 7 sen 
5 jun 5 sen 
7 jun 3 sen 
10 juniors
77
82
161
78
78
279
232
245
269
269
-
232
318
336
269
279
232
177
150
-
82
83
154
79
75
232
223
279
259
300
-
-109
226
363
300
232
343
324
71
-
average 476 256 296 219 473 261 249 271
2.3. Conclusions
In the perspective of ageing, the cooperation and competition between diﬀerent gen-
erations of workers is a major challenge for the enterprises. In this context, the
issue of managing the intergenerational teams is particularly important (Hamilton,
Nickerson and Owan, 2001; 2004). In this section we have studied risk attitudes,
self-conﬁdence and propensity to enter the competition within the age-heterogeneous
workforce. In particular, we looked at how group age composition has an impact on
the individual decision to enter the competition. As far as we know, these questions
have not yet been studied in the literature. In this purpose we used a market entry
game that is largely inspired by Camerer and Lovallo (1999) and which we adjusted
to study the diﬀerences between generations.
Although no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in attitudes towards risk and ambiguity have been
found between both generations, the market entry game reveals interesting discrep-
ancies between juniors and seniors with regard to their expectations and strategic
behaviour. We ﬁnd that information on age of others players has an important
impact on decision to enter the competition. Although both generations predict ex-
cessive entry, seniors enter the market signiﬁcantly more often. Moreover, they are
more willing to enter the competition when they are matched with many juniors.
We propose several explanations for this phenomenon. First of all, seniors tend to
underestimate actual juniors' willingness to compete by strongly underestimating the
number of entrants when matched with many juniors. Older players seem also very
conﬁdent about their relative performance in a quiz on general economic knowledge.
Indeed, both generations are convinced that seniors got better results in the quiz than
juniors. Consequently, seniors might enter more the market, hoping that juniors will
recognize this superiority and will not be willing to compete against them in the
game. Finally, the high propensity to enter the competition by seniors could be
motivated by the willingness to ﬁght against the stereotype of their generation as
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shy and less productive workers. Due to this negative image, seniors were largely
discriminated on the labour market over last thirty years. In our experiment, seniors
enter the competition in excess as if they wanted to prove that they are not more
risk-averse or less prone to engage in competitive tasks than younger generation.
However, the excessive entry of seniors turns out to be ineﬃcient i.e. it brings them
lower proﬁts than they expected. We ﬁnd that both generations maximise their
individual proﬁts when the group composition is balanced in terms of age. Hence,
we can conclude that in the situation of competition, equilibrium between both
generations helps in better calibration.
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2.4. Appendix 1: Instructions
We thank you for participating in this experiment on decision-making. Throughout the session, your earnings are 
expressed in ECU (Experimental Currency Units) with the following conversion rate: 
100 ECU = 2 CHF 
This session consists of several parts. We have distributed the instructions for the first part; you will receive the 
instructions for the next parts once the first part will be completed. Please read these instructions carefully.  
At the end of the session, your payoffs in ECU from the different parts will be added up and converted into 
Swiss Francs.  You will also receive a show-up fee of 15 CHF. You will be paid individually and in private. 
Throughout the session, it is strictly forbidden to communicate with the other participants. 
Part 1  
Part 1 consists in two sub-parts.  
o Description of the 1
st
 sub-part 
Imagine an urn that contains 10 balls, 5 yellow balls and 5 blue balls.
You must make 20 successive choices between extracting a ball from this urn with replacement (for each 
decision, there are always the same 10 balls in the urn) or earning a certain amount of money.   
If you extract a yellow ball from the urn, you earn 500 ECU; if you extract a blue ball from the urn, your 
earn 0 ECU.
We propose you 20 certain amounts possible, from 25 ECU to 500 ECU; the certain amount increases by 25 
ECU at each new decision.  
You must indicate on your computer screen for each decision if you prefer receiving the certain amount or 
extracting a ball from the urn. 
The following Table will appear on your screen:  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
O I choose the certain amount of 25 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 50 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 75 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 100 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 125 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 150 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 175 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 200 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 225 ECU  
O I choose the certain amount of 250 ECU  
O I choose the certain amount of 275 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 300 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 325 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 350 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 375 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 400 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 425 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 450 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 475 ECU 
O I choose the certain amount of 500 ECU 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
O I choose to extract a ball 
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o Description of the 2
nd
 sub-part 
This sub-part is similar to the previous one, except that we use a new urn and you do not know its composition.  
You must again make 20 decisions between receiving a certain amount or extracting a ball from the new 
urn. The certain amounts are the same as in the previous sub-part. The new urn also contains 10 balls, yellow 
balls and blue balls. 
However in contrast with the previous sub-part, you do not know the number of yellow balls and blue 
balls in the urn.
How are payoffs determined in this part? 
At the end of the session, the computer program will randomly draw one of your 20 decisions in the first sub-
part and one of your 20 decisions in the second sub-part. Each decision has the same chance to be selected. You 
should therefore give the same attention to each decision. 
For each randomly selected decision: 
 If you have chosen the certain amount, we will add this amount to your other earnings in the 
experiment; 
 If you have chosen the random draw, the computer program will extract one ball. If it is yellow, 500 
ECU will be added to your other payoffs; if it is blue, you will earn 0 ECU.  
----- 
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand and do not speak aloud. We will 
answer your questions in private.  
Part 2 (distributed after Part 1 was completed)
You receive an initial endowment of 500 ECU in this part.  
This part consists of 18 periods during which you must decide to enter or not a market.  
These 18 periods are grouped in two sequences of 9 periods each.  
 The “random draw” sequence,  
 The “performance” sequence.  
Your computer screen will indicate if you start with the Random sequence or the Performance sequence.  The 
two sequences will succeed automatically.  You are informed on your screen of the current sequence. 
1. Description of the Random sequence 
o Description of each period 
1. At the beginning of each of the 9 periods of this sequence, you are grouped with 9 other participants. You do 
not receive any information about these participants except for their generation (« junior » ou « senior »). 
2. Then, each group member is informed on the value of a number “C”.  Imagine that C is the market capacity, 
i.e. the number of participants who can make profits on this market. C can take values 2, 4 or 6.  For example, if 
C = 4, then 4 participants who decided to enter the market will be able to make benefits. The other participants 
who decided to enter will lose 500 ECU.  
3. Next, we will ask you to estimate the number of the other group members who will enter the market (between 
0 and 9, you excluded).  
140
4. Then, you have to decide if you enter or not the market.  
* If you decide not to enter, you do not earn anything and you do not lose anything either.  
* If you enter, your payoff depends on the market capacity and your rank among the participants from 
your group who have decided to enter (the “entrants”).  We explain below how your rank is assigned 
to you. 
The Table that has been distributed indicates for each market capacity the payoffs of the entrants (in ECU) 
according to their rank. Please look at this Table. 
For example, suppose the market capacity is 2 (C=2) and you have decided to enter. If you have the first rank 
among the entrants, you earn 1900 ECU. If you have the second rank among the entrants, you earn 1100 ECU. 
If you have the third rank and beyond, you lose 500 ECU. 
5. At the end of each period, you are informed on the number of other members of your group who have decided 
to enter the market during this period (between 0 and 9). 
oDetermination of ranks 
In the Random sequence, the ranks of the entrants are randomly determined by the computer program.  For 
example, if there are 5 individuals who decide to enter the market in a period, the program will assign randomly 
a rank between 1 and 5 to these entrants. If the market capacity is 4 (C=4) and your randomly determined rank is 
5, then you make a loss.  
You do not know your rank when making your entry decision.  
o What does change from one period to the other in this sequence? 
 the composition of your group of 10 participants, 
 the market capacity, C (i.e. the number of entrants who can make on the market), 
 the payoffs associated with each rank as indicated in the Table we have distributed. We invite you to 
consult this Table throughout the game, 
 your rank if you decide to enter the market. 
2. Description of the « performance » sequence 
This sequence consists also of nine periods. Each period is similar to the Random sequence except for one thing: 
the ranks of the entrants do not depend of a random draw any more.
The ranks of the entrants depend on their relative performance in a quiz of general economic knowledge 
that will be presented to you in Part 3. 
For a given period, the computer program will compare at the end of the session the performance in the quiz of 
each entrant on the market. The entrant who will have given on average the answers the closest to the correct 
answers will get the first rank. The entrant who will have given on average the worst answers to the quiz will get 
the last rank among the entrants. In case of ties, ranks are assigned randomly among the ex-aequo entrants. 
In the quiz, the questions are similar to the following ones: 
* What is the current rank of Swirtzerland in the world in terms of Gross Domestic Product?  
* which percentage of its GDP does the deficit of Greece represent in 2009? 
Since the quiz is administered in the next part, you do not know your rank when you decide to enter the market 
or not. You can just have a belief on your rank.  
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3. Determination of payoffs in this part  
At the end of the session, the computer program will select randomly one period out of 18. Each period has the 
same chance to be selected for payment.  It is therefore important to give the same attention to each of your 18 
decisions.
 For this period, the program calculates the number of participants who decided to enter the market in your 
group of 10 participants. If your prediction of the number of entrants in this period is exact, you earn 100 
ECU.
 If you decided to enter, the program assigns you a rank and compares your rank to the rank of the other 
entrants in your group.  If your rank is lower or equal to the capacity of the market, C, you make a benefit 
and you earn the amount corresponding to your rank for this capacity. If your rank is higher than the market 
capacity you lose 500 ECU. 
 If you decided not to enter, you do not earn and you do not lose anything.  
 Your total payoff in this part is therefore equal to: 
           500 ECU (your initial endowment)  
+ 100 ECU if your prediction of the number of entrants in the selected period is exact 
+ the ECU earned /or/ the ECU lost due your decision to enter the market in the selected period. 
At the end of the session, you are informed on your payoffs. If you entered the market, we also inform you about 
your rank among the entrants.  
You are not informed on whether, in this period, your rank depended on a random draw or on your relative 
performance in the quiz. 
--- 
We invite you to read again these instructions and to answer the comprehension questionnaire that has been 
distributed. If you have any question, please raise your hand and we will answer your questions privately.  
 ---  
Table for the determination of payoffs in Part 2 (in ECU) 
Rank among the 
entrants 
Market capacity, C 
C = 2 C = 4 C = 6 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 
1,900 
1,100 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
1,400 
900 
500 
200 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
900 
700 
500 
400 
300 
200 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
- 500 
Note: The market capacity indicates the number of participants in the group of 10 who can make profits if 
entering the market. C = 2 indicates that 2 entrants can make profits; C = 4 indicates that 4 entrants can make 
profits; C = 6 indicates that 6 entrants can make profits.  
Please refer to this Table during the 18 periods of this part.  
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Let’s take the previous example where the correct answer is 19.  
a) If your answer is 12, then the difference in absolute value between the correct answer and your answer 
is equal to: |19-12| = 7. 
b) If your answer is 30, then the difference is: |19-30| = 11. 
The distance index is the mean value of these differences in the four questions.  
Information
At the end of the session,  
 You are informed on your total payoff in this part; 
 You are informed of your distance index only if you ask to know it in a further part. 
-------- 
If you have any question, please raise your hands and we will answer your questions in private.  
-------- 
Part 4 
Please indicate, among the proposed categories, your expectations about: 
 your distance index (i.e. the mean difference in absolute value between the correct answers and your answers 
to the four questions in the previous part) 
 the average distance index of the 10 juniors in the session 
 the average distance index of the 10 seniors in the session 
 your performance rank in the quiz among the 10 participants of your generation (i.e. juniors or seniors) given 
by the comparison between the distance indices 
 your performance rank in the quiz among the 20 participants in the session.  
Each correct prediction pays you 50 ECU.   
At the end of the session, you will be only informed of your total payoff in this part.  
-------- 
Part 5  
1) Please indicate on your computer screen if you are willing to know or not to know, at the end of the session, 
your distance index.  
2) Please indicate if you are willing to know or not to know, at the end of the session, your performance rank in 
the quiz among the 20 participants given by the comparison of the distance indices.  
3) Please indicate if you accept or not that we disseminate to the other participants the three following pieces of 
information: 
 the number of times (between 0 and 9) you decided to enter the market in the Performance sequence in Part 2 
(when your rank depended on your relative performance) 
 your performance rank in the quiz among the 20 participants 
 your generation. 
A Table will disseminate anonymously these pieces of information relative to those who have accepted this 
dissemination.  In this Table, you will not be able to see any information concerning you personally. 
---------------
After answering a final questionnaire, you will be informed on your screen of your earnings in each part of this 
session.
Please remain seated until we invite you to leave your cubicle and do not communicate with the other 
participants.  
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2.5. Appendix 2: The experimental laboratory in the com-
pany
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General conclusions
The process of population ageing will aﬀect the size and the composition of the
labour force. While the active population and the share of young workers are shrink-
ing, the average age of the employees is increasing. Due to calling for prolongation of
working life, in the near future enterprises are expected to accommodate the increas-
ing share of senior employees. However, although the supply of older workers will
increase in the coming years, their employment rates will depend on the actual level
of demand. In particular, the situation of older workers on the labour market may be
undermined when aging drives a negative wedge between the workers' productivity
and earnings. The increasing age-earnings pattern, characterised by lower wages for
juniors and higher wages for seniors, is accompanied by serious doubts about the
true productivity proﬁles. Indeed, there is no consensus in theoretical as well as
empirical studies on the actual relationship between earnings, productivity and age.
In addition, while some theories underline the eﬃciency of deferred compensations
contracts according to which seniors are paid above their productivity levels (Lazear
1979; Carmichael, 1983), many empirical works indicate the negative implications
of wage-productivity gap for older workers (Hutchens, 1986; Zwick, 2008; Heywood
et al., 2010).
The research work presented in this thesis aims at estimating the actual proﬁle of
productivity for diﬀerent age groups (chapter 2). The originality of this study is
twofold. First, the estimated econometric model allows the imperfect substitution
between diﬀerent age and skill categories of workers. Up to now, workers belonging
to diﬀerent age groups were always assumed to be perfect substitutes. In order
to evaluate labour productivity, we estimate the production function with a nested
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) speciﬁcation in labour. Second, the labour
force has been diﬀerentiated not only by age (as it is usually done) but also by skills.
It allowed us observing the pattern of productivity for the young, mid-age and older
workers separately within the low-skilled and the high-skilled category.
Among the main ﬁndings, we found that, in contrast to what is usually assumed,
workers of diﬀerent ages are imperfect substitutes in production. Thus, the aging
process will certainly aﬀect relative wages of younger and older workers. It can be
expected that when young workers become scarcer, their relative wage will rise. Con-
sequently, since employment decisions hinge on perceptions of workers' productivity
and the costs of employing them, the changes in relative wages of juniors and seniors
might considerably modify the relative level of attractiveness of diﬀerent age groups
for the employers. However, whether it actually happens, also depends on the labour
market institutions.
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Furthermore, thanks to the decomposition of workforce in our model into two skill
groups, we have found that labour productivity is highly dependent on skill level
of workers. In the low-skilled category, the older workers appear the least produc-
tive, whereas the high-skilled senior employees tend to be the most productive group.
Thus, an important signal for the employers is that if we focus on skill diversity of the
workforce, age becomes less of an issue. This result suggests that the development of
the continuing education from the beginning of the career and especially more en-
couragement and training oﬀered to senior workers could improve their employment
rate.
However, we cannot forget that the ratio of the productivity with relation to earnings
remains the most relevant indicator of workers' value for the employers. When this
ratio diﬀers across age groups, it means that employment of workers belonging to
certain age categories is more proﬁtable than others. In particular, the discrepancy
between productivity and earnings is supposed to be a source of employment diﬃ-
culties for older workers. Our empirical results indicate that the mid-age workers
(except in manufacturing sector) are those who tend to have the highest productiv-
ity/earnings ratio. This fact is important for employers since when facing negative
productivity shocks, ﬁrms have no incentives to retain other workers whose produc-
tivity exceeds their wages.
Though, the real problem is a bit more complex. When discussing about the optimal
earnings and productivity proﬁles, there exist opinions that ideally wages should
correspond to workers' productivity at any age. However, certain theories prove the
rationality of a discrepancy between productivity and earnings along the working
life of an individual. Let us suppose that a person is pursuing a career in the same
enterprise. Then, paying her below the marginal productivity when young and above
it when old (keeping neutrality over the life cycle) can be absolutely reasonable for
the eﬀort incentive reasons (Lazear, 1979). In reality, due to high labour turnover,
at present, many employers are mainly interested in the current productivity of
their workforce. Consequently, even if a young workers are expected at one point
to produce more that they costs, in case of economic downturn, they might be the
ﬁrst to become redundant as they have not yet seen much investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
human capital. Anyway, no one can guarantee how long they will stay in the company
before changing job. Thus, nowadays, in the process of employee-employer matching
on the labour market, there is a certain discrepancy in goals and time perspectives.
The employee cares about the net present value of his wage stream over the lifetime
and the employer cares about the current value of worker's marginal productivity
over the time he spends in the enterprise.
One of the solutions to improve the employment of older workers could be via chang-
ing the managerial attitudes. Paradoxically, as younger workers become relatively
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scarcer in the next few decades, employers may be forced to turn more often to older
workers. It is likely to induce new attitudes and policies (Smeaton and Young, 2007).
The practice has shown that imposing certain behaviour on employers by politicians
does not always bring the expected results. For example, the anti-discriminatory leg-
islation implemented in order to protect young and older workers suﬀering from some
prejudice, brought about a stigmatisation of these age groups on the labour market
(Mercat-Bruns, 2002). Employers started considering these workers as problematic
groups and it did not stay without an inﬂuence on their hiring and employment
decisions. The similar eﬀect had a policy to encourage early retirement. As a result,
workers who reached retirement age started to be sometimes considered automat-
ically useless. The repercussions of these problems could be observed also in the
results of our experimental study (chapter 3). We could observe that senior partic-
ipants demonstrated excessive propensity to enter the competition. The analysis of
the results suggests that this behaviour of seniors could be explained by the envy to
signal the image of them contrasting with the stereotype. Seniors have seemed to
communicate that they are not more risk-averse or less prone to engage in competi-
tive tasks than younger generation.
When searching for the optimal age mix of workers, employers should not forget
that age diversity is a potential source of improved performance. Older workers tend
to have an advantage over younger ones in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital and in the
general human capital that is best learned on the job. Younger workers are more
likely to have the edge in the general human capital that is best acquired through
formal schooling. It is some mixture of young and old that is likely to produce the
most productive work environment (Lazear, 1998). This point let us think about
the possible directions of further research aiming at helping the employers to make
the best decisions while managing, hiring and motivating their ageing workforce.
The natural extensions include the development of the econometric model estimated
in the second chapter which could be further enhanced by exploring the relative
eﬃciency of diﬀerent age compositions of employees and investigating the process of
transfer of knowledge between juniors and seniors using the experimental methods.
Regarding the estimation of productivity and earnings proﬁle by age, the model pre-
sented in chapter 2 could be further improved by using longer time periods. It would
allow the comparison of productivity patterns between diﬀerent cohorts. Further-
more, the information on labour turnover, provided that this type of data is available,
would help to eliminate the potential auto-selection bias according to which seniors
that are still working are those who are more productive. Also, the functional form
could be speciﬁed diﬀerently, taking into account bigger number of thinner age
groups, or allowing more skills categories.
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Two important aspects could be further investigated applying the experimental ap-
proach. First, one could address the question of relative eﬃciency of age-homogenous
and age-heterogeneous groups of workers in a real eﬀort task. We could expect that
thanks to complementary skills, a mix of juniors and seniors would be more eﬃ-
cient. On the other hand, age-homogenous groups might have an advantage due to
stronger group identiﬁcation and lower communication cost. This could be tested
experimentally in the ﬁeld.
Another issue that merits more examination is the transfer of knowledge and know-
how between generations. In a ﬁrm, it is important that seniors coach younger
workers so that their know-how is not lost when they retire. At the same time,
older workers could better keep up with developments by learning new techniques
and other skills from younger workers. An experimental study could explore both
of these streams of knowledge transfer. It could be tested under which conditions
workers are ready to share their know-how with the members of other generations
and whether this willingness is age-speciﬁc. Moreover, it would be interesting to see
whether the decision of knowledge sharing is mainly driven by one's own strategic
considerations or, on the opposite, by other-regarding preferences.
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